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Preface 
Three major subjects are the concern of this study: 
Mysticism, Plotinus, and st. Augustine, any one of which 
would allow elaborate investigation. Here, we have made 
no attempt to deal with any one of these comprehensively, 
but have been concerned only to make a comparative analy-
sis of the mysticisms of Plotinus and Augustine. 
The writer's interest in Plotinus stems from the fact 
that Plotinus is both a first-rate philosopher and a mystic, 
being generally regarded as 11 the father of Western mysticism." 
The significance of Augustine in the history of Western 
Civilization and the fact that he is both a convert from 
neo-Platonism and a mystic make him an apt subject for 
comparison with Plotinus. Both men carried their first 
principles to their logical conclusions so effectively that 
even today one aan detect overtones of their fundamental 
theses re-occuring within the various systems of contemnorary 
philosophy and theology. 
Admitting an appreciation for m1st1cism, the writer finds 
it difficult to aooept a mysticism-for-the-sake-of-mysticism, 
but is rather attracted to mysticisms of the type of Plotinus 
and Augustine's---mysticisms that are clearly metaphysically 
related and also suggest a meaning for ordinary human exper-
iences. 
Preface 
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Explanation 
Some ot tho· footnotes ha.ve been ma.de ra.ther 
lengthy, especially in Chapters II, III, IV, 
und V. Such footnotes have been designed us 
an additional feature and serve the function 
either of 111\listro.ting the literary style and 
manner of argument -<>f Plotinus and Augustine 
or of expanding certain of their ideaso 
If the render happens to be bored with-lengthy 
footnotes, he may restrict himself simply to 
the reading of the text. 
"The fire still burns on the altars o~ Flotinus.11 
Eunapiua 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
The Moaning of Mysticism 
Only a small number of mystics havo boon ~h1losoohcrs 
of mysticism. Still a small0r number have been nhilosophical 
mystics. Tho nurnoso of this thesis is to examine tho thought 
of two philosonhical mystics, Plotinus (A.D. 205-270), the 
chief neo•Platonist, and st. Augustine (A.D. 354.430), Bishop 
of Hippo, Christian Church Father and chief Christian apologist 
of the first five centuries. Although Augustine was himself 
a neo-Platoniat for a number of yoars before his conversion to 
Catholic Christianity, there are so~o basic differences in his 
mysticism and the mysticism of Plotinus. By comparing the 
systems of those two men we may be able to see these differences 
and to note the two fundamental strains of Christian and non-
Christian mysticism evident thoughout the development of 
Western thought. We shall seek to see what differences Humanism# 
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Supernaturalism, Emanati oni si;i, T:rinitarianism, Revela tioriJ etc. 
make in the formation of a mysticism. But, before y;e.,oan ai1e.S.yz.e 
the mysticism of Plotinus and Augustine we must f~.rst make sotie 
atudy or the meaning of mysticism, itself. 
What is mysticism? Is it an art, a process, a science~ 
a technique, a religion, a philosophy, a way of life? How ar-d 
whemdoes it originate? Does it come from the mind or from soma 
real.tty outside ·of the'.:mindfl ·. Is it a product of natural causes 
or is it a Revelation? Is the condition pathological or health~ 
ful? Should it be praised or ridiculed, encouraged or challenged, 
held in reverence or held in scorn? 
The uncertainty that most neonle have concerning the correct 
answers to these questions serves to illustrate the general 
confusion there is in the mind of the average man, and in 
literature, as to the exact meaning of mysticism. As Dean Inge 
aptly remarked, few words have been more loosely used in the 
English language, to the extent that there can never be any 
certainty in the mind of the user that anyone else has the same 
meaning of the term as he does. Anyone who attempts to use the 
term must first define it before he dare take its meaning for· 
granted in his usage. 
Generally, the term signifies an ex~erience looked on as a 
direct communication with the ultimate reality of the universe, 
usually conceived of as God. It is characterized by feelings of 
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extreme bliss, or ecstasy, relaxation or sel.f"-a.bandonment, and 
certa1ntf that there ls direct knowledge of ultimate real1ty,it-
self'. Most of the major cultures have recorded the existence 
of mystics, and often.they have figured prominently in the 
history of religions, for example, Zoroaster, Buddha, Moses, 
Mohammed, Jesus, Paul, Aµgustine, Luther, Aquinas, Loyola, 
Zinzendorf, Wesley, and Jonathan Edwards, to name a few. 
The definition of mysticism, however, is a rather.difficult 
task due to the wil. .. e variations of opinions of both the mystics 
and the philDsophel"-s of mysticism concerning the exact- nature, 
meaning, and seop~ of the experience~ Judgments vary all the 
way from sheer qua9kery and 11 forillless spe,Qulat1on11 to the con-
clusion that it is the most elevated religious meaning possible 
to the heart and mind of man. Goethe termed it 11 the scholastic 
of the heart." Harnack called it "rationalism anplied to a 
sphere above reason. F. H. Bradley writes: 
"Nothing can be more real than what we ~xperience in 
religion. The person who says that man in his religious 
consciousness is not in touch with reality does not know 
what he is talking about."· l . 
William James considered it a state or a feeling common to all 
religions, but Leuba, on the other hand, insists that only 
certain religions incorporate 11 true11 mysticism. Roman Catholic 
l. quoted by w. R. Inge, Mysticism.!!'! Religion, P• 15. 
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writers usually regard it as a supernatural suspension of nat'ti.ra'.L 
law and relate its me~ning direotly to the sacraments of the 
Roman Cattlolio churchi It has bean regnrded as auto-erotioi~m~ 
self-hy~nosis, and neurasthenia. James Hinton has termed, it 
"an assertion of a means of knowing that (which) must not be 
tried by ordinary rules of evidenoe---the claiming authority fer 
- . a 
our own impressions." R. A. Vaughan has termed it "that f'or:r.i 
of error which mistakes for a Divine manifestation the operati~n 
of a merely human faculty. 113 Victor Cousins has written: 
11Myst1oism is the pretention to know God without inter-
mediary, and so to speak~ raoe to face. For mysticism, 
whatever 1s between God and us hides Him from us •••• 
Mysticism consists in substituting direct 1nspirat1on for4 
indirect, ecstasy for reason, rapture for philosophy." . 
Protestants vary widely in their opinion of mysticism, 
some such as Thomas Hy\vell Hughes insisting that Protestantism, 
with its evangelical concept of the direct experience of Christ 
through taith is mystical at tts very core, and others, such 
as Paul Elmer More, concluding that it is a disease of religion. 
Luther was rather mystical, being influenced by Tauler and some 
other German mystics, but Calvin looked upon it with disfavor. 
Theologians in the Sohle1ermacher1an tradition usu~;1y tavor it 
whereas exponents of the Ritsehl1an position are opposed to it. 
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Suoh thinkers as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner have ranged them-
selves strongly against it. 
It must not be concluded, however, that only oonf'uFd.on 
remains concerning the nature of mysticism. The difficulty of 
explanation lies in the fact that it is an essentially private 
experience. The mystics and nhilosophars who attempt to inter• 
pret mysticism must d'' RO in terms of their own philosophies, 
and the philosophies themselves vary in their meanings. Actually, 
there is oonsider~ble agreement among all the mystics ooncern!ng 
the psychological aspeot of mysticism. Certain characteristicg 
seem alwaye to be associated with the experience. William James 
has listed them as (l) ineffability, (2) passivity, (3), tran-
sciency, and C4) noetic certainty. Immediacy should.possibly be 
added to this list due to its pronounced effect as part of the 
experience, although it is not necessarily a distinctive inner 
characteristic. 
The mystical experience is -immediate in that it is a1ways 
a direct awareness of some other.reality, that is, some reality 
other than the reality of one •.a ordinary self. It is not a 
secondary experience, a recall or a meditation on the nrinc1pl6 
of a thing. It is rather the immediate part!cination in the 
thing itself~ All mystics seem agreed on this point. 
The mystical experience is ineffable in the sense that the 
experience itself defies description by comparison with other 
hum.an exner1ences. Most mystics admit their inability ~o be 
discursive about the matter and explain that the weakn.~ss ller 
not in the lack of the richness of the experience but !'R. 1~b.e:- ~.l' 
the inability of language adequately to communicate faali.r.g., 
Mystical literature makes use of poetic descriptions, similies, 
and the like to attempt to incorporate some of the nature of tbe 
feeling. William James comments on this oharaoteristin: 11 1!1 t::O'LJ 
respect the experience is more like a state of feeling tha"l ll 5 -
state of intellect. 11 The implication is that one must pcsRoss. 
a certain facility for understanding the experience, l!ke t~e 
ability to appreciate a symnhony, before he may gain the mean!.ng 
and effect or what happens in the occur renoe. 
' The mystical experience 1s passive in the sense that it is 
art inner experience which seems to come of its own accord once 
, I 
1ts oonditions are met. The mystic does not bring it about or 
cause it to occur exce~t by meeting the conditions of its ooour-
rence 1 However, the meeting of the conditions necessary to the 
' 
occurrence or the eJ_tperience does not rieoess.arily'1nsUl'e its 
occurrence in every instance. In the highest level of the ex-
~erience the ind1v1duai seems to feel ae 1f he were taken over---
~ossessed by some ~ower outside or himselt~--aome powe~ that he 
cannot control. 
5. William James, Vari ties of Religious Exnerien~, th ;Bo. 
The mystical experience is transient in that its state of 
eostasy or illumination, according to certain interpreters, re-
mains only tor a very short time. It may take days, or years, 
or even a life-time to arrive at the high level of ecstasy, but 
once attained the experience itself may be only momentary, like 
a flash of light. William James says it may last only an hour 
or two at the most. Even though the experience itself is tran• 
sient, the memory of the exnerience remains for quite a long 
time and constitutes a powerful influence unon the consequent 
behaviour of the individual. 
Noetio certainty is always typical of the e:xperience. There 
is always certainty in the mind of the believer about the fact of 
his experience, and often there is also the conviotion of a reve-
lation---ot the recention of DBW ideas and meanings not previous-
ly known. Yet, revelation is not necessarily an 1i{egral part of 
mysticism, as mysti6ism may consist merely of the affirmation or 
denial of some idea previously known. Characteristically, 
mysticism is the affirmation or denial of the nature of reality---
the affirmation that there ,!! some ultimate spiritual reality 
attested to by its ability to be experienced. Technically, the 
concern is not so much that of the overall nature of ultimate 
reality as it is the bare assertion that such does exist in an· 
experienoeable way. Bertrand Russell has wr1tten1y aptly of 
this phase of the experience& 
-s-
"The mystic insight begins w1 th the sense of o. eyntcry 
unveiled, of a hidden wisdom now suddenlybeoome certain 
beyond the nossibility of a doubt. The sense of certain-
ty and revelation comes earlier than any definite bel1.ef'. 
The definite beliefs at Which mystics arri~e are the result 
of reflection upon the inarticulate experience gained in 6 
the moment of insight. 11 
I 
In a rather loose sense, this process·may be considered as a 
religious awakening or religious con~ersion. 
Mysticism is often thought of as an art or process entered 
into and followed according to a formula ~· more or less scientif• 
ic behaviour. The bulk of the literature written by avowed 
mystics deals ~mainly with'; .. the details involved in the 'Practice 
or mysticism as an art, and there is a certain general s1m1lar1ty 
1n the formulae they suggest. Whenever mysticism is considered 
as a technique or nrocess it is usually conceived of in terms 
of a series of stages of exneriences, which have been described 
by various writers as 0 the mystic way. 0 These stages vary in 
ter~~nology and place of division in the various mystical systems, 
but they may be roughly divided into (1) mortification, or bodily 
- - -
discipline, (2~ purgation, or purification, (3) concentration, or 
mental fixation, and (4) illumination, ecstasy# and joy. 
In mortification the mystic brings his -physical nature under 
control of his mental or sniritual nature. The will becomes more 
k• quoted by Inge, Mysticism !!l Religion, P• 24. 
and more in control or the body. It might be necessary even to 
inflict damage upon the body in order to bring it under the con-
trol of the soul. The purpose of this stage is to cut oneself 
loose from the controling impact of one's physical nature in order 
to allow the freer operation of the mental nature. Symbollically• 
it indicates an allegiance to that which is considered to be of 
higher value. 
Purgation is mental purification. Not only must the indivi" 
l 
dual be released from the effects of the passions, the mind itself 
must be cleansed of its impurities. It is a catharsis in which 
everything inconsistent with the nature of the objective sought 
is ignored and neglected, and, insofar as possible, deliberately 
excluded from consciousness. 
Concentration is the stage of the active endeavor to think · 
about the order or condition of the object sought. Consideration 
is given to the details of information known about the object. 
Wheras purgation is the elimination from thought of everything 
inconsistent with the goal of the mystic quest~ concentration is 
the bringing to mind of everything consistent with it. 
The stage of illumination is the one in which qthe light 
.... 
breaks through.~ The nature of the object or condition becomes 
directly exper1encable, culminating in union~ joy~ and ecstasy. 
The object of the quest is realized and the whole process is 
terminated~ only to be gegun all over again. 
... 
Fundamental problems concering mystloism ate the questions 
whether the experience may be termed normal or abnormal, whe~jhor 
it is to be considered valuable or disvaluable, and whether it i~ 
to be agreed that there is a. revelation of reality in it. AG has 
already been indicated, philosophers of mysticism are in disagre~~ 
ment concerning these questions. 
Whether or not one wishes to term the experience 11 normal 11 
depends, of course, upon what he defines as rtot'mal experience. 
To say the least, it cannot be called an ordinary experience• 
Whether or not it is an average experience or an experience 
universal to all men. is not easily determined. Most mystics 
insist that the experience may come to anyone who meets its 
necessary conditions, but it is not certain if everyone has a 
native ability or canacity to meet the necessary conditions~ 
Some interpreters think that there is a class of mystics, a 
certain group of people wh' are suited by their mental natures 
tor being mystics•· and the implication is that there are other 
neople who could never bring thmnselves to meet the required 
conditions. The suggestion 1s that there are people who would 
be incapable ot mysticism as a tone deaf ~erson would be unable 
to anprec1ate a S'Ylllphony. The answer to this question must 
be left uncertain as it w:>uld be practically impossible to 
fathom all of the reasons why a certain ~erson seems suited 
or unsuited ror mysticism. Mysticism does seem to be a normal 
eXperience for very religious people. There is reason to believe 
that any man is capable of having mystical experience unless he 
has been hindered from Antering into it by certain other psycholog~ 
ical conditioning. 
The value of mystical experience must be answered in terms 
of the query "valuable for what." All mystics will insist that 
the experience is valuable-in-itself, and should be encouraged 
as an end-in-itself. Philoso~hers judging mysticism sometimes 
disagree concerninJ whether or not the experience should be 
encouraged. Some insist that it cause~ damage to the general 
mental well-being of the mystic, especially in instances when it 
allows a free disregard of reason. All instances of mysticism 
more or less allow a break-down of the final appeal to reason. 
If the test would be "Does it lead to productive activity?" 
the answer would have to be that it has in some instances, and 
in others it has not. Many mystics are not vocal about their 
mysticism and certain types of mysticism seems to encourage 
activity more than others. Rufus Jones identifies mysticisnt 
with the creative element in religion. He writes: 
"It is not too much to claim ••• that whenever, in the course 
or history, religious life and thought have had a fresh 
new birth, have surged up with a new intensity to a higher 
level, and have brought release of new power to live by, 
there has always been at the heart of the movement a leader 
of the creative type.• •• 11 ., 
7. Rufus Jones, Some Exnonents .2f. Mystical Religion, P• 23• 
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Most of the rounders of the world's great civilized religions 
have been mystics. 
A crucial question, indeed, is whether or not thera is a 
revelation of reality in mysticism. This is the central claim 
of all myst1cism---all mystics agree that they have communicated 
. 
. :_• with reality and that at least some message o~ affirmation o~ 
denial of the nature of reality has been indicated. This 
question must be decided on the basis of a dooiaion as· to whe~her 
the evidence is adequate and reliable enough to lead to thi::r 
conclusion. Some nhilosonhers have concluded that it is, and 
some have concluded that it is not. It would be a rather 
sweeping assertion to .conclude that all mystics have been under 
an illusion about the nature and meanings of thir own experiences, 
yet, certain interpreters conclude just this. Others admit tht~ 
illusion, but sanction it as a value ... · In mysticism, we are 
faced with the problem of communicating inner feelings and 
intuitive meanings in a way that will be meaningful to people 
who do not have the same inner feelings and meanirigs. This 
is a problem in mysticism because it is a problem in meaning, 
language~. and communication in general,. Our suggestion is that 
the clue to the answer to this question·wili, in the final 
analysis, depend upon the ""articular metarihysical and religious 
understanding or the philosopher who makes the judgment. We 
cannot help but make our judgpients on the basis or our own 
experiences and their meanings. If one's own metaphysical and 
religious beliefs do not allow the possibility of mystical life, 
he will likely term all mysticism an illusion. On the other 
hand, if one feels that he has, himself, had experiences similar 
enough to those which the mystics assert to admit the reality 
and value of the experience, and if such are not contradictory 
with his own metaphysical and religious meanings, he will likely 
term the experience a true revelation.of reality. 
Our theory here is that a metaphysical and religious meaning 
must necessarily be involved in the basic meaning of mysticism 
itself---that any particular occur.ronce of myseicism will imply 
a specific metaphysical and religious position. Therefore, the· 
~eaning of any particular example of mysticism cannot be inter• ~ 
prated apart from an analysis of the basic metaphysical and 
religious concents associated with and to a large extent prior 
to its occurrence. Our assertion is, that the objectives ~ought 
within mysticism are in reference to metaphysical meanings known 
at least in some sense---possibly symbolically~--prior to the 
mystical experience. This metaphysical knowledge may not have 
the emotional quality of that obtained within the mystical exper-
ience, but it does have the power to serve as one of the reasons 
why the experience is entered into. 
The wide variations 1n the meta-physical conceptions ass,,c1 a(j .. , 
' 
ed with the various philosophies of mysticism should serve as an 
adequate example of' tlia-importance of this factor in the underste:td 
ing of mysticism. Our thesis is that variations in prior meta-
nhysical concepts account in large measure for the variations in 
consequent ideas of the final ideal within the mystical nrooess 
or experience. or course, it might be admitted that mystical 
experience itself is a factor contributing to these metaphysical 
meanings, but such is not the exact concern of this thesis. 
Granting that metaphysical concepts are affected by the mystical 
process---that mysticism is essentially a conversion experience, 
philosophically, psychologically, morally, and otherwise---we are 
but adding the assertion that they also affect the reason for 
entering into the process and the inherent meaning of the process. 
The meaning of mysticism oan never ~e stated in a definition 
or indicated by a purely scientific explanation of the psycholog-
ical . process involved, Its final meanings are ontological 
meanings---beliefs about the nature of being, life, and value. 
As such, its meaning is better expressed by poetry than by logic 
-~-it 1s better felt than understood. Yet, we are faced with the 
need for an agreed upon working definition of mysticism for the 
pur~osea of this thesis. Here we are willing to accept for 
practical purposes the definition of w. R. Inge that mysticism 
1s "the attempt to realize, in thought and feeling, the immanence 
of the temnoral in the eternal, and of the eternal in the 
·a 
temporal;'' · that ot Pfleiderer who writes: 
.. 
"Mysticism is the immediate feeling of the unity of the 
self with God; it is nothing, therefore, but the fund~m~ntal 
feeling of religion, the religious life at its very hea~t Q 
and center;" ' 
and the defintion of Albert Seth: 
"Mysticism is a phase of thought, or. rather, perhaps o:f 
feeling, which from its very nature is hardly susceptible 
or exact definition. It appears in connection with tha 
endeavor of the human mind to grasp the Divine essence or 
the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness 
of actual comw.i..~nion with the highest. The first is the · 
philosophical side of Mysticism; the second, its religious 10 
side." 
It is quite erroneous to think of mysticism simply as an 
art or a process. In it there must be meanings that reach beyond 
the mere level of feelings---meanings whose essences involve more . 
than the essences of the various psychological st~tes, themselves• 
and have a point of reference beyond the limits of the psycho•~ 
logical experience itself. The meaning of mysticism should be 
divorced from the conception of it as a science or the mastery 
of certain techniques and be thought of in terms of its particu-
lar concept of the nature of being and ultimate reality---as it 
1s these meanings that matter most even within reference to the 
techniques themselves. 
8. W. R. Inge, Christian Mysticism, P• 5• 
9• quoted by Inge, ~., P• 3'9• 
10. Ibid. 
-
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Tho mysticism or Plotinua and Augustine is to be found 
not only in the processes involved in their final ways of. Sa.J .• 
vation, but also in the basic ontological concepts involved 1~ 
their metaphysics and general religious meanings. In ord~r to 
study their mysticisms we must study both their metanhysics ann Yt{ 
their religion. Our method will be to analyze the!n·meta~hysios~ 
religion, and techniques of mysticism in order to determine 
oe»tain similarities and differences and to see how their 
meta~hysics and religious meanings affect the meanings of 
their mysticisms. 
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Chapter II 
The Metaphysics of' Plot·1nus 
The root concept of the system of Plotinus is that of 
positing of the nature of ultimate reality as a supra•existent 
.ideal form or orde~. Three factors apply in such an order: 
unity, intelligence (mind), a~d soul. The ultimate constituent 
of this ordeii, variously called by Plotinus as "the First;u 
"the One," "the Good," "the Simple," "the Absolute;" nthe 
Transcendence," "the Infinite," "the Unconditioned, 11 and !'the 
Father," is an inexpressible being devoid of qualities and 
surpassing existence. From it all existence and existing 
things come by means of its production of a next lower, less 
real stage of its own self expression. Such a stage in turn 
produces a next lower, less real stage of its self expression 
which in turn does the same thing, and so forth, on and on, 
until the level of pure nothingness or illusion is reached. 
The doctrine is that the universe is constituted of an indef-
initely complicated and systematic series of levels ranging 
-18-
' 
from the ultimate Supra-existent Belng, through the various 
forms of existence, to aheei., nothingness,, with every item :b.av ... 
ing a precise location ar.d relaticnship by v~.rti.i.e of t:he irsu":J?J1'· .. 
Real's" impingement upon it within the system.. Every thase OJ~ 
existence --everything that exiata -~ flows from, emanates o~ 
irradiates out of this ultimate reality and also aspires ir-
1ts own consciousness to flow back toward it. 
The most vital element of the system is best conceived of 
logically as unity. Being 1nexpres1ble and devoid of qualita-
tive attributes, any conceptual indication of it will be inad-
equate. Strictly speaking, it is not a First Cause, for First 
l 
Cause is a lower formulation than the Supra-Real itself. It 
may not be said to be non-existent and it may not be considered 
as a thing that exists. This situation beyond existence and the 
ordinary conceptions of being is defended by Plotinus on the 
grounds or its immanence in all things without its possibility 
2 
of being identified with any or them. 
h iUl tJW.nb!t-• however aica.J.ted., august, ara later than This ((The One)) 1 
It is the souroe of' all, though in some sense It is no souroe: we must k~ep 
all things apart from It ••• even freedom of action. • •• It oan enter into 
no relation with the realm of ExistEmoe." VI• 8. P. ·. ' 
I 
"When we oall it a Cause we are not making an ass ert1on about .Lb but about 
ourselves; we speak of what we derive .from It while It remains steadfastly 
within Itself." VI. 9. 3. All quotations of the l\Ords of Plotinus are from 
the Ste,r.hen MaoKenna Translation. See Bibliogr~:phy and Appendix. 
2. 'lrhe 6ne is all things and no one of than: the source of all things il!f 
not all things; all things are its possession -- rumiing baok. so to speak, 
to it -- or more oorreotly, not yet so, they will be. • • • 
(continued on next page) 
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-. 
Vfuen Plot1mis speaks of the Supra-Real as "the Good .. 11 he 
is attempting to expi'ess the idea of' its perf'ection -- that 
there is nothing of evil or imperfection as a part of its nature 
He writes: 
com• 
"· •• The ,rord "good" used of him (the One) is not a predioate 
ass6'Eing his possession of goodness; it conveys an identifioation. It 
is not that we think it exact to oall him either good or The Good: it 
is that sheer negation does not indicate; we use the term The Good to 
assert identity without the affirmation or Being." VI. 7~ 38. 
"Unity seeks nothing towards its being or its well-being or its safehold 
upon existence; oe.us e to all, hoVI can it acquire its oharaoter outside 
of itself or know any good outside? The good of its being oan be no 
borrow~ng: .This is: the Good •••• This Principle is not._therefore-to 
be identified with the good of which it is the source; it is good in 
the unique mode or being The Good above all that is good~" VI. 9. 6 
It is preois ely becaus.e there is nothing within the One that all things are 
from it a in order that Being may be brought about the source must be no 
Being but Being 1s generator, in what is to be thought of as the primal aot of 
generation. Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is 
perfect, and in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced 
the new: this product has turned again to its begetter end been filled and 
has become its contanplator and so an Intelleotual-Prinoiple." V .2. 1. 
"Generative of all, the Unity is none of all; neither thing nor quality nor 
quantity nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not in time; it is the self• 
defined, unique in form or better, formless, existing before Form was, or 
Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the 
manifold it is." VI. 9. 3 
"No wonder that to state it is not easy; even Being and R>:rm are not easy, 
though we have a way, an approach through the Ideas. 
The soul or mind reaching 'bov:ards the formless finds itself incompetent to 
grasp where nothing bounds it or to take impression where the impinging --
reality is diffuse; in sheer dread of holding to nothingness, it slips away. 
The state is painful; often it seeks relief by retreating from all this 
v~gueness to the region of sense, there to rest on solid ground, just as the 
sight distressed by the minute rests with pleasure on the bold." VI. 9. 3. 
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On his idea of the Supra-Real as "the First," he writes: 
hAnything existing after The First must neoessarily aria e fron thai:; 
First , v1hether immediately or as tracing baok to it throueh .!.nt·J.:.·-
v·c'nl.ents; there must be an order of seoondaries and tert:lal·le:::, ~n 
whl~h any s eoond is to be r er erred to The First, any third to bha 
seo6'bd. Standing before all things, there must exist a Simple::, 
diftering from all its sequel, self-gathered, not inter-blended with 
the forms that rise from it, and yet able in some mode of its own ·to 
be present to those others' it must be authentically a unity, not 
merely something elaborated into unity and so in reality no more than 
unity's oounter!'eit. V. 4. l. 
"All that is not One is oonserved by virtue of the One, and from the 
One derives its oharaoteristio nature; if' it had not attained suoh 
unity as is consistent with being made up of multiplioity we oould not 
affirm its exist en.a es it we are able to affirm the nature or single 
things, this in virtue of the unity, the identity even, whioh eaoh of 
then possesses. But the all-transcendent, utterly void or multiplioity1 
has no mere unity of partioipation but is unity's self', independent or 
all else, as being that trom whic}i, by whatever means, all the rest take 
their degree of unity in their standing,, near or far, towards it." V.3.15 
His conclusion is that this Supra-Real 1s indefinable, beyond 
sense, beyond formulation, and in some degree, at least, beyond 
logic. He writes: 
"Thus The One is in truth beyond all stat anent i any at'firmation is of a 
thing; but the all transcending, resting above even the most august 
divine lli.nd, possesses alone or all true being, and is not a thing 
among things. We oan give it no name because that would imply predi• 
cation: we oan but try to indicate, in our own feeble way, something 
oonoerning it." v. 3. 13. 
If this is the case, then, that the best ex~ression of 
reality lies within the concept of unity -- sheer unity, pure 
and simple, but beyond language and activity, as Plotinus asserts 
to be the situation .... what hope is there for the attainment ot 
any understanding of reality? The answer is round in the sec·ond 
element or his system: namely, intelligence, mind, or spirit. 
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By means of this second factor some connection may be established 
between the One and all existing things. Since mind is that 
which is most like the One,and nearer to it than all else,and yet 
is itself not transcendent, not a Supra-Real, but an existent 
functioning within the world of existents, it is the avenue of 
all understanding. It is that factor about reality that is 
understandable, and as such.!l! understanding. It is form, 
pattern, principle, order, intelligence, meaning,. purpose, and 
consistency. It is the inherent intelligence - factor or reason~· 
principle of all being. All being below the One forms a part of 
mind or spirit. It is the factor through which all parts of 
the total universe are seen to be connected one with the other 
by virtue of the oneness of their purpose, intelligence, pattern, 
etc,. 
Conceived· of as intelligence, or possibly as super-intel-
ligence, some of the richness of the idea is likely to be lost 
unless the term 11 spirit" is also incorporated within it. This 
is because mind is not to be conceived of as pure abstraction but 
rather as an existing thing. It is the first and highest of the 
comprehendible realities -- the richest knowable reality.. By his 
formulation of its status in his system Plotinus gives to in-
telligence a near-religious connotation, for as he sees it, mind 
1s reality as we may know it. 
Mind is produced by the One as a sort of byaproduct result-
ing from the overrlow, irradiation or aemanation" of the One 
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itself. It constitutes a rough image of the One without bein~ 
the One, much in the same sense that a mask may be a moulded. 
image of a face without being that face. It is tho n.rst, cf tL.F.1 
three major nhases of emanations obtaining within the sy::tt em_, 
and the first one of all the many emanations there are within 
the realm of existing things.; 
3. Plotinus comments upon its order and origin: 
"But how and what does the Intellectual-Principle see, and, especially, 
how has it sprung from that whioh is to become the object of this vision~ · · 
The mind demands the existenoe of' these Beings, but it is still in trouble-·o:ver 
the problem endlessly debated by the most ancient philosophers: from such a 
unity as we have deolared The One to be, how does anything at all come into 
substantial existfJ'lloe, any multiplicity, dyad, or number? 
Why has the Primal not remained self-gathered so that there be none of this 
profusion or the manifold nhich we observe in existenoe and yet are compelled 
to trace to that absolute unity? In venturing an answer, we first invoke 
God Himself, not in loud v~rd but in the 'nay or prayer whioh is alway& within 
our power, leaning in soul towards Him by aspiration, alone towards the alone. 
But if' we seek the vision of that great Being within the Inner Sanctuary--
self-gathered. tranquility remote above all els e--we begin by considering the 
image stationed at the outer precincts, or, more exactly to the moment, the 
f'irst image that appears. How the Divine :Mind comes into being must be ex.; 
plained. Every moving has neoessarily an object towards which it advances: 
but since the Supreme oan have no such object, we may not asoribe motion to it. 
anything that comes into being after it oan be produced only as a oonaequenoe 
of' its- unfailing s eli'-intenticn •• '4Given this immobility in the Supreme 
it can neither have yielded assent nor uttered decree nor stirred in any way 
towards the existence or a secondary. · 
What happened then? What are we to conceive· as rising in the neighbo~· 
hood of' that immobility? It must be a :ciroumr.t~di:ation~...,:,.Produoed· from -the ·Supre:ne 
but from the Supreme unaltering••and may be compared to the brilliant light 
enoiroling the sun and ceaseleesly generated from that unchanging substance. 
All existences, as long as they retain their aharaoter, produce about them-
selves, i'rom their essences, in virtue of the power which must be in them, 
some neoessary, out"v1ard facing hypcstnsis continuously attached ·to 'than and 
representing in image the engendering erohetypes1 Thus fire gives out its heat,, 
· (oontinuocl on next p!1ge) 
In certain passages Plotinus seems to identify mind with truth. 
The One cannot be truth since it is beyond expression, but mind 
cont. 
snow is cold not merely to itselfJ fragrant substances are a notable instance 
for. as long as they last, something is diffused from them and perceived 
wherever they are present. • • • V. 1. 6. 
The Intellectual-Principle stands as the ima~e of The One, firstly because 
there is a certain necessity that the first should have its offspring. oa~ry­
ing onward much of its quality, in other words that there be something in 
its likeness as the sun's rays tell of the sun. 
Yet the One is not an Int ell eotual-Principle: how then do es it engender an 
Intellectual-Principle? Simply by the faot that in its self-quest it has 
vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual- Principle. Any perception of 
the external indicates either sensation or intelleotion, sensation symbolis-
ed by a line, intelleotion by a circle •••• 
All there, too, is a unity, though a unity which is the potentiality of all 
existence. The items or this potentiality the divine intelleotion brint;s 
out, so to speak, from the unity and knows than in detail, as it must if it 
is to be an intEllectual principle. 
It 'has besides a oonsoiousness, as it were, within itself of this same po• 
tentiality; it knoins that it can or itself bet;et an hypostasis and can de-
termine its own Being by the virtue emanating from its prior; it knows that 
its nature is in some sense a definite part of the context of' that First; 
that it thenoe derives its essence, that its strength lies there and that 
its Being takes perfection as a deri vati,ve and a recipient from the First. 
It sees that, as a member of the realm or divisiop and part, it receives 
life and intellection and all else it has and is, from the undivided and 
partless. since that First is no member or existence, but can be the source 
Of all on oondition only Of being held down by one distinctive shape but 
remaining the undeflected unity. V. 1. 7. 
The.t station towards the One (the f a.ot that something exists in pr es enc e or 
the One) establishes Being; that vision directed upon the One establishes 
the Intellectual-PrinoipleJ standing towards the One to the end of vision, 
it is simultaneously Intellectual-Principle and Being> and attaining 
resemblance.in virtue of this vision, it repeats the act of the One in 
pouring forth a vast power." v. 2. 1. 
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being the thing neare$t to the One, and yet ex~ressible, is 
4 
truth. Mind is a "secondary God, 11 
Since the Intellectual-Principle is expressible it may be seen 
as ultimate truth, for intellect,on both begins and ends in 
this realm of mind. 5 
• ·< 
'• . 
universe of authentic beings,, the Truths as- suoh it is a great god or better,, 
not a god among gods but the Godhead entire. It is a god,, a secondary god 
manifesting before there is any vision of that other,, the_ Supreme (the One) 
which rests over all, enthroned in transoendence upon that splendid pediment 
the Natu~e following olose upon it. 
The Supreme in its progress oould never be borne forward upon some soulless 
vehicle nor even directly upon the soul: it will be hearalded by some 
ineffable beautyr before the great YJ.ng in his progress there comes first 
the minor train,. then rank by rank the greater and more exalted,, oloser to 
the King the kinglier •••• 
In that royal progress the King is of another order from those that go before 
him, but the King in the Supreme is no ruler over externs; he holds that most 
just or governanoes, rooted in nature, the veritable kinship, for he is King 
or Truth. holding sway by all reason over a dense offspring of his own, a 
host that shares his divinity,. King over a king, and over kings and even more 
justly called father of Gods," v. 5, 3. 
5. "This Intelleotual•Prinoiple,, if the term is to oonvey the truth, must 
be understood to be not a principle merely potential and not one maturing f'rom 
unintelligence to intelligence-· that would simply send us aJeeking, onoe 
more, a necessary prior -- but a principle which is intelligenoe in aotuality 
and in eternity. · 
• • • • A principle whose wisdom is not borrowed must derive from itself any 
intelleotion it may make: and anything it may possess within itself it oan 
hold only from itself; it follows that, intellective by its o'V!Il resouroe and 
upon its own oontent. it is itself the very things on which its intelleotion 
acts••.• What then is its oharacteristio Act and what the intellection which 
makes knower and knoY!?l, here identical? 
Clearly, as authentic Intelleotiou, it has authentio intelleotion or the 
authentic existent, and establishes their existenoe. Therefore it is the 
Authentic Beings •••• 11 V. 9. 5. 
"We take it then,, that the Intellectual •Principle is the authentio exis-
tences and contains them all - not as in a place but as possessing itself' 
(continued on next page) 
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Plotinus views mind as the same as both truth and being. Truth 
cannot get beyond mind either in reference to the One (due t~ 
the inexpressibility of the One) or in reference to Soul (fo~ 
Soul only has meaning and understnnding in terms of mind.)~ 
Mind also extends eve~ the entlre range of everything that may 
be said to exist, gi~ing forth the very suggestion of being nr 
existence in any instance by virtue of its evidence of principle. 
Mind is both a thinker and "thoughts." Thinker, thinking, and 
objects of thought are all identical. Ideas are not copies of the. 
universe, rather the universe ( the practical universe) is the 
imperfect copy of the one essential idea: mind. 
On the subject of the relation of mind as a unity with 
individuals, Plot1nus 1 own words are clear enough: 
"Intelleot as a whole must be thought of as prior to the int elleots 
actualised as individuals; but when we come to the particular intellects. 
we find that what subsists in the particulars must be maintained from 
the totality. The Intellect subsisting in the totality is a provider 
for the particular intellects. is the potentiality of them: it involves 
them as ·:members or its universality. while they in turn involve the 
universal Intellect in their particularity. just as the particular 
science involves science the total. 
The ~reat Intellect, we maintain, exists in itself and the particular 
intellects in themselves; yet the particulars are anbraoed in the whole, 
cont. 
and being one thing with this its content. All are one there and yet are 
distinct a similarly the mind holds many branches and items of knowledge 
simultaneously, yet none of them merged into any other, each acting its 
O'\l'm part at call quite independently, every conception coming out from the 
inner total and working singly. It is after this way, though in a 01.oser 
unity. that the Intellectual-Principle is all Being in one total - and yet 
not in one. since eaoh or these beings is a distinot power, whioh. however, 
the total Intellectual-Principle includes as the species in a genus, as the 
Parts in a whole. • . • V. 9. 6 
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and the whole in the partioulars. The particular intellects exist by t'.!r:tt • 
selves and in another. the universal by itself' and in those. All the-· 
partioluars exist potentially in that s elf-EIXistent universal, v.hioh o.ofa •. 
ually rs the totality. potentially eaoh isolated member: on the othel' ,h.,.r?.v 
eaoh particular is aotually what it is (its individual self} potentially 
the totality. In so far as what is predicated of them is their esser..loEi, 
they are actually what is predicated of them; but where the predicate is a 
genus, they are that only potentially. Qi the other hand, the universal 
i"6 so f'ar as it is a genus is the potentialrty of' all its subordinate 
species, though none of them in actuality, all are latent in it. but 
because its essential nature exists in actuality before the existence of' 
the species, it does not submit to be itself partioularised. If then the 
particulars are to exist in actuality·- to exist, for example. as species--
the cause must lie in the Aot radiating from the universal." VI.2.20. 
"How then does the universal Intelleot produoe the particulars while. in 
virtue of its Reason-Principle, renaining a unity? In other mrds. how 
do the various grades or Being• .. ,arise • ••? 
It is a universal rule that whatever reasoning discovers to exist in Nature 
is to be found in Intellect apart f'rom all ratiocination: we conolude that 
Being has so created Intelleot that its reasoning is after a mode similar 
to that ot the principles which produce living beings, torthe Reason• 
Principles, prior to reasoning though they are, aot invariably in the 
manner which the most oarei'ul reasoning would adopt in order to attain the 
best results.... · 
Everything exists forever, unfailing, involved by very existence in eter• 
nity. Individuals have their separate entities. but are one in the (total) 
unity. The complex, so to speak, of than all, thus combined is IntelleotJ 
and Intellect, holding all existence within itself, is a complete living 
being, and the essential Idea of Living Being. In so tu as Intellect sub• 
mite to contemplation by its derivative, becoming an Intelligible, it givet' 
that dtrivative the right also to be called "living being. VI. 2. 21. 
When we think or Being we have t? think of, it iP. terms ot cer-
tain categories. The categories of mind are: lite, Being, motion, 
stability. identity# and difference. He ss7s ot 11te: 
"We have found Substanoe (Essence) and lite simul'taneously present in 
Soul. Now. this Substanoe is a oonmon property ot Soul. but lite. common 
to all souls. differs in that it is a property ot Intellect also. 
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Havint; thus introduced Intelleot and its life we make a single 
t;enus or what is common to all life'" namely mt ion. Sub::itano e 
and the Motion which constitutes the highest life we must oc•ndd.er. 
as two genera; f,or even though they form a Ull?ity, they e.2·e se,?FJ.ra-
ble to thought which f~.nds their unity not a unity; otherwise :lt 
could not distinguish them. Observe also how in other th:Lig$ 
Motion or life is clearly separated from Being -- a separe:Ho!l 
impossible~ doubtless, in True Being, but possible in its shadow 
and namesake. In the portrait of a man much is left out, and 
above all the essential thing, life: the 0 Being" of' sensible thi::igs 
is just suoh a shadow of True Being, an abstraotion from that Being 
complete \'\•hich was lif'e in the Arohetype; it is because of' this i::-
oomplet eness that we are able in the Sensible world to separate 
Being from life and life from Being." VI. 2o 8. 
Life is not the ty~ical indication of the order or mind, but it 
is a property of mind. Although life applies to soul, still 
mind can not he said to be lifeless. Plotinus says the 
Int~llect 
"• •• lives a life that endures and keeps a thought acting not 
upon any future but upon that which already is, upon an eternal 
present -- a thought s eli'-centered1 bearing on nothing outside 
of itself." VI. 2. 8 
Both motion and stability are characteristic of mind. 
There is both change in the universe and an inherent stabil-
ity to it all. The mind moves, but it does not go any place} 
it is rather its movement within itself. Mind does not 
change, it rather acts maintaining its typical stability in 
the midst of its action. 
Plotinus i1troduces Stability to Being and Motion viz.: 
"Being,then, containing many species. has but one genus. Motio~ 
however, is to be classed as neither a subordinate nor a supple-
ment of' Being but as its ooncomitantJ for we have not found Being 
serving as substrate to Motion. Motion is Being's Act; neither 
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is separated from the other exeept in thought; the two na:~ur'31'l 
are one; for Being is inevitably actual, not potent:l.nL ••• 
Now I!;.otion., thus manifested in conjunction with Being~ do si::; nr,t 
alter Being's nature ... unless to complete ita esse·:rtial c~.a:r-~ 
acter -- and it does retain forever its own peculiar natul'.'s; at 
onoe. then, we are forced to introduce Stability. To rej eo7. 
Stability would be more unreasonable than to rClject Motion; for 
Stability is associated in our thought and oono eption with Bciinr, 
even more than with Motion; unalterable condition., unchanging 
mode, single Reason-Principle ·- these are charact eristios of 
the higher sphere. 
Stability, then. may also be taken as a single genus. Obviously 
distinct from Motion and perhaps even its contrary. that it is 
also distinct from Being, so also would Motion be, with equal 
right. Why identify in the case of Stability and not in that 
of Motion. vJhen Motion is virtually the very life and Act both 
of Substance and of Absolute Being? However, on the very same 
principle on which we separated 1,!otion from Being with the under• 
standing that it is the same and not the same .... that they are two 
and yet one -- we also separate Stability from Being. holding it 
yet. inseparable; it is only a logical separation entailing the 
inclusion among the Existents of this other genus. To identify 
Stability with Being, with no difference between them, and to 
identify Being with Motion., would be to identify Stability with 
:Motion through the mediation or Being, and so to make Motion 
and Stability one and the same thing." VI. 2. 7. 
''Being.the most firmly set of all things, that in virtue of which 
all other things receive Stability; possesses this Stability not 
as from without but as springing within as inherent. Stability 
is the goal of intellection., a Stability which had no beginning, 
and the state from which intellection v1as impelled was Stability, 
though Stability gave it no impulsion; for !lotion neither starts 
from lv:Otion nor ends in Motion. Again. the Form .. Idea has 
Stability., since it is the goal of Intellect: intellection is the 
Form's Motion. 
Thus all the Existents are one, at onoe Motion and Stability; 
Motion and Stability are genera all-pervading., and every subse-
quent is a particular being, a particular stability and a 
particular motion." VI. 2. a. 
Identity and Difference need little explanation beyond 
the indication that mind maintains its essential identity and 
Yet undergoes an active process or dealing with different 
particulars. 
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Plotinus explains briefly: 
" .••• Identity and Dif.t'erenoe have the generio status independently 
of the particular. 
They will. moreover. be primary genera. beoaus e nothing can be pred-
icated or them as denoting their essential nature. Nothing, of 
oours e we mean. but Being; but this Being is not their genus. since 
they cannot be identified with al\Y' particular being as such •.•• " 
"In sum~ the unity exhibited in Being on the one hand approximates 
to Unity-Absolute and on the other tends to identify itself with 
Being: Being is a unity in relation to the Absolute, is Being by 
virtue of its s equenoe upon that Absolute: it is indeed potentially 
a plurality. and yet it remains a unity and rejecting division 
re.f'us es thereby to b eoom e a gen us • " VI• 2. 9. 
Mind is manifested in the whole or the universe and any part or 
Being will manifest mind. Over and above the appearance ot all 
~art~culars in their multi~licity is both a transcendent and an 
immanent unity in virtue of the Intellectual- Principle. 
In the second element in his system, Plotinus solves the 
ancient problem of how the universe may be both fixed and in 
movement. Mind is not identical with the total universe for 
there are certain elements and factors within the universe in• · 
consistent with it. Yet, Mind is identical with the ration-
ale or the universe to the extent that all forms, all Being, 
.. 
find their ideal archetypes and even their individual meaning 
within Mind. Mind, however, is .not an aggregate of little 
minds. It is rather itself one unbroken, extensive, consistent 
and com~rehensive simplex. It pervades all Being -· more cor-
rectly -- all Being is its innnediate identity and production. 
Within the universe there are certain elements, factors, 
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situations, etc., inconsistent with mind. ~are not a part 
of Being for they are so possessed with inconsistencies, mu).ti· ... 
plicities , falsehood, and so far removed from beauty and gocd.·· 
ness so as to have no evidence of mind. In their rapid chang-
ing state they form a contrast to the inherently ordered rela-
tion of mind. Whereas their movement involves change and dis-
ordered motion. the movement of mind involves no change at all 
for mind is always continuously in action, in self-expression, 
within its fixed and eternal realm. Change and multiplicity in 
things indicate their lack of mind, their lack or authentic ex-
istence. Ordered, unified action indicates the presence of mind, 
the participation in the fixed orders and relationships of Being, 
an ident·ity with the overall stability in the universe. 
We may conceive of mind, then, as not the logical ultimate 
of existence, but rather as the practical ultimate of our un-
derstanding. It is truth ( truth is a practical idea), it is 
authentic existence, it is spirit, reason, intelligence, and 
perhaps even personality. Anything devoid of it is non-exist-
ent, and yet it emanates itself in lesser degrees of richness, 
eventually to have a logical determination a~ Soul. 
The third tactor in Plotinus' system is Soul. It is the 
Second Emanation of the whole system, logically coming from 
mind in essentially the same manner as mind logically contin-
ually issues forth from the One. Soul constitutes a sort ot 
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second order of being, its reality being by virtue of some 
1nherence of mind. To the order of Soul belongs all living 
things,for the principle of soul is the principle of lifee 
Soul is less real than mind due to its status of being 
more distantly removed from the One. Although there is no clear-
ly indicated distinction between any of the stages of emanation 
so that there is a continucus flow of unbroken series contin-
uing through.out, soul may be conceived of as occurring after the 
final ( hy-pothetical) stage of mind. This is to say that the 
first order or soul (the first soul emanation) is lower in de-
gree than the last order of mind. 
Soul may be conceived of as mind in movement, or as the 
fixed motion of mind. The concept is nearly identical with the 
concept or life, for as Plotinus sees it, everything that is 
alive is a soul. The doctrine is not that everything that is 
alive ~ a soul, but rather that everything that is alive .!.,! 
a soul, for to be alive is to be a soul and to be a sdul is to 
be alive. 
In the physical universe in which we live we see most .. : 
things in their soul-condition. We customarily think of life 
in reference to soul and soul in reference to life. Both 
concents are abstractions in which there is embodied something 
or the energizing aspect of the universe. Plotinus, in one of 
his passages, bids us to look deeper into the nature of things 
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as ·we see them in their soul-condition to observe that ·beyonC: 
soul there is mind, that beyond mere movements there is th~ 
principle of movements 1 -- beyond principles there is a iJF.1.t-C .s.i''.·1 
based upon an even more ultimate ideal unity. 
The concept of the soul in Plotinus is so closely inter-
woven with the concent of mind, and also with even the One, 
that it may be unders~ocd only in reference to prior establish-
ed concepts. Soul is so closely identified with mind that it 
would not be incorrect to say that soul .!.§!. mind in exactly the 
same sense that it would not be incorrect to say that mind is 
unity or the One. Yet, from a practical point of view different 
words must be used to describe the various aspects of reality 
in the system of Plotinus. 
Soul is the immanence of mind. In an ultimate sense, of 
course, it is also the immanence of the One through the media 
of mind. Soul is mind in process, the more local, immediate, 
sensible effect of mind: mind operative on its practical, 
existential level. Whereas it is the distinctive nature of 
mind in itself to be fixed, non-evolutionary in order, un• 
changing, and according to principle, Mind nevertheless, 
emanates out to a lower tunctioning level wherein external 
change and multiplicity may become so associated with it 
that it must no longer be called mind but soul. 
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Soul still retains the fundamentals of mind in its fundamental 
6 
order. Soul, as a lower order of mind, just as mind is a 
6. "Soul is sub~.equent to Intellect, yet b;</ its vory nature it involves 
Intelleot in itself and peroeives more clearly in that prior." VI~- 2~ 2:?. 
" ••• That vision direoted upon the One establises the IntelleotuaJ.-
Principle; standing toward3 the One to the· end of vj.sion, it is simul-· 
taneously Intelleotual-PrlncipJ.e and Being; a:p.d attainin.g~resembla:nce in 
virtue of this vision, it rep eats the aot of the Une in pouring forth a 
vast power. This second outflow is a Form or Idea representing the 
Divine Intellect as the Divine Intelleot represented its own prior, The' 
One. This active power sprung from essence ••• is Soul. 
Soul arises as the idea and act of the motionless lntelleotual-Principle 
--- which its elf sprang from its own ·motionless prior--- but the soul's 
operation is not similarly motionless; its im·age. is generated from its 
movanent • • • • " V. 2. l 
"So~l, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a s eoondary 
an image of the Intellectual-Principle: reason uttered is an image or the 
reason stored within the soul, and in the same way soul is an utteranoe 
of the Intelleotual- Principle: it is even the total of its activity. the 
entire stream of life s ent forth by that Principle to the production of 
further being; it is the forthgoing heat or a fire which has also heat; 
essentially inherent • But ''1ithin the Supreme we must see energy not as 
an overflow but in the double aspect of integral inherence with the estab• 
lishment of new being. Sprung, in other m>rds, from the Intelleotual-
Prinoiple, Soul is intellective, but with an intel1-eotion operating by the 
method of reasonings: for its perfecting it must look on that Divine 
Mind, which may be thought or as a father watohing over the development 
or his ohild born imperfect in comparison with himself." v. l. 3. 
"Time at first • •• lay, s elf~cono entrated, at rest within the Authentio 
Existent: it was not yet Time; it was merged in the Authentic and motion-
less with it. But there was an active principle there, one set on govern 
ing itself and realising it8elf (: the All-Soul). and it chose to aim 
at something more than its present: it stirred .from its rest, and Time·· 
stirred with it •••• For the Soul contained an unquiet faculty., always 
desirous or translating elsewhere what it saw in the Authentic Realm, 
&.nd it could not bear to retain within itself all the dense fullness of 
its possession •••• Putting forth its energy in act after aot, in a-· · 
constant progress of novelty, the Soul produces succession as well as actJ 
taking up new purposes added to the old it brings thus into being what had 
~t existed in that former perica when its purpose was still dormant and 
its life was not as it since became •• • • (continued on naxt pngo) 
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lower order of the One~ may be viewed in its own connotatiort 
as the lively aspect of mind: mind in action, mind in motion. 
cont. • . Time, however, is not to bo c·:moe:i.ved as outside c:.f Soul; Et;ernity is not 
outside of the Authen·bic 'ExifJ'l:euo 3! mr is it to be taken as a sequence or 
succession to Soul •••• It ~~s a ·lihing seen upon Soul, inllerent, coeval to it1 
aG Et;ernity to the Inbelleotual Realm." III. 7. 11. 
nThe (Universal) Soul --- containing the Ideal Principles of Real-Beings, 
and itself an Ideal Principle ,. __ includes arl in concentration within itself. 
just as the Ideal Principle of eaoh particular entity is complete and self-
contained: it11 therefore,, sees these principles of sensible things because 
they are turned, as H were, towards it and advancing to it: but it· cannot 
harbour them in their plurality,, for it cannot depart from it's- lfind; it ·· 
sees them,, therefore, stripped of Mass. Matter, on the contrary, destitute 
of redsting power since--it has no Act of its own and is a mere shadow, oan 
but accept all that an active power may choose to send. In what is thus 
sem:~· from-·the Reason-Principle in the Intellectual Realm, there is already 
oolrl;ai_ned a degr.ee -of the partial objeot that is to be formed: in the image 
making impUlse within the Reason-Principle there is already a step (toward 
the lower manifestation} •••• " III. 5. 18 
"Let every soul recall, then at the outset the truth that soul is the aUthor 
of all living things, that it has breathed the life into them all, that 
whatever is nourished by earth and sea. all the creatures of the air, the 
divine stars in the sleyJ it .is the maker of the sun; itself formed and order-
ed this vast heaven and oonduots all that rlwfihmio motion: e.nd it is a prinoi• 
ple distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life, 
and it must of necessity be more honourable than they. for they gather or· 
dissolve as soul brings them life or abandons them, but soul, since it can 
never abandon its elf, is of eternal being ••• • 
As the r·ays of the sun throwing their brilliance upon a lowering cloud make 
it glenm all gold, so the soul entering the material expanse of the heavens 
has given life, has given immortality: what was abject it has lifted UpJ and 
t~e heavenly system, moved now in endless motion"by the soul that leads it in 
wisdom, has become a living and a blessed thing; the soul domiciled within, 
it takes worth where, before the soul, it was stark body, --·clay and water-· 
or, rather, the blankness of Matter, the absence of Being ••• " V. l. 2 
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Whereas the inind is more of a. simnle un1 ty; soul is a complex 
embodying the whole vital essence of the world and of all 
individual in it so that the whole universe fits together as 
7 
one living organism. 
If then, it is the characteristic of soul to be active ---
what does it do? The answer is that it produces bodies. It 
does not create them out of nothing but rather creates them out 
of itself: it emanates them as by-products. According to the 
thinking of Plotinus, being does not come and go, it remains 
eternally in its fixed limits, eternally having its same degree 
of intensity and reality. Individual. things, however do come 
into existence, have an individual history and pass away. Soul 
shares in this procGsa, producing bodies as an emanation in 
similar mamer in whicli .mind pro'duces .s.oul· and ~in,'..whj}.ch.~mind is 
produced by the One •. Soul acts as a shaping and arranging 
. ' 
7. He writes oonoernin~ the soul of the univers.e: "If we oan traoe 
neither to mate-Ylo.l. t::t!)enoies (blind ~J.t{!J onts) llvl" to any deliberate int en.• 
tion the influeno e.:i from without which reach to us and to the other forms · 
of life and to the terrestrial in general,, what ca.use satisf'aotory to reason 
remains? The s eo ret is : firstly 1 that this All is one universally oompr e-
hena i ve living being,, encircling all the living beings within·it. and hav-
ing a soul, one soul, which eitends to all its-manbers in the degree or plir-
~icipaiib membership held by eaoh; secondly, that every··separate 'thing is an 
integral part of tnis All by belonging to t qe total ma~rial fabric ... ;; 
unrestriotedly a part by bodily membership, while,, in so far as it has also 
some participation in the All-Soul it possesses in that degree spiritual 
membership as well,, perfect where participation is in the. All•Soul alone,, 
partial where there is also a union with a lower soul. ~ •• 
T~is One-All, therefore3 is a sympathetio total and stands as one living be-
ing; the far is near; it happens as in one animal with its separate parts: 
talon, horn, finger,, and any other members are not continuous and yet; are 
effectively near •••• Where all is a living thing summing to a unity there 
is nothing so remote in point or place as iiot to be near by virtue of a 
nature whioh makes of the one living being a sympathetic organism." IV .4.32 
factor in giving a pattern or principle to the more remote, 
multiple, diffuse, and dis ... arraneed levels of em.anations. These 
distant emanations are so diffuse, so inconsistent, so diearrang~ 
ed that in their state apart from soul they may said to have no 
being. This is Plotrunus idea of theoretical matter: that which 
is so multiple, chaotic, and disorganized that it has no affin• 
ity with unity. Technically, pure matter does not actually 
exist. It is not a part of Plotinu~ system of real ~ei~g, yet, 
it is a part of his system of becoming. It may not properly be 
included as authentic existence, however, Plot1nus must suggest 
its logical existence below the level of Soul. It is the logi-
cal extreme of his system of emanations, namely emanation out 
of sheer nothingness itself. 
Bodies are matter that tends toward form: forn.f~atter. 
Yet, the form of bodies does not come from the nature ot matter 
itself but rather from soul. All evidences of form come from 
soul. Each particular soul emanates its own body, the form ot 
the body coming from soul. The logical conclusion trot; Plotinus' 
doctrine on the subject would be that every body is a soul 
It . 
embodied", although he usually makes reference to the concept 
ot living bodies only to about the level ot 11 vegetal0 things. 
He writes that every part of the universe has a lite SJ! ~ kind: 
"'ife cannot think of the universe as a soulless habitation, however vast 
and varied, a thing of materials easily told ott, kind by kind --- wood 
and stone and whatever else there be, all blehding into a kosmos: it 
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must be alert throughout, every member living by its own lii'e, nothing 
that oan have existenoe failing to exist within it. And here we have 
the solution ot the problem, "How an ensouled living form oan inolude 
the soulleuf\ for this aooount allows grades or living within the 
whole, grades to some of whioh we deey· life only because they are not 
peroeptibly self•moved: in the truth, all of these have a hidden life; 
and the thing v.hose life is patent; to sense is made up or things whioh 
do not live to sense, but, none the less, ooni'er upon their resultant 
total wonderful powers towards living •••• " IV. 4. 36. 
Since lite is ideqtified with soul, living bodies are those that 
have more soul as a part of their nature. The soul 13 present 
with the body, but is n~ ~1th1n it, for the body is penetrated 
in every part by the soul that created it. It is a situation 
8 
in which souls have bodies rather than bodies have souls. 
Si PlG'lims .. elttb6'rate~ .. .:on thi·s .point ':i:tl an oxo ell ont pass age a 
"The soul ••• may not be oonsidered to be within the body as in a spaoe: 
space is a oontainer,, a oontainer oi' body: it is the home or suoh things as 
consist of isolated parts,, things, therefore, in which at no point is there 
an entirety; now, the soul is not a body and is no more contained than 
containing. 
Neither is it in body as in some vessels whether as vessel or as plaoe of 
location, the body would ranain, in itself, unensouled. If we are to think 
o:r some passing-over from the soul ---that self-gathered--thing •••to the con-
taining vessel, then soul iS- diminished by just as muoh as the vessel takes ••• 
Nor oan it be in the body as in some substratum: anything in a substratum 
is a oondition affecting that --- a coloilr, a fonn ---but the soul (is no 
condition of' something else), is a separate exist eno e. 
Nor is it present as a part in the ·wholeJ soul is no part or body. Ir we are 
asked to think or soul as a part in the living total we are i'aoed with the old 
dirUoulty: •• HOVI it is in that whole. It is oertainly not there as the wine 
is in_ the wine jar,, or as the jar in the jar, or as some absolute is self•.· 
Present, 
Nor can the presence be that or a v1hole in its parts: It would be absurd to 
ihink of the soul as a total of which the body should represent; the parts .. 
t is not present as Form is in MatterJ for the Form as in Matter is inaepa• · 
rable, and, further, is something superimposed upon an already existent thingJ 
~,~l, on the contrary is that which engenders the Form residing within the 
~ter and therefore is not the Fbrm. It the reference is not to the Form 
(continued on next pn.gcJ. 
Just as mind, conoeived of as a totality may be pictured as 
embracing all the reason principles, patterns, and explanaticna 
or all individual things, so soui Dlay be conceived of as a tctal-
9 1ty or all the active life principles or all individual things. 
Conceived or individually, every individual thing or item exists 
in direct and immedia~e- relationship to soul. "Individual" souJ.s 
are to be conceived or only in terms or one total sQul-nature in 
general • 
• 
actually present, but to Form as a thing existing apart from all formed objects .. 
it is hard to see how such an entity has found its way into body, and at a~ 
rate this makes the soul separable. How comes it that everyone speaks of 
soul as being in body, Because the soul is not seen and the body is: we per• 
ceivetho bcdy, and by its movement and sensation we understand that it is··an-
sculed, and we say that it possesses a soul; to speak or residence is a natu-
ral sequence. If" the soul were visible, an object of' the se~ses, radiating 
through the entire life, if' it were manifest in !'till f'oroe 'to the very""out-
ermost surf'aoe, we would no longer speak of soul as in body; we would se.y the 
minor was within the major. the contained within the container, the fleeting 
within the perdurable." r.v • 3. 20. 
9 .!'The soul is the author or all living things, • • • it has breathed 
the lire into then all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea. all the 
creatures or the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker or the 
aun1 itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic 
motions and it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law 
and movanent and life, •• • they gather or dissolve as soul brings them 
lii'e or abandons than. • • • 
The material body is made up or parts, eaoh holding its own plaoe, some in 
mutual opposit6on and others variously interdependent; the soul is in no 
such oonditionJ it is not whittled down ao that life tells· of a part of the 
soul and springs where some suoh separate portion impingesi eaoh separate 
lire lives by the soul entire, omnipresent in the liken.etas of the engendering 
rather, entire in unity and entire in dii'fUsed variety. • • • " V • l. 2 
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Being indestructible life-principles,souls do not come into 
being within time. However, individual souls do have h~.stor~.es i:1 
their relationship with bodies: that of being i~prisoned with a 
particular body for a certain period of time --- a tragic process 
which occurs over and over again constituting the endless episode 
ot reincarnation of every individual soul. Strictly speaking, 
birth and death cannot apply to souls. 
Perhaps the most significant fact about Plotinus' teachings 
about soul is his explanation that man is most characteristically 
a soul. He is only one among many sorta of' souls within the 
univer~e, and his relationship to mind and the One is essential-
ly the same as .that of all other souls. He shares the common lot ' 
ot all souls in~the manner of his coming into existence as an in-
dividual in his connectedness with the universe, and in the fact 
ot his meaning and destiny being incorporated within the nature of 
the system. Among the order of souls; man is ranked a little above 
Cehter in the scaling of individual souls. On this Plotinus 
\7r1tes: 
"In the Universe the middle and lower members are human beings; above 
. them .. the Heavens and the Gods that dwell there; these Gods with the 
· entire circling expanse of the heavens constitute the greater part of 
the Kosmos: the earth is but a o antral point. • • .. . 
ft.&t• humanity, in reality is,, poised midway between gods and beasts, 
and inclines nov~ to the one order, now to the ot.her; some men grow 
like to the divine,, others to the brute, the greater number stand 
natural •• • •" III. 2. 8. 
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As an individual human being, man consists of an indivi-
dual soul that has generated a body with which it is assocj.ated., 
As a soul man is part of mind and part of the One. His body, 
being incidental to his being, is comnosed of matter,which acts 
contrary to the inherent nature of soul and nrovides a constant 
. ~ 
struggle between the soul and the body. Everything there is 
that is bad about man is due to his involvement in matter. 
Everything noble and worthy about his is due to his soul nature. 
Strictly speaking, we may not say that man has a soul nature, 
for he actually has only soul nature. His personality is to 
be identified with his soul-ness, and with this alone. Neither 
can we say that man has a mind. It is rather the case that man 
is a nart of mind by virtue of being a soul. His particular 
reason nrincinles, patterns, ideal forms, destiny, etc.J are 
but a pa.rt of mind in general and ultimately, as we have in-
dicated, are a part of the inherent unity of the universe. 
Yet, so long as we maintain the setting of man distinctively 
as a soul we may to some extent picture him as having a 
particularized mental aspect. The position of man in the uni-
verse and his involvement as a soul limited by matter set 
the stage for the drama of human history. 
On various occasions Plotinus refers to the analogy of 
a series of concentric circles with radii extending from the 
Ultimate center as a means of describing his system. His com-
ments concerning these may well summarize the presentation 
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of his system. He writes: 
" ••• A oirole related in its path to a centre must be admitted to owe 
its scope to that centre; j.t has somethinp; of' tho nature of that "ortrP. 
in that the re.dinl lines c~nverging on that one c entra::. point ar.f-lirn11rl·Ve 
their impinging ends to that point of oon..,.re't't;enoa and of dcpertnre, !;hti 
dominant of radii and terminals: the ter:ninals are of one nc:i;u:r.e vi. ch 
the oentre, separate reprodu0Itio~1s of it,, since the centre is, :1.n L\ 
oertain"sense,, the t<".tal of terminals and radii impinging at every point 
upon itJ these lines reveal the centre; they are the development o:f' thr.-1; 
undeveloped. In the same way we are to tnke.uBoing-. This oomb:..nF.id 
power springs from the Supreme, an outflow as it were de'7elopment from 
That and remaining dependent upon that Intellective natu~e, shovtlng 
forth That v1hioh, in the purity of' its oneness, is not Intellectual• 
Prinoiple sinoe it is no duality.. No more the.:i in the oirole are the 
lines or oiroumfrenoe to be identified with that Centre which is the 
sou;roe of both:· radii and oirole are images given forth by indwelling 
power and, as produots of a oetta.in vigour in it, not cut off from it." 
VI. a. 18. 
" ••• Imagine a small luminous mass serving as centre to a transparent 
sphere, so that the light from within shows upon the entire outer surface. 
·otherwise unlit: we surely agree that the inner core of' light, intact 
and immobile, reaohes over the entire outer extension; the single light 
of that small oentre illuminates the whole field., The diffused light 
is not due to any bodily m3gni tud~ of that central point which illumi• 
nates not as body but as body lit, that is, by another kind of power 
than corporeal quality: let us then abstract the corporeal mass,. 
retaining the light as power: we oan no longer speak of' the light in 
a..~y particular spot; it is equally diffused within and throughout the 
entire sphere •• ••" VI. 4. 7. 
11 
• •• Aa a help towards stating the nature of' the produo ed mul tiplioi ty••• 
we use the example of many lines radiating .from one centre; but while 
we provide :for individualization "VJe must care.fully preserve mutual 
pres enoe. Even in the oas e of our oirole we need not think of separated 
radii: all may be taken as forming one sur!'aoe: where there is no 
distinction even upon the one surface but all is power and reality un-
differentiated, all the beings may be thought of as centres uniting at 
one central centre: we ignore the radial lines and think of their 
terminals at that centre, where they are at one. Restore the radii; 
onoe more we have lines, ea.oh touohing a generating centre or its own,, 
but that centre remains coincident vtlth the one first centre •• ••" 
VI. 5. s. 
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Perh.a~s we may diagram his system as follows& 
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In summary, the four elements or Plotinus' system are The 
One, Mind, Soul, and Matter. Everything after the One is a g~a­
dation of the One insofar as it exists in any reality. Everything 
that exists is a part of the One so that to be real and to be the 
One are one and the same thing. Mind, Soul, and Matter, in order, 
are less real than the One, each in succession being less real 
than the one before, but the reality of all three may be analyzed 
into the One. Everything that exists after the One, exists insid~ 
of the One and as a part of it, but is i,.ot solely ·1dent1cai :witti.ite 
This arrangement or things accounts for the explanation ot 
the nature of the universe and also for its origin. The universe 
1s itself eternal as the One is eternal. Time or succession do 
not apply in the case of any of the P.arts of the system. 
Life is inferior to both Mind and the One, being identified 
with movement and change rather than with unmoving existents. 
Qualities of differentiation apply more in the case of the in• 
ferior parts of the system, such as in the case of souls, indivi-
dual things, and matter, rather than in reference to the richest 
centers of reality: Mind and the One. Although all other things 
spring from the One in origin and meaning, there is no change in 
'POsition within the framework of the system, all movement and 
change being self-movement or change within position. 
Man is a soul, and as such is a part of both Mind and the One. 
His soul emanates a body, which is a burden to him and from which 
he longs to be free. Within the system. man is located at about 
~idpont between the extremes of disvalue and value: matter and 
'D\11' c/ c/ 
.. e unity, u~i and ~v • 
-~-
Chapter III 
The Religion of Plotinus 
According to Porphyry, Plotinus was not a religious man , 
according to the then-contemporary standards for judging a 
religious man. He abstained from all rites and sacrifices, 
. ~ 
rejected the popular Greek polYtheism of his ~ay, a~d partici-
pated in no forms of' public or private worship. Typical of 
his attitude in these matters 1 Porphyry tells, was his utteI'-• 
ance: "The Gods must come to me, not I ·to them.11 
Plotinus, notwithstanding, was quite a religious men. His 
philosophy is essentially a religious philosophy and his con-
cepts are fundamentally religious concepts. It seems to be the 
case that he was so concerned about religion that he could not 
tolerate any meager expressions or 1t1 so that his scorn for 
popular religion was but h1s way of' testimony to a higher 
level of religious devotion. From what Porphry bas to say 
about his behaviour in general and on the basis of the central-
ity of religious concepts in his system, he is to be seen as an 
intensely religious man, completely absorbed in ultimately 
religious concepts and dedicated to a religious way or life~ 
It might be well said of him, as it was said of Spinoza, that 
he wo.s a "God-into:x.:tcated11 man. Eis non~c.on!'o!'I!lity is 'but a 
clue to his over-.. all hcnes~.;y :!.n refus~.ng to p:r:-ofes9 his religi .. 
ous allegiance except in term13 of h1s cwn philosc;phy, which, a·t 
the time, happened to be aJ.:ten 1;o his con-ljor!1.porA:.."'i.es. B:e 
belongs to that long l~.st o:f men wh'> e.re i'ormally " irreligious~ 
not because they l:hir.tk: l.,aligion is u.n~.mpo:r.ta.rt :> bu~ because they 
feel that its mea.:n:!.ng and ess e!lce cannot be incc:rpo!'~.ted in 
symbolisms and ceremord.esJ but mi.1st be connected, related.~ an.d 
explained within a system. 
· Iy is not a simple undertaking to attempt to analyze the 
religion or Plot;tn·;.s o Due to his disposit~.o:n. on the subject he 
never O.iscusses rel:tgion. in any ce.tegorical way,, That which he 
has to say that may be termed 11 religious 11 is rather scattered 
over the whole of his writings. We must also grant that cate-
gorical concepts of religion often do not mean the same thing in 
different settings, so that in a study of religious ideas, that 
Which was said within one system must necessarily be tra~slated 
into that which is understood in terms of an.other system or set 
Of categories •. Add to this the abstractness and abstruse~ens of 
many of the ideas of Plotinus and the task becomes difficult and 
challenging. 
We propose an analysis of the religion of Plotinus under 
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the headings ot (l) his concept of deity, (2) bis idea ot man, 
(3) his concept ot sin, (4) his ideas of life and death, and (5) 
his philosophy of salvation. 
Reference has already been made to,Plotinus' skepticism 
concerning the ordinary de1.t1es ot Greek polytheism. Throughott 
the Enneads numerous references are made to them, but there is 
no reasoh to believe that the terms are to be taken to have mean-
ing except in a literary sense. 11 0uranious (heaven) is some -
times useQ. to denote unity., "Kronos," sometimes means mind, and 
1 
11 Zeus11 is often used to indicate the World•6oul. 
1. Jt typical example of' the latter is: "But· Zeus •-- ordering all, 
governor~ guardian and dispose.,possessor for ever.of the Kingly soul and the 
kingly intellect, bringing all into being by his providence, and presiding 
over all things ns they come, administering all under plan and system, un-
folding the periods of' the kosmos, many of which stand already aocomplished·-
'WOUld it not seem inevitable that, in this multiplicity of concern, Zeus 
should have memory of all the periods .. their n1unber and their different 
qualities •••• Even this matter of' Zeus' memory of the kosmic periods is 
difficult •••• Zeus cannot know the n\llllber of' his works ..... Zeus knows his ·own 
unlimited lite, and in that knowledge, knows the activity that flows from him 
to the kosmos •••• " 
IV. 4. 9 
and a.gain: 
"When under the name of Zeus we are considering the Demiurge we must 
leave out all notions or stage and progress, and recognise one unohan:ging 
and timeless lite •••• " 
IV. 4. 10 
(see also1 III. 5. 8, 9; v. 1. 7J & v. s. 12) 
• 
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'l'he question o~ determining what is Plotinus' doctrine o.'!'' 
God, specifically, ~ is to be con~1.derod God, accC'rdinB to 
his interpretation, is not so easily determlno.cd, ':ehe qi.'J.estion 
demands some elaboration. 
Plotinus uses the word God or 11 theos 11 many times in his 
writings. However, he does not explain the meaning that he 
would attach to the term.1 and apparently uses the term loesely 
to apply to different parts of his system at different times. 
We may not deduce his doctrine of God from an analysis of his 
use of the word alone. 
·There are five possible ways of interpreting Plotinus• 
idea of God. They are (1) the identifying of God with Plotinus' 
concept of gods and demons, (2) the identifying of God with the 
World-Soul, (3) the identifying of God with the Divina-Mind, 
(4) the identifying of God with the One, and (5) the identifying 
ot God with Plotinus' entire system of real being (authentic 
existence). 
The possible argument for the first case is that Plotinus 
believed in the existence of a collection of beings existing 
'betvre~n the level of man and the World-Soul. They were souls 
greater than men, not as completely 11 embodied11 as men, more 
powerful than men --- serving in some sense as mediators between 
the higher order than they and men. In short, the view seems 
to have a rough parallel tq the concept of the Ol'YJJlpian deities, 
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with the exception that these gods arid demons were even less 
limited and less colorful than the po~ular Greek' deities. The 
demons were lesser powers than the godsabut both were of the 
same general tYPe 1 the -difference being that the gods ranked 
2 
higher and were essentially more noble in character. 
2. Plotinus speaks of this second higher level of spiritual beings 
above men viz. : "You are wrongedJ need that trouble an immortal 'i You are 
put to death; you have attained your desire. And f'rom the moment your citi-
zenship of the world becomes irksome you are not bound to it. Our adversa .. 
ries do not deny that even here there is a. system of law and penalty: and 
surely we o annot in justice blame a dominion whioh awards to every one his 
due, where virtue has its honour, and vioe oomes to its fitting shame, in 
which there are not merely representations of the gods, but the gods them-
selveg. watchers from above, and--- as we read---easily rebutting human re-
proaches, since they lead alll things in order from a beginning to an end.-
alloting to eaoh human being, as life follows lire,, a fortune shaped to all 
that has prededed --- the destiny which, to those that do not penetrate it, 
becomes the matter or boorish insolenoe upon things divine •••• · We must 
recognise that other men have attained the heights or goodness; we must admit 
the goodness of the celestial spirits, and above all of the gods ---those 
whose presence is here but their contemplation in the Supreme, and loftiest 
or them, the lord of this All, tho most blessed Soul. Rising still higher, 
we hymn the divinities of the Intellectual Sphere, and above all these, the 
mighty King of that dominion, whose majesty is made patent in the very 
multitude or the gods·" 
II. 9. 9 
And again: "We must, therefore, lny down the grounds on which we distinguish 
the G ods from the Celestials---that is, when we emphasize the separate 
nature of the two orders and are not, as oft en in praotioe1 inoluding these 
Spirits under the common names of Gods. 
It. is our teaohing and conviction that the Gods are immune to all passions 
while we attribute experience and emotionbo the Celestials which, though 
eternal Beings and directly next to the Gods, are already a step towards 
ourselves and stand between the divine and the human.~.~ · 
· It is beat not to use the word"Celestial" of any Being of that Realm; the 
word "God" may be applied to the Essential•Celestial •·- the auto-daimon ·-· 
and even to the Visible Powers or the Universe of sense down to the Moon; 
Goda, these too, visible,, secondary, sequent upon the Gods of the Intellectual ~etU.m, oonsonant with Them,, held about Them, as the radiano e about the star. 
Mlat then are these spirits? A Celestial is the representative generated by 
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Although it is true that Plotinus speaks of these higbor 
~~Jt( 
spiritual beings as gods, we can1be content with the con.(·,J,u,d.t,r. 
that he intended for such to be his total doctrine or deity~ 
Such animism is quite inconsistent with his more elaborate cm:.-
cept of being, in general, and it would be difficult to th1nJ: 
that which we would term 11deity11 existing on a lower level the.n 
some other formulated concept or being. 
A much better argument can be made for identifying the 
World-Soul as deity. Plotinus goes to great detail to en:.pb.as~.ze 
his doctrine of man's essential identity with the World-Soul, 
the great life of the universe. It is his distinctive message 
about man that as a soul he is identified with all souls in the 
universe and even with the universe as a soul. For all practi-
cal purposes man's connection with any other aspect of being 
is directly dependent upon the W·orld-Soul, for man must reach 
cont. 
ea.oh Soul when it enters the Kosmos. And why? by n Soul entering the Kosm6s? 
Because Soul pure of the Kosmoa generates not a Celestial Spirit but a God: 
hence it is that we have spoken or Love, offspring of Aphrodite the Pure 
Soul, as a God •••• 
But what partioipation oan the Celestials have in Matter, and in what Matter? 
Certainly none in bodily liiatter; that would make them simply living thinga 
of the order of sense. And if', even, they are to invest themselves in bodies 
of air or or fire, the nature must have already been altered before they 
o~uld have any oontaot· with the corporeal. The Pure does not mix, unmediated, 
'lliith bady --- though- many think that the Celestial-Kind, of its very eas enoe, 
comports a body aerial or or fire." 
III. 5. 6. 
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; 
even mind and unity through the medium or soul. 
3. Plotinus v.rrites: "But what becomes of the soul's infinity if' it :ts 
thus fixed. The infinity is a matter of' power: there is question not of the 
soul's being divisible into e.n infinite number of parts, but of' an infinite 
possible eff'eotiveness: it is infinity in the sense in which the SupreI!lo 
God, also, is f'ree of all bound. 
This means that it is no external limit that defines the individual being or 
the extension of souls any more than of God; on the oontrary each in rj.ght r>f 
his own power is all that it ohoos es to be: and we are not to think of' it as 
going forth from itself' ( losing its unity by any partition): the fact is 
simply that the element 'Within it, which is apt to entrance into ·body, has 
the power of' ill?llediate projection any whither: the soul is oertainly no·~ 
wrenched asunder by its presenoe at once in foot and in finger. Its presenoe 
in the All is similarly unbroken; over its entire range it exists in every 
several part of everything having even vegetal life, even in a part out of'f 
from the main; in any possible segment it is as it is at its souroe. For the 
body or the All is a unit, and the soul is everywhere present to itas to one 
thing.u · 
IV. 2. 8 
" ••• While the Soul ( as an eternal, a Divine Being) is at rest --- in rest 
finnly based on Repose, the Absolute ..... yet, as we may put it, that hugh 
illumination of the Supreme pouring outwards oomes at last to the extreme 
bourne of its lighte and dwindles to darkness •••• 
Imagine that a stately and varied mansion has been built; it has never been 
abonded . by its Architeot, who, yet, is not tied down to it; he has judged 
it worthy in all its length and breadth of all the care that can serve to 
its Being --- as far as it can share in Being --- or to its beauty, but a 
care without burden to its director., who never descends, but presides over i 
it from aboves this gives the degree in which the Kosmos is ensouled,, not by 
a soul belonging to it, but by one present to it; it is mastered not mas'f?er; 
not possessor but possessed. The soul bears it up, and it lies within,, rio 
fragment of it unsharing. 
The kosmos is like a net which takes all its life, ·as fe.r as ever it stretches 
from being wet in viater, and has no not or its own; the sea rolls away and· the 
net; With it, precisely to the full of its scope, for no mesh of' it oan strain 
beyond its set plaoe: the soul is of so far-reaching a nature --- a thing 
unbounded ---. as to ~braoe the entire body of the All in one extension; so 
far as the universe extends, there soul is; and if the universe had no 
existence, the ment of' the soul would be the same1 it is eternally what it ~s. The universe spreads as broad as the presence of the soul; the bound of 
sts expansion is the point at whioh, in its downward egression from the 
upreme, it still has soul to bind it in one ••• •" 
"IV.- 3. ~­
(continued on next page) 
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The chief objection to identifying the World-Soul as God 
cont, 
"The Intelleotunl-Principle in the Supreme hns ever been the sun of that 
sphere - let us accept that as the type of the creative Logos- and i.m-
mediately upon it follows the Soul depending from it, stationary Soul from 
stationary Intelligence. But the Soul borders also upon the sun of thic 
sphere, and it becomes the medium by which all is linked to the over-world; 
it plays the i;>art of an interpreter be!iween what emanaies from that sphere 
down to this lower universe, and what rises - as far as, through Soul, 
anything can·- from the lower to the highest. 11 
IV. 3. 11 
"The administration of the kosmos is to be thought of as of a living unit: 
there is the action determined by v1hat is external, and has to do with the 
parts, and there is that determined by the internal and by the principle .... 
And in· the oase of the universe, the administration is all the less oompliodi 
oa.ted from the fact that the soul actually oiroumsoribes, as part of a liv-
ing unity, all the members which it conducts. For all the Kind~ included in 
the universe are dominated by one Kind, upon which they follow, fitted. into 
it, developing from it, growing out of it, just as the Kind manifested in 
the ,bough is related to the Kind in the trees as a whole. 11 
rv. 4. 11 
''We cannot think or the universe as a soulless habitation, however vast and 
Varied • a thing of materials easily told off, kind by kind - wood and stone 
and what ever else there be, all blending into a kosmos: It must be alert 
throughou'.b, every manber living by its own life. nothing that om have 
existenoe failing to exist within it. 
And here we have the solution or the problem, "How an ensouled living form 
can include the soulless": for this account allows grades of living within 
. the whole, grades to some of which we decy life only because th'ey are not 
perceptibly self-moved: in the truth, all of these. have a hidden life; and 
the thing whoa e life is patent to s ens e is made up of things which do not 
live to sense, but, none the less, confer upon their resultant total wonder• 
ful powers towards living. • • •" 
IV. 4. 36. 
"'Fire, air, water,, earth, are in thanselves soulless -- whenever souls is in 
any of them, that life is borrowed •• and there are no other forms of body 
than these four: even the school that believes there are has always held 
them to be bodies.. not souls, and to be witbout life. None of these, then,, 
having life, it 1\0Uld be extraordinary if life crone aoout by bringing them 
together; it is impossible, in fact, that the oollooation of material 
entities should produce life, or mindless entities mind. No one, moreover, 
would pretend that a mere chance mixing could give such results: some 
tregulating prinoiple would be neeessary, some Cause directing the admixture: he guiding principle would be -- soul •••• " 
IV. 7. 2. 
(continued on next poge) 
_,(!_ 
in Plotinus is the fact that Plotinus also clearly refers to ·chb 
Divine -Mind as deity. Deity cannot be accounted for apart frum 
something that is itself greater than soul. Immanence may eff130 
effect a meaning but it is not itself that meaning. Fror11 the 
standpoint of pure immanence there would be much argument for 
the view that the World-Soul alone is all that may be considered 
deity in Plotinus, but if we look to the meaning of experienoe 
in something that is itself transcendent of the experience it-
. . 
self, we must appeal to that which is more divine than soul, 
namely mind. 
oont·~-· 
"Thus in sum,, the soul,, a--divine being and a dweller in the loftier realms,, 
has entered body: it is a god,, a later phase of the divine: but um.er ....,_., 
stress of its powers and of its tendency to bring order to its next lower, 
it penetrates to this sphere in a voluntary p"lunge •••• -'The aot reveals the 
povier,, a power hidden, and we might almost say obliterated or non-existent, 
unless at some moment it became effective: in the world as it is,, the rich-
ness of the outer stirs us all to the 1'/0nder of the inner whose greatness 
is displayed in aots so splendid." 
IV. 8. 5. 
"N ow are we to hold similarly that your soul and mine all are one, and that 
the same thing is true of the universe,, the soul in all the sever al forms of' 
lii'e being one soul, not parcelled out in separate items,, but an omnipresent 
id~tity? First we must assure ourselves of the possibility of all souls 
being one as that of' any given individual is •• •• " 
II -- -- . IV. 9. l. 
How can a multitude of' essential beings be really one? Obviously either the 
one essence will be entire in all,, or the man¥ will rise from a one which 
remains unaltered and yet; inolucles: the one-maey in virtue of giving itself. ~ithout self-abandomnent,, to its own multiplication. It is competent thus II 
1~ give and remain, because while it penetrat·es all things it can never 
self' be sundered: this is an id entity in variety.• •• 11 
rv. 9. s 
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To identify Plotinus' concept of mind with deity would bA. 
-
to identify God with principle, pattern, intelligence, and spi~it~ 
-
It would be the conceiving of being and deity as one and the Aan:e 
thing. In this connection it will be remembered that unity or 
the One does not conform to the normal requirements of the 
concept 11being11 in that it is being 1 s source, a Supra-being in 
the sense that its intensity of being is too high to be known. 
To interpret the Divine-Mind as God would also be the viewing 
of the whole system of authentic being, for even soul as mind• 
in-motion must ultimately be identified as mind, pattern, prin-
ciple. spirit, intelligence, etc. Some suggestion along these 
lines- is given by the fact that Plotinus gives an unusual promi-
nence to the treatment of mind in his system. He at least once 
4 
identifies the Intellectual-Principle as God. When Plotinus 
speaks of Prayer the implication is quite stro~g that it is to 
be directed toward mind. The very concept of prayer would seem 
to be rather ridiculous unless that which responds existed in 
some condition of mind. The following passage from Plotinus 
gives some implication to this effect, but the point is debatable: 
--
------ ----- ------· -------
4~ "Thus we have here one identioal Prinoiple, the Intellect, which 
is the universe of' authentic beings, the Truth: as such it is a great god, 
or, better,, not a· god among gods but the Godhead entire. It is a god, a 
seoondary god manif'esting before there is any vision or that other1 the 
Supreme which rests over all, enthroned in transoendenoe upon that splendid 
Pediment, the nature follovdng close upon it•" 
v. s. 3. 
i 
"But ho·w and what do es the Ihtel.i eotuai-Prinoiple see and, esp eoi ally 
how has it sprUJlr; from that whieh is to become the objeot or i·t;E v5s.i.cn 
In venturing an answer, we first invoke God Himself, not in loud W(..r.t 
but in that w w of' prayer which is always within our power, leani:n~ ;.u 
soul towards Him by aspiration, alone towards the alone •••• 
v. l, 6. 
It 1s not here explicit whether 11 alone towards the alone" imp1i~"s 
direction toward the Intellectual-Principle as an object or 
towards the One ae anobject. On the bas!s of other·paesagea 
6ne could get no farther than the Intellectual-Principle in the 
medium of prayer even though he may be directed to an object 
beyond it• 
The objection to the identity of mind and deity in Plotinus 
- -
is that such a view sacrifices logical scope in the oonce~t of 
deity to the practicality of devising deity as an object. The 
View is not so much an explanation of deity in Plotinus as it is 
a resort to the necessity of conceiving of deity in terms of 
understandable categories. 
Although not many interpreters have suggested it, there is 
some reason to identify the One and God. From this approach, 
God is always conceived of in terms of ultimates. Anything less 
than an ultimate io not God. It might be a secondary god or a 
lllediation of' God, but worship may only be directed toward a 
logical ultimate. This view is that Plotinus indicates a 
logical definition of what God must be even though such a God 
1s not the God of human experience. The One or unity is to 
be seen as the ultimate combination and coherence of all known 
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values in a manner so as to be a:inf1nitely infinitett" to 
borrow a l)hras e of Samuel Alexander. Often Plot,.nus refers to 
the One or unitJ as "The Good" and by this connotat1.or. he r-~e~-,. I'! 
something more than rightneas in behaviour. He means th~:d; 
whose very existence is entirely good. This doctrine is con-
sistent with the ancient and traditional tendency to me~ge the 
concept of independent or ultimate good in with the concept of 
ultimate deity and vice versa. 
This view presents the One as a sort of God of Philosop.~ers. 
There is a sense 1n which Philosophers will worship a logical 
God ~ather than a practical God. It is necessary to experience 
all values in their ultimate formulations before the admission 
or the thesis that they must logically exist in ultimate com-
bination. 'I'he abstract mind always worships more than it 
experiences. 
The identity of unity and deity is not at all inconsistent 
With the Hebrew concept of the utter holiness of God as Jahveh, 
the ultimately self-existent 11 I am that I am. 11 It would be 
difficult to calculate how God could be anything less than the 
ultimate coalescence of values and still meet the logical demands 
that must be put upon the concept of deity. The question at 
issue 1n this interpretation of the God of Plotinus is whether 
or not the ·concept of deity in Plotinus may be limited to the 
Ultimate logical merger of values. That which he ascribes to 
the One is usually ascribed only to deity. The One is perfect, 
or more correctly The Perfect or Perfection. Soul and Mind are 
not perfect in themselves for they must have their perfection 
only through the emanation of the One. The One is at peace 
with itself, being its own object, whereas mind must have the 
One for its object and soul must have mind. The One was not 
produced, it contains its own self-causality within itself. 
Mind and soul, however, are productions. The One is Eb ove will 
in the sense that it constitutes its own object as well as its 
own desires. The One is a complete self-activity: a sel£-1den-
tical essence {Vl.8.l;), logically situated above even thought 
and thinking (I. 7. 1). In itself it is complete in every 
sense. It would seem to be the case that Plotinus' own de• 
scription of the One is the same as our usual description of 
deity. 
There is further evidence, however, that Plotinus himself 
did not identify the concepts 11 God11 and "The One. 11 He writes 
at one place: 
"Think or The One as Mind or as God,, you think too meanly; use all 
the resource of understanding to conceive this Unity and, again,, it 
is more authentically one than God, even though you reach for God's 
unity beyond the un~ty the most perreot you can conceive. For This 
is utterly a self-existent, with no oonoomitant whatever. This self• 
sufficing is the essence or its unity.·· Something there must be 
supremely adequate, autonomous,, all-tr·anacending,, most utterly with-
out need." VI, 9.6. 
A tentative suggestion at this stage is that Plotinus seems to 
~ank God less than he ranks the One. Plotinus a~pears ambiguous 
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as to a conclusion about the matter as sometimes seems to rank 
· God as something less than the One and sometimes appears to use 
the idea of God to serve as a synonym for the One. The answer 
to the problem is too difficult to undertake within the limits 
of this study. May it suffice to say that there is considerable 
evidence to support the identity of deity with the One, but also 
evidence in Plotinus to the contrary. 
The most likely view, in the opinion of the writer, is the 
fifth possibility, namely the view that the God of Plotinus is 
the identity of all three elements or states: unity, mind, and 
soul as one deity. This would be saying that the entire system 
or metaphysical reality as ~lotinus suggests it is the same 
thing as deity --- that the real world (authentic existence) 
and God are one and the same thing. This would be a modified 
pantheism rather than a thorough-going pantheism due to the 
fact that God could not be identified with our entire phenomonal 
world. Only that part of the universe that might be concluded. 
to be real could be oonsidered as deity. Illusions, Matter, 
Evil --- all the negative aspects of our universe conceived ot 
aa sheer multiplicity, chaos, etc. share no part of reality, 
being or deity. 
As Plotinus would have it, deity is everywhere --- in the 
Sun, Moon and heavenly bodies, in spirits and demons that in-
habit the upper world, in anything that possesses ~ife. He even 
says that inanimate things have a 11 life of their own" even 
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though we thr~.ugh our senses may not discern the pecul~.ar l~_fe 5· 
within them. Plotinus speaks of both soul and mind as Gc.C.y 
upon different occasions. One question at issue in these in .. 
stances is whether he is thinking of the soul as God in the 
sense that it is the One and in that sense only, or whether he 
is considering the soul as soul as making up a part of deity. 
The arguments already given in this chapter for possibility # 2 
namely, the identifying of God with the World-Soul seem to in-
dicate that soul considered in itself is treated as deity. The 
same situation occurs in reference to mind, as already hereto-
fore_ mentioned, so that the conclusion that should follow is 
that Plotinus treated both soul and mind as God, and implicitly 
so treated the One. 5oemthing of his beaching about deity wouli 
be left out if the concept were limited to any one of the three 
parts of his system of authentic being. Unless it can be shown 
that in associating soul and mind with deity Plotinus means for 
soul and mind to be considered as God only in the sense that 
they may be considered the One, the best practical solution to 
the question is the identity of deity with the whole system of 
authentic being. 
· s~ ·He writes: "We oannot think of the universe as a soulless habitation 
however vast and varied, a thing of materials easily told off, kind by kind 
... •wood and stone and whatever else there be, all blending into a kosmos: it 
must be alert [ alive J throughout, gvery member living by its own lif'e,, 
nothing that can have existenoe failing to exist vdth it." IV. 4.36 
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Although it would not be necessary to think of Plotinus' 
view or man as a religious one, his doctrine or man is a vital 
part in the religious a.apect of his sy~em. Religion is possible 
because man can do something about his condition. Even though 
man is closely identified with nature, and especially with ali 
being by virtue of his existence as soul, his destiny is not 
purely determined by hi~ situation or environment. He can choose 
the high road or the low road a~d his choices make a moral dif-
ference in the determination of future reward and punishmenta. 
As has already been indicated, man is significantly a soul. 
He is a soul embodied with that not consistent with soul. This 
accounts for the struggle within the consciousness of man between 
that tendency toward the noble and good and that tendency toward 
the ignoble and evil· Matter makes man evil, soul makes him goode 
The moral struggle is the struggle to be more soul-like in total 
disposition rather than to relax into the downward pull and 
degradation of matter. 
Man as soul is not notably different fr0m any other soul in 
general with the exception that he is a higher soul than some 
Of them and a lower soul than others. It is the distinctive 
mess.age of Plotinus that man is located in the mid-point of the 
total universe. As a soul he shares in the world or being and 
aa a soul embodied he shares in the world or becoming. Even in 
the ranking of the souls he does not belong to the highest order 
of souJ.a, but is again ranked in the middle of the order of souls. 
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It is the doctrine of Plotinus that man is the central figure 
in the universe although not the epitome of its value. 
Man can and does sin, according to Plotinus. Sin consists 
simply in man's choosing of that which is below him in preference 
to that which is above him: the surrender to a lower value (for 
that which has no value) instead of allegiance to supreme values. 
Sin is being like the nature of matter instead of being like the 
nature of soul, mind and unity. 
Punishment for sin is mainly reserved for future life and 
is effected by karma. Like all souls, man as a soul undergoes 
reincarnation. Justice is effected by the fact that the soul 
in its next existence is incarnated in a body most in keeping 
with the faculty that it has developed most in its previous in-
carnation. Plotinus writes: 
"Those that have attained the human level are men once more. Those 
that have lived wholly to sense become animals --- corresponding in 
species to the particular temper of' the life --- ferocious animals 
where the sensuality has been accompanied by a certain measure of 
spirit, gluttonous and lascivious animals where all has been appetite 
and satiation of appetite. those who in their pleasures have not ev'en 
lived by sensation, but have gone their way in a torpid grossness be-
come mere growing things, for this lethargy is the entire act of the 
vegetative, and such men have been busy be-treeing themselves. Those, 
• •• that otherwise untainted, have loved song become vocal animalsJ 
kings ruling unreasonably but with no other vice are eagles; futile 
and flighty visionaries ever soaring skyward, become high-flying birds; 
observance of civic and seoular virtue make man again. or where the merit 
is less marked • one of the animals of communal tendency,, a bee or the 
like." III. 4. 2 
Perhaps P~otinus is not completely serious in everything he says 
in this particular passage and may even be presenting the idea 
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in the 11myth11 tradition, but his doctrine or reincarnation is to b~ 
be taken as a serious explanation of the possibility of justice 
6 
in reference to sin. 
Sin is to be seen, nevertheless, as a possibility under the 
self-determination of souls rather than as an indication of any 
indeterminancy of soul. Souls as particularu souls exist under 
a system of rigid determination and whatever freedom of choice 
men or other. souls have occurs within a limit of their particular 
order, withih their power to act as free agents insofar as freedom 
is operative in their current incarnation. The doctrine is, 
further, that the higher the order of the particular soul, the 
greater the degree of free choice. Men have more free choice 
than horses, and spirits and demons have more free choice than 
-
men. Even though choices are determined by the particular 
,· 
.~_ .. .,,.. ________ _,,_;.:__ ______________ --::, _________ _ 
s, Plotinus ax:presses the idea: more teohnioally, viz. & "In that 
archetypal world every form of' soul is near to the image t the thing in the 
world or copy} to which its individual oonsti tution inclines it J there is 
therefore no need of a sender or leader acting at the right moment to bring 
it at the right moment whether into body or into a definitely appropriate b 
body: of it own motion it descends at the precisely true time and enters 
where it must. • • • The Souls go forth neither under compulsion nor of 
freewill; or at least, freedom, here, is not to be regarded as action upon 
preference; ~t is more like such a leap of' the nature as moves men to the 
instinctive desire of sexual union, or in the case or some, to tine oonduot: 
the motive lies elsewhere than in the reason: like b destined unfailingly 
to like, and each moves hither or thither at its fixed moment." IV'. 3. 13. 
essential nature of the soul in its current incarnation, they 
are still to be considered as free choices in that the respon-
sibility for the current condition resides in choices made in 
previous incarnations. Action in accordance with providence 
is not necessarily action to which the soul is determined by 
providence. hence, misfortune and suffering are to be viewed 
as the just payment for sin committed in a previous incarnation. 
In like manner, goodness, virtue 1 and nobility as well as vice, 
suffering and pain are to be conceived of as the result of 
moral action on the part of souls acting as free agents. In 
summ~ry 1 although the soul as soul cannot will to do evil, sin 
may be considered as the impulse of souls to free themselves from 
their participation in the nature of the World-Soul and to allow 
themselves to become like the nature of matter. 
Essential in every religion is some qualitative concept of 
life, some suggestion of the nature of the summum bonum for man. 
Parallel with that will be the opposite condition, usually con-
ceived of as "death." In this sense life is conceived of as 
nearly identical with the concept of value in contrast with the 
less qualitative concept of being as existence. ImP,licit in the 
concept is the suggestion that man can do something about mak-
ing existence more qualitative, and the doing of such is at 
least part of what is involved in religion. 
Plotinus' summun bonum is the mystic~l identity of the soul 
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(i.e. man as a soul) with the One, an estatic joyous relation-
ship that can only rarely occur. It is the high peak of his 
religion, the culmination of his discipline of salvation. 
Plotinus, however, also granted the fact of the impossibility of 
life being lived on such a high plane of joy. In a secondary 
sense, then, we may say that his comcept of the good life is the 
life dedicated to the discipline of attaining mystical identity 
of the soul with the One. By similar parallel, death occurs 
when sin is effective ·-- when soul is so limited by its in-
volvement in matter as not to typify the inherence of the One in 
it. In short, life for Plotinus is the joy of identity in 
communion with the One, death is merger into Matter and multi-
plicity. 
But how doos on~raaoh the ~ummum b~ according to 
Plotinus? What technique or routine does Plotinus suggest as 
the way of salvation for man? The answer constitutes his pbil• 
Osophy of Salvation. 
As has already been indicated, the metaphysics of Plotinus 
1s a system of ideal reality: the conceiving of the real as the 
ideal in typical Platonic fashion. However, in his doctrine ot 
Sa1va·bion Plotinus indicates a practical religious way of life in 
Which man may come into immediate union with the ideal. In 
this manner, _he counteracts the possibility allowed by Plato ot· 
conceiving of ideal life as a sheer abstraction. For Plotinus, 
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the real world is no abstraction, no mere idea in the mind. 
Instead, it was a thing there to be known, more or less, by 
means of and virtue of the souls proper behaviour in the pro-
cess of its search for ideal life. 
The whole necessity for Salvation rests upon the thesis of 
Plotinus that the soul { man as soul: man as an individual) 
exists in the universe in a 11 fallen11 stat e. Man finds his 
identity with deity by conceiving of himself as soul, as having 
emanated ultimately from the very ideal world for which he longs. 
Parallel to his doctrine of Emanation as it applies in the broad 
metaphysical sense (wherein the ultimate overflows to produce 
less real stages which overflow repeating the same process in 
turn) Plotinus's soterology incorporates the doctrine of 
"Epistrophe," namely the desire and attempted return of the 
soul to that from which it ultimately came. Apparently, for 
Plot1nus, Salvation is possible only among individual souls, 
and possible to all individual souls. 
Salvation, as Plotinus sees it, is essentially a technique 
involving three processes: (l) catharsis, or purification 
(morality); (2) dialectic, or the practice or the discipline 
of philosophy; and, (3) illumination, or enlightenment ( Vu~trr. s) 
---a state of ecstasy wherein the soul finally comes into direct 
communion with the One itself· The way of Salvation is a 
journey from soul to mind to the One, the emanations are re-
traced in the process so that the soul progressively realizes 
its identity with the World-Soul, the Divine-Mind, and finally 
with the One itself. 
Salvation occurs in stages. The stages and processes are 
not to be seen as distinct in themselves but rather as grad~­
ally flowing from one into the other. They constitute a gl"adual 
inclined plane rather than steps of a pyramid. They are to be 
interpreted not so much as a formal process entered into as they 
are as an informED. way of life, a prolomged and sustained 
effort to penetrate deeper and deeper into spiritual realities 
of li_fe --- into 11 fa1th in the unembodied11 as Plotinus himself 
terms it• Affirming the existence of an ideal order and supra-
sensual reality, the way of Salvation is an introspective journey 
away from the wo~ld of sensuous reality into the world of the 
soul, and hence into the world of the mind until the journey 
finally stops in the ecstasy of enlighment, the direct communion 
of man as a soul with the Ultimate. It is a shifting of the 
center of our conscious attention away from matter to soul, mind~ 
and spirit --- the focussing of our minds away from their own 
mental processes to an awareness of divinity -in-general. 
It seems to be the teaching of Plotinus that everyone is 
capable of entering into the process of Salvation, although he 
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conceeds that all may not begin at the same level. Plotinus 
further grants that all may not use the same method in the 
journey towar~ union with the One. He indicates three fundamen-
tal methods or temperaments that a.nply in the entrance into 
Salvation: that of the musician, that of the lover~ and that of 
8 
the philosophel" • 
1. t•~'\.nyone not of the stra;.eth ·!;o lay hold of the first soul, that poss es s-
ing pure intellection,, nnst grMp that whfoh hM ·l:;o do with ou'l'." ordins.ry 
thinking and thenoe ascend: ii' cr1en this prove too hare, let him turn to 
account; the sensitiv{j phase which carries the ideal fcnns oi' the less fine 
degree , that phase whioh ~;oc:-: w:d;h its powers, is immaterial and lies 
just" within the realm of' Ideal··prinoipleS'. One may even, if it seem nec-
essary, begin as low as the reproductive soul and its very prcduc-!;ion and 
thence make the ascent, mounting from those ultimalieideal principles to 
the ultimates in the hi&her sensG, that is to the pri1nals. 11 V. 3o 9. 
'~. • • in ours elves the relation to the Supreme--is not identical from soul 
to soul; some of' us are capable of' becoming UrJ.ate, otliers of striving 
and almost attaining, ·while a third rank is much less apt; it is a matter 
of the degree or powers of the soul by which our expression is determined 
--- the first d agree dominant in the one person, the s eoond., the third 
(the merely animal lif'e) in others while, still, all of us contain the 
powers • 11 IV• 3 • 6 • 
t!.. .. 1Io"t"1 lie$ the oO:urse? IG· it alike .for· all.;··or ·is··'th'ert1' a:;~t 
~hod for oooh olMs .or temper~~'? 
For all there are two stages .. of the path .... the first degree is the 
conversion f'rom the lower life; the second, held by those that have already 
lllade their way to the sphere of the Intelligibles., lasts until they reaoh 
the extreme hold or the plaoe, the Term attained when the topmost peak of' 
the Intellectual realm is won •••• 
We must begin by distinguishing the three types. Let us take the musioian 
first and indicate his temperamental E}quipment f'or the task. 
The musician we may think of as being exceedingly quick to beauty,, drawn in 
a very rapture to it: somewhat slow to stir of his own impulse, he answers 
~t once to the outer· st.im•11us: as the timid aro sensitive to noise so he 
h 0 tones and the beauty they conveyJ all "that off' ends against unison or 
arruony in melodies a.."'l.d rhymes repels him; he longs for :t:?easure and shapely 
Pattern. This natural tendency must be made the starting-point to suoh a 
man; he must be drawn by the tone~ rhythm and design in things of' sense: he 
must learn to distinguish the material forms from the Authentic-Existent (continued on next page) 
Art, morality, and philosophy --- all may encourage the in-
dividual along the journey toward the One for in them all there 
is a certain catharsis, a pur11'1cat1on. They all must be 
con ·• 
whioh is the source of all these correspondences and of' the entire reasoned 
scheme in the work of' art:· he must be led to the Beauty that manifests-· 
itself' through these forms; he must be shovm that what; ravished him was 
no other than the Harmony of' the Intellectual world ·and the Beauty in that 
spnere; not some one shape of beauty but the All-Beauty, the Absolut'e 
Beauty; and the truths or philosophy must be implanted in him to lead him 
to faith in that which, unknowing it, he possesses within himself. 'What 
these truths are we will show later. I. 3. l. 
The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain ....... and then 
either come to a stand or pass beyond --- has a certain memory of beauty 
but, severed from it now, he no·-ionger compregends it: spellbound by 
visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall 
down no longer in .bewildered delight before some one embodied form; he must 
be led under a system or mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made 
to disoern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle apart from the 
material forms, springing from another souroe, and elsewhere more truly 
present. The beauty, for example, in a mble course of life and in an 
admirably organised social system may be pointed out to him --· a first 
training this in tbe lo11eliness of the immaterial --~ he must learn to 
recognise the beauty in the arts, soienoes, virtues, then these severea 
and partioular forms must be brought under the one principle by the expla-
nation of their origin. From the virtues he is to be led to the Intellect-
ual-Principle, to the Authentic-Existent; thence onward, he treads the 
upward way. I. 3. 2. 
The metaphysioian, equipped by that very character, winged already and not 
like those others, in need of disengagemnet, stirring of himself towards 
the supernal but doubting of' the way, -·needs only a guide. He must be shown, 
then, and instructed, a willing wayfarer by his very temperament, all but-
self .. direoted. Mathematics, which as a student oy nature he will take very 
easily, will be prescribed to train him to abstract thought and to faith in 
t~e U~anbodied; a moral being by native disposition, he must be led to make 
his virtue perfect: and after the lrathematics he must be put through a 
course in Dialectic and made en ~adept in the scienoe." I. 3. 3. 
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followed by dialectics, however, so that considered categorica:"..l.-r 
the three processes or Purification, Dialectics and Ecstasy still 
obtain in any manner or the way of Salvation. 
With this in mind, how, then, may we chart the course or 
the soul in its journey in the various processes on the way to 
Salvation~ The first Of the processes, 0~rtharsis 1 is an . 
elemen~ary act of self-purification. It is a cleansing of the 
mind (soul) from all things alien to its essential nature. 
Purification in Plotinus is to be interpreted as an act of moral-
ity as if Plotinus were saying that Morality constitutes the 
first. demand for Salvation. The basic moral act, according to 
Plotinus, is the turning away from sense to soul, from body to 
mind. Matter is evil and souls have their defilement by con-
nect1on with ~odies. Any process of salvation must begin with the 
the disassociation or souls from bodies. 9 
9. "Ir a. man has been immersed· in tilth or dnubed m'..th"zhud · his.'rlat!v~f 0~liness disappears. ·ana· all that :ts seen is the ··toul sturr beemeari:;i.g· him: 
w.s ugly condition is due to alien mati:;er "that has encrusted him .. and if he 
is to win back his ·graoe it must be his business to scour and purify him .. 
self and make himself whit he was. 
So, we may justly say, a Soul becomes ugly ---by something foistered upon 
it,, by sinking itself into the alien, by a fa11;· a descent into body, into 
Matter. The dishonour of the Soul is in its ceasing to"be clean and apart. 
Gold is degraded when it is mixed With earthy particleSJ ii' these be work.-
ad out, the gold is left and is beautiM,, isolated from all that is foreign 
gold with gold alone. And so the Soul: if it is to be but cleared of the 
desires that oome by its too intimate converse with body1- emancipated fr0m 
all the passions .. purged of all that embodiment had thrust upon i'ti, with,,..-
drawn,, a solitary, to itself again .... in that moment the ugliness that eame 
only from the alien is stripped away. I. 6. 5-. 
Self~pui:t1ticat1on, or morality at this ievel begins first 
by the beginning of the practice of ordinary moral life in the 
sense of being a gdod citizen. It consists of active emphasis 
upon and participation in the natural 6r public virtues; called 
by Plotinus, 11 the civic virtues~ 11 These are the same virtues 
as the four cardinal virtues of Plato, namely, wisdom, courage, 
temperance, and justice. (I. 2. 1) These virtues alone are in-
. . 
adequate to lead the soul to the One but- they do serve an elemen~ 
tary and practical function in the process. 
Plotinus writes--or their value: "T"he Civic Virtues ••• are a prinoiple 
or order and beauty in us as long as vre ·remain passing our lii'e here: 
they ennoble us by setting bound and measure to our desires and to our 
entire sensibility, and dispelling false judgement --- and this by 
sheer ef.f'ioaoy of the better:.1 by the very setting of' the bounds, by the 
faot that the measured is lifted outside of the sphere of' the unmeasured 
and lawless. And further; these Civic Vir~ues --- measured and ordered 
tliems elves and aoting as a principle of measure to the Soul whioh is as 
Matter to their forming -·- are like to the measure reigning in the 
overworld, and they carry a trace of that Highest Good in the Supreme •• ': 
I. 2. 2. 
Civic virtues,as Plotinus sees them , have some minor image of 
the One in them but their function is lim~ted primarily to the 
realm or sense, to the functioning of souls with bodies• They 
serve the value of restraining men from entering into vice, and 
or purifying them from entering into evil action, but much more 
than this is necessary for the attaining of Salvation. As 
Plotinus incidentally comments: 
"· •• our concern is not merely to be sinless but to 
be God." I. 2. 6. 
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Beyond the simple negation of sense, morality also involves 
the positive affirmation of the ideal. Following Plato, Plot:tnus 
suggests that the Civil virtues are but. poor examples of a higher 
order of virtues, namely these same sorts of virtues in their 
10 
more idealized or intellectualized form. 
As the soul becomes more and more introspective, purifica-
tion becomes more and more a matter of inner purity. The civil 
virtues, apart from intercourse with bodiesj become ideal virtues, 
virtues in distinctive reference to the soul itself. The soul, 
in effecting its morality, turns more and more int~ itself and 
looks upon its own reason --- looks to the deeper purifying of 
soul as soul. By this Plotinus seems to be saying that morality 
itself is more than a negative limitation of the power of body, 
lo. "To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct orders of 
VJ.rtue, and the oivio does not suffice for Likeness: 'Likeness-·to God,' 
he say;- 'is a :f'light from this world's ways and things': in dealing with 
the qualities of good oiti.zenship he does not use the simple term Virtue 
but adds the distinguishing word oivio:--and elsewhere he declares all the ·-
virtues without exception to be purii'ioations. ·-But in what sense oan we oall 
the virtues purii'ioations,, and how does purifioation issue in Likeness? As 
the Soul is evil by being interi'used with the body, and by coming to share 
the body's states and to think the body's thoughts, so it would be good, it 
would be possessed cf virtue,, ff it threw off the body's moods- and devoted 
itself to its own Aot: the state of Inbellection and Wisdom; never allowed 
the passions of the body to a.ffeot it: the virtue of Sophrosyne (temperanoe J 
knS'i'J. no fear at the parting from the body: the virtue of' Fortitude (courage] 
and if reason and I:rrl;elleotual-Prinoiple rules: in which state is Righteous-
ness. [ justloeJ • Such a disposition in tho Soul, become thus intellective 
and lll'!Ilune to passion,, it would not be wrong to oall Lj.kene3s to <kid •••• " 
I. 2. 3 • 
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it is a positive affirmation or the purity of soul. He summa-
r1ze8 many of his ideas concerning morality as follows: 
"The solution is in understanding the virtues and what ea.oh has to 
give: - thus the man will learn to work with this or that as every 
several need demands. And as he reaches to loftier principles and 
other standards, these in turn will define his··conduot: ·ror exaxnple, 
restrainli in its earlier form will no longer satisfy him; he will v.-ork 
for the final disengaganent; he will live, no lon~er; the human life 
of the good man --- suoh as Civio Virtue commends --- but, leaving this 
beneath him, will tako up instead another life, that of the Gods, For 
it is to the Gods, not to the Good, that our Likeness must looka to 
model ourselves upon good men is to produce an image of an image: we 
have to f'ix our gaze above the image and attain Likeness to the Supreme 
Exemplar," I. 2. 7. 
The principle advocated here, under the 1dea or doctrine of 
Purification is the appeal to the ideal order of mind and unity 
over and against the satisfaction associated with bodies. An 
educational process takes place in the sense that the soul learns 
to dis-like the sensuous and to appreciate 'the ideai and 
ll 
beautiful. 
11. Plotinus oomment11: "Cur interpretation is that the soul-•-by the 
very truth or its nature • by its affiliation to the nobleat Existents in 
the hierarohy of' Being---when it sees anything of that kin, or any traoa 
of' that kinship# thrills.mth an immediate delight, takes its own to itself;; 
and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all its affinity." 
_ I~ G. 2. 
"He that has the strength, let him arise and withdraw into him· 
self', foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever f·rom t~e material beauty that onoe made his joy. 'When he peroeivee those shapes; 
0 graoe that. show in body, let him not r>ursue: He must know them for 
~0Pies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of.•• 
B Let us i'l ea then to the beloved Fatherland t: this is the soundest oouns el. 
tut -·what is this flight? How are we to gain the op en sea? The Fatherland 
0 Us is There whenoe we have aome., and There is The Father. 
(oont. on next page) 
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Civic virtues and a love for the ideal finally will lead to 
the third stage or level of Purification, namely, a rigid ascet-
icism in which the:e is a complete disassociation of soul and 
body. Plotinus explains that this is more than a mere withdraw-
al from certain evil aspects of the body --- it is a flight of the 
soul entirely away from the body and all sensuous desire. 
cont. 
What then is our course,, what is the manner or our flight? This is not 
a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from land to land; nor need 
you. think 0£ ooaoh or ship to oarry you awayJ all this order or things 
you must set a.side and refuse to see: you must olose the eyes and oall 
instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you,, a vision,, the 
birt~-right of all,, which few turn to use." a 
I. b. ~ • 
11And tfiis intter vision, what is its operation? " 
Nev1ly awakened it is all too feeble to bear the ultimate splendour. There• 
fore the Soul must be trained--- to the habit or remarking, first, all 
noble pursuits:, then the works of beauty produced not by the labour of 
the arts but by the virtue of men known for their goodness: lastly, 
you must searth the souls of those that have shaped these beautiful forms ••• 
Withdraw into yourself and look. lmd if you do not find yourself 
beautiful yeb, aot as does the oreator of a statue 'that is to be made 
beautiful: he cuts away here, he smoothes there,, he makes this line lighter 
this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you 
also. out away all that is excessive, straighten all that is orooked, 
bring light to all that is overoast, labour to make all one glow of beauty 
and never oeas-e chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on 
you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the 
perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine •••• 
If the eye that adventures the vision be dimmed by vice, impure, or weak , 
~d unable in its cowardly blenching to sea the uttermos_t brightness, then 
it sees nothing even though another point to what lies plain to sight 
before it. To any vision must be brought an eye adapted to what is to be 
seen, and having some likeness to it. Mever did eye see the sun unless it 
had first become sunlike, and never can the soul have vision of the First 
Beauty unless itself be beautiful.. Theref'ore, first let ea.oh become 
godlike and eaoh beautiful who cares to see God and Beauty ••• " 
I •. 6. 9. 
In so doing, all individual souls realize their identity 
with the World-Soul. Individual things lose their consciousness 
of their particularity. The Soul instead or seeing itself as 
distinct, an item of individuality such as a single soul with a 
single body, sees itself as more truly but one overall soul unit. 
As such, each individual soul is not a function of the World-Soul, 
nor does £t in any sense "belong" to the World-Soul. Each one is 
distincj in itself apart from body or other souls, however, by 
virtue of the interrelatedness of each soul with all other souls 
the overall likeness or souls, one to another, may be see~. 
Altho~gh they exist separately, all souls may be said to ~artalte 
of the nature of the World..Sou1 and find their overal 1 id.entity 
1n the fact that their similarity is greater than their dis-
•1m1lar1ty. By this technique the soul comes to see its true 
existence as soul by ridding itself of its illusion or its real-
ity as body. It looks upon its own reason and attains its 
highest purity within the process of its discovery or the nature 
Of itself as soul, or soul•ness in general, and of the overall 
likeness or all souls. 
Purif1cation1 then, can hel~ the soul to see itself as an 
item of value apart from body, but it cannot in itself lead the 
soul tosee its significance as mind. By catharsis and an ulti-
~ate asceticism the soul of man may see its identity with the 
World-SouJ.: the Soul of the World, all souls in general, but 
catharsis alone cannot lead man to the Divine -Mind or to the One' 
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In order to go higher, in order to attain identity with the Divine 
Mind, the soul must turn away from itself as an object and fix 
its attention upon the Divine Mind. In so doing it enters into 
the second major pro~~as in the way of Salvation, namely, 
Dialectics. 
This second process is the science or philosophical inquiry, 
the practice or philosophical mevhod in the analysis or the real 
world. It is not philosophy in general but the discipline or 
method of philosophy. Plotinus writes on this point: 
"But this science, this Dialectic ••• what, in sunh is it? 
It is the method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of 
pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things---
what each is, how it differs fro~ others, what common quality all 
have, to what Kind eaoh belongs and in what rank eaoh stands in ita 
Kind and whether its Being is Real-Bing, and how many Beings there 
are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings_. 
Dialectics treats also of the Good and the not-Good~ and of the 
particulars that fall under eaoh, and of what is the Eternal and what 
the not-Eternal.... All this accomplished. it gives up its touring 
or the realm of sense and settles down in the Intellectual Kosmos and 
there plies its ovm peculiar Aot: it has abandoned all the realm of 
deceit and falsity, and pastures the Soul in the "Meadows of Truth:" 
it employs the Platonic division to the diso~nment of the Ideal-Forms~ 
of the Au~hentic-Existenoe and of the First-Kinds (or Categories of 
Being): it establishes, in the light of Intelleotion. the unity there 
is in all that issues from these Firsts. until it has traversed the 
entire Intellectual Realm: then. resolving the unity into the par-
ticulars once more, it returns to the point from which it starts. 
I. 3. 41:. 
He further writes directly concering the relation of dialectic 
and philosophy: 
"Is Dialectic, then, the same as Philosophy? It is the precious par"t 
of Philosophy. We must not think of' it as the mere tool of the meta• 
physician: Dialedtic does not consist of bare theories and rules: it 
deals with verities; Existences are, as it were, Matter to it, or, 
at least it proceeds methodically towards Existences, ead possesses 
itself', at the one step, of' the 110tions and or the· realities •••• 11 
I. 3. 5. . 
"Philosophy has other provinoes, but Dialectic is its preoious part: 
in its study of' the laws of' the universe, Philosophy draws on DialeotiG 
mu oh as other studios and or afts use Ari thmetio, though, of' oours e., 
the allianoe between Philosophy and Dialeotio is oloser, And in Morals, 
too, Philosophy uses Dialectic: by Dialectic it comes to contemplation1 
thpugh it originates of' itself' the moral state or rather the disoipline 
from which the moral state develops •11 
I. S. s. 
Dialectics may be interpreted as the soul's transition 
from its introspection in which it sees itself as soul, and as 
identified with the World-Soul, to its vision of itself' as mind. 
The soul reaches the Divine-Mind by means of the practice ot 
dialectics. This must be done gradually, even pa1nstakenly. That 
which is authentically mind is determined by critical analysis, 
step by step and 'Process by process, involving every real thing 
in the universe. As the process develops into its .tulness the 
soul ceases to see itself as an ~bJect and fixes its attention 
Jm,tirely upon mind. Plotinus explains that there are essentiall~ 
t\!O phases within dialectics i (1) the process of rising to the 
level of the intelligible from the level of the world of sense, 
and (2) a further process of discip~ine that takes plaoe within 
the intelligible ~orld after that sphere has been r eached. Of 
the three genex>al t¥Pes of me~ capable of' being saved, the musi• 
cian , the lover, the philosop°her, the first two of these need a 
more thorough~going catharsis than does the philosopher since 
the Ph1losophe~ by nature will already have been disengaged from 
the ~Owers of sense. It would be well to point out in this 
.. -··- -
connection that the transition from catharsis into dialectics 
----~ ·-~ ... -- --
is not so much of the order of a clear-cut division or disti:.~ct 
tion of one phase from the other as it is of a gradual, even ~ub~ 
conscious change. Typical of the thought of Plotinus is the 
general doctrine of the gradual evolvement of one phase or stage 
of a thing into its high€~ or lower level as a flowing change 
without specification as to the exact time of change from one 
level ~o another. 
Plotinus writes that dialectics is a science that makes us 
capable of reasoning about the nature of things in order to 
determine their real values. It involves such inquiries as the 
similarities and differences of all things one to another, their 
overall unities and possible differences. It concerns itself with 
the meaning and determination of good and evil, of what is eternal 
and what is transitory, and of the careful analysis and ranking 
of all forms of being following after the One. The appeal is not 
to the senses, but to reason and pri~ciple evident within the 
intelligible world here and now. Plotinus says that dialectics 
employs the Platonic method of division to discern ideas and to 
define objects in order to conclude the various kind or essences, 
the correlation and systematizing of essences, and the final 
deduction or various conclusions from the material presented. 
To this Plotinus adds, however, that dialectics thereafter re-
~er~es itself in order to point back in explanation to the One, 
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the place from which it ultimately started. When it arrives back 
at the One it "rests" having no further need to busy itself with 
a multitude of objects 1 having arr!ved at unity itself. 
The ultimate object of dialectics is the One. From an ob-
servation of the various mind-principles the soul realizes the 
unity of the Divine Mind and that even it finds its unity in 
12 
something superior to itself. 
·· 12. n ••. Cleared of all evil in our intention towards The Good~ we · • 
must ascent to the :Principle within cu:f'.'selves; from many, we must beoome ones 
only so do ·we attain to knowledge of tha·c 1;J1ich is Principle and Unity. We 
shape ourselves into Intellectual-Primiple and set it finnly in That; thus 
what That sees the soul will waken to s::ie: it is through Intelleotual-Prinoipl.e 
that we have this vision of The Unityl it must be our care to bring over 
nothing whatever from the sense; to allow nothl/ing even of the soul to enter 
into the lntellectual-Principl e; with Intellect pure, and with the summit 
ot Intellect, we are to see the All ... Pure. If the quester has the impression 
or extension or shape or mass attaching to That Nature he has not been led by 
Intellectual-Principle which is not of the order to see such things; the 
aotivity has been of' sense and of the judgment following upon senset only 
Intellectual-Principle can inform us 0£ the things of its scope; its compe• 
tence is upon its priors, its content and its issue: but even its conte~t is 
outside of sense; ~nd still purer, still less touched by multiplicity, are 
its priors, or rather its Prior. The Unity, then, is not Intellectual-Prin-
ciple but something higher still: Intellectual-Principle is still a being 
but that Firs'5 is no being but precedent to all being: it cannot be a"being 
for a being has what we may the shape of its reality but The Unity is !ld.i.h-,,u-6 
ah~pe, even shape Intellectual. Generative of all, The Unity is none of all) 
neither thing nor quantity nor quality nor intellect nor soul~ not in motion. 
~ot at rest, not in place, not in time: it is the self-defined, unique in 
0
1nn .. or, better, formless, existing before Form was, or :Uovanent, or Rest., a l of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold" it is." 
It VI. 9o 3 -· 
lf' the mind reels before something thus alien to all we know, we must take 
~~~ stand on things of this realm and strive thence t~ see. But in __ the look 
th'l'.a.re of thawing outward; this Principle does not lie away somewhere leaving 
1 e rest void; to those of power to reach, it is present; to the inapt, absent. snlou~ daily affairs we cannot hold ari objeot in mind if we have given our• 
e ves elsewhere, oooupied upon some other matter; that very thing must be 
(continued on next pagE?) 
rhe message of Plotinus is that Man as soul by means of the dia .... 
lectio comes to ·See himself as mind. Just as catharsis leade man 
to see himself as soul and eventually to realize his inherent~ 
identity with the World- Soul the dialectic leads him to see 
his identity through soul with mind and leads him up to the point 
of merger with the Divine-Mind. As Plotinus expresses it a 
number Qf times 1 it is a process of arriving at 11faith in the 
unembod1ed11 by means of a scientific study. The dialectical 
~rocess will indicate1 as it progresses step by step8that there 
must be something of the order of mental life behind each level 
that ·1s discovered. The various things that exist in the uni-
verse are revealed to exist not in themselves but by virtue of 
some primciple of operation superior to the things themselves. 
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Each level of probing for a cause will reveal a deeper and 11more-
mental" cause behind each particular stage of existence. On and 
on ~he dialectical process goes until nature of mind becomes.less 
complex and more simple and intense in its nature. Finally, 
cont, 
~~ro:~ us to be truly the object of' observation. So here also; preoooupied. by. 
i e ll'0..'9reas or something else, we are withheld under that pressure from beoom-
ng aware or The Unity; a mind gripped and fastened by some definite thing oan. n~t take the print of the very contrary. As Matter, it is agreed, must be void 
~h quality in order to aooept the types of' the universe, so and much more must 
't e soul be kept formless if there is to be no ini'ixed impediment to prevent; ~ being brimmed and lit by the Primal Principle. In sum, we must withdraw 
tr~m all the extern, pointed wholly inwards; no leaning to the outer; the i~ al or things ignored, first in their relation to us and later in the very 
e ea; the self put out of mind in the contemplation or the SupremeJ all the 0~~lllerce ao closely There that, if' report were possible, one might become to 
era reporter of' that communion." VI. 9. 7. 
the top level of the dialectic is reached and process ceases~ fpr 
.. 
the soul has then entered into the third stage, the level of' en.. 
lightenment , illum~nation and ecstasy. 
There are two phases to this third stage of Salvation, ac-
cording to Plotinus: (l) unity with the Divine-Mind, and (2) 
unity with the One. The first of these may be considered to be a 
mental process, the latter nay not be so considered. The first 
of these is characterized by its flash of' 1ns1i;ht and understand-
ing of various mysteries --- the joy of' finding meaning. The 
last phase is characterized by sheer ecstasy, a beyond meaning 
i3· 
union with deity---a state of being inebriated with deity. 
13, "Intelleotual-Prinoiple, thus, has two powers, first tha·t· or. 
grasping intellectively its own content, the s eoond that of an advancing and 
receiving whereby to know its transcendent; at first it sees., later by that 
seeing it takes poss es sion of Int ell eotual-Prinoiple, b eoorning Done \..Q..nly( thing 
With that: the first seeing is that of Intellect kno·wi.ng, the seoond that or 
Intellect loving; stripped of its v1isdom in the intoxication of the nectar, 
it oomes to love; by this excess it is made simplex and is happy; and to be 
drunken is better for it than to be too. staid for these revels •• •• In thia 
seeing of the Supreme it becomes pregnant and at once knows what has oome to 
be within itJ its knowledge o:f' its content is vihat is desh·nated by its -. 
lntelleOtion} its knowing of tho S~.p;.·eme is the virtue of' th~t power-'·.Within 
it by whioh in a later (lower) atage it is to become "'Intellective."' 
As for soul, it attains that vision by--.. so to speak---conrounding and annull-ing the Intelleotual-Prinoiple within it; or rather that Principle immanent 
n soul sees first and thence the vision penetrates to the soul and the two 
'Visions become one." 
VI. 7. 3'5. 
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The third stage is not an advanced level ot dialectics. It is a 
process which takes place after dialectics. Movement occur~ ~.n 
the first phase of it ( union with Divine-Mind) but does not 
occur in the last phase (union with the One). Union with the 
Divine- Mind occurs in the merger of the soul as mind with the 
overall mind-principle of the universe. In the final analysis 
it is of the order of a revelation of the ultimate sameness of 
all me~tal life. It is more than a mere similarity of one in-
di~~dual mind to another individual mind. It is the realization 
that the two minds are not two minds but rather truly one and 
the same mind. 
In the beginning Plotinus argues the fact of man as a mind 
must be granted. He writes: 
"Man ••• must be some Reason-Principle other than soul.. But why should 
he not be some conjoint--a soul in a certain Reason·Frinoiple---the 
Reason-Principle being, as it were, a definite activity which however 
could not exist without that whioh aots ••• ? 
The higher man ... rises from the more godlike soul, a soul possed 
of a nobler humanity and brighter perceptions.... The higher soul 
enters to bestow a brighter life, or rather does not so much enter as 
simply impart itself; for soul does not leave the Intellectual but 
maintaining that contact holds the lower life a perdant from it, 
blending with it by the natural link of Reason-Prinoiple to Reason-
Prinoiple: and man, the dimmer, brightens under that illumination. " 
VI. 7. s. 
''But how oan that higher soul have sense-perception? It is the 
perception of what falls under perception There, sensation in the mode 
of that realm:. it is the souroe of the soul's perception of the 
sense-realm to tho lowest extremity of its counterpart There, pro o eed• 
ing from the fire Intellectual to the fire here whioh becomes perceptible 
by its analogy vdth that of the higher sphere. If material things 
~xisted There, the soul '\\'OUld perceive them; Man in the Intellectual. 
l:J.an as Intellectual soul, -would be aware of the terrestrial. This is 
how the seoondary Man, oopy of Wi.an in the Intellectual. oontairis the 
Reason-Principles in copy; and W.lan in the Intellectual-Principle 
contained the Man that existed before any man. The divinel" shines 
out upon the secondary and the secondary upon the tertiary; and even 
the lastest I'ossesses them all •••• " 
VI. 7. a. 
Although we must speak of man as characteristically a soul, it is 
part of the wisdom of Plotinus to indicate that man 1s soul-ness 
may be ex.plained only in terms of his mind-ness. The first phase 
of the third and final stage of Salvation a~ man•s~a.1~.­
of himself as mind. Such a discovery comes as a flash of insight 
after the long process of dialectics, It is an illumination in 
the sense that an identity is seen. The rec~gnition of the nature 
ot man as more basicall7 mind than 11 soul11 is explained b7 
Plotin~s by mean of air1entation from the nature of Intellectual-
Principle in general. Having este.bliahed the fact that all 
14. He writes: "Being, thus. at once Collective Identity and Colleotiva 
Difference. Intellectual-Pringipal must reach over all different things; its 
very nature then is to modify its elf' into a universe. I:f the realm of . 
different things existed before it. these difi'eront;. things must have modified 
it from the beginning; if they did not,, this Intellectual-Principle produced 
all, or rather was all. 
Beings oould not exist save by the activity of Intellectual-Principle; wan• 
daring down every way it produces thing after thing,, but wandering always 
"1ithin itself in suoh self-bound wandering as authentic Intellect may knOWJ · 
this wandering permitted to its nature is among real beings which keep paoe. 
with its movement; but it is always itself; this is a stationary wandering,, 
~Wandering within the Meadow of Truth from which it does not stray. It 
1°lds and covers the universe which it had made the space, so to speak,, of ta movement, itself' being also that universe whioh is space to it ••• 
(oont. on next page) 
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being is of the order of mind and that soul and life are of the 
order of mindj facts which will be clearly indicated by dialecticsr 
cont. 
The Intellectual-Principle is the Intellectual Act; its movement is complete, 
filling Being complete; And the entire of Being is the Intellectual Aot en-
tire, comprehending all life and the unfailing succession of things. Be-
cause this Principle contains Identity and Difference i'lS division ia oeas e-
lessly bringing the different things to light. Its entire movement is through 
life and among living things .. u 11 VI. 7. 13. 
"There is infinity in Intellectual-Principle sinoe, of its very nature 
it is a multiple unity,, not with the unity of a house but with that of a 
Reason• Principle, multiple in itself: in the one Intellectual design it 
includes within itself, '11' th were in outline,, all the outlines,, all the 
patterns. All is within it,, all the power& and intelleotions. 
VI. 7. 14. 
" ••• Intellectual-Principle becomes all things, knows that fact in 
virtue of its self-knowing and at ono e becomes Intellectual-Principle, filled 
so as to hold within itselr that object of its vision,, seeing all by the 
light :f'rom the Giver and bearing that Giver with it. In this way the Suprane 
may be understood to be cause a.t once of essential reality and of the knowing 
or reality ••• " 
VI. 7. 16. 
" A first must transcend its derivatives; the giver transcends the 
given, as a superior. If therefore there is a prior to actuality, that 
prior transcends Activity and so transcends· Life. Our sphere oontaining 
life, there is a Giver of Life, a principle of greater good,, of greater 
mrth than Life; this possessed Life and had no need to look for it to 
any giver in possession of Life's variety. But the· Life was a vestige of 
that Primal not a life lived by it; Life, then, as it looked towards That 
was undetermined: having looked it had determination though That had none. 
Life looks to unity and is determined by it, taking bound, limit, form. But 
this form is in the shaped, the shaper had non.a1 the limit was not external 
as something drawn about a magnitude; the limit was that of the multiplicity 
or the Life There1 limitless itself as radiated from its great Prior." 
Plotinus further explains Illumination as the soul's awareness 
15 I 
of its own awareness of i·i.;s overall identity with mind. As has 
15. He writes: "But sinoe Thence come the beauty and light in all# it 
ia Thence that Intelleotual•·Principle took the brilliance of the I~telleotual 
Energy whioh flashed Nature into being; Thence soul took power toward life, 
in virtue of' that f'uller l!fe steaming into it. Intellectual-Prinoiple was 
raised thus to that Supreme and remains with it, happy in tha presence. Soul, 
too, that soul whioh as possessing knowledge and vision was capable, clung to 
what it saw; and as its vision so its rapture; it saw and was stricken; but 
having in itself something o:f.' that principle i:b. felt its kinship and was moved 
to longing like those stirred by the image of the beloved to desire the 
veritable presence ••• ., By only noting the flux of things it knows at once 
that from elsewhere oornes the beauty that floats upon them and so it is urged 
Thither, passionate in pursuit of what it loves: never--.. unless someone robs it 
of that love-•-never giving i1p til it attain. There indeed all it saw was 
beautiful and v eri table; it grew in strength by aeing thus filled with the 
life of the True; itself becoming veritable Bein and e.ttaing veritable 
knowledge, it enters by that neighbouring into oonsoious possession of wha' it 
has long been asking." VI. 7. 31 
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••• our self~owing oomes to the knowing of all the rest of our being 
in virtu_e or this thing patently present; or by that power itself communicating 
to us its own power oi self-knowing; or by our become identical with that 
principle of kno·nledge. Thus the self-knower is a double person: there is the 
one thf\t takes cognisance of the principle in virtue of' which understanding 
0oours in the soul or mind; and there is the higher, knowing himself by the 
Intelledtual-Prinoiple with itiioh he beoomes id entioal: this latter knows the 
self as no longer man but as a being that has become something other through 
and through: he has thrown himself as one thing over into the superior order, 
iaking with him only that better part of the soul whioh alone is winged for the 
ntellectual Aot and gives the man, onoe established There .. the power to 
appropriate what he has seen ••• • A man becomes Intelleotual-Prinoiple when, ~gnoring all other phases of his being, he sees through that only and sees only 
hat and so knov1s himself' by means of the s elf•·•in other words attains the 
self-knowledge whioh the Intelleotual .. Prinoiple possesses." 
v. 3. 4. 
iln "The soul therefore (to attain self•knowledge) has only to set this 
p ~ge. (that is to say# its highest phase) along side the veritable Intelleotual• 
0~~noiple which we have found to be identical with the truths constituting the ~ri ea~s of intelleotion, the world of Primals and Reality_: for his Int ell eotual• 
R noiple, by very definition, cannot be outside of itself# the Intellectual t~ality: self-gathered and unalloyed, it is Intellectual•Frinciple through all 
th~ range of its being .. --for unintelligent intelligence is not possible·-and 
on \ 1t possesses of necessity self-knowing, as a being immanent to itself and Pr; a'l/ing for function and essence to be purely and solely· Intelleotual-
noiple. tt v. 3. a. 
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been suggested the first phase of the last stage of Salvation 
for Plotinus, namely, union wit~ the Divine-Mind, is to be seen 
as the soul as mind realizing its own identity with eternal truth. 
In this process the soul sees itself as identified with all that 
is meaningful and steady by virtue to its real being as mind, as 
an eternal participant in the overall reason principle of the 
universe. ·Multiplicity md change are seen to be a part of body, 
not of mind, the real essence of man. There is satisfaction at 
the realization that there is something in man that is of enduring 
16 
value. Union with the Divine-Mind, or Illumination, takes ·- ~ 
lB. 11 ••.The Intelleotual-Principle must have,, actually has., self-vision, 
firstly because it has multiplicity, next because it exists for the external 
and therefore must be'<t seeing power,, one seeing,that externa:i; in faot,, its 
'Very essence is vision. Given some external,, there must be vision; and if 
there be nothing external the Intellectual-Principle exists in vain. Unless; 
th.ere is something beyond bare unity, there cnn be no vision: vision muct 
converge with a visible obj eat. And this which the seer is to see can be only 
a 1;1Ultiple, no undistinguishable unity; nor could a universal unity find any-
t~ing upon which to exercise any act.... J,n agent must either act upon the 
extern or be a multiple and so able to 0.ot upon its elf: maldng no advance te-
'lnrds. anything other than its elf 1 it is mdtionless and where it could know 
only blank fixity it C'.:ln know nothing. The intellective power, therefore1 
When occupied with the intellectual act, must be in a state of duality, whether 
on~ of the two elements stand actually outside or both lie within: the intell-
ec U~l act will ahmys comport diversity as nell as the necess~ry identity, 
~nd in the so.me way its ch~fracteristic objects (the Ideas) must stand to the 
ntellectual-Principle as 6t onoe distinct and identioal.... There can be 
~\intellection except of something containinc; separable detail ••• _ The 
lllnl e~lectual-Prinoiple,, thus,, is informed of itself by the fact of being a 
u tiple organ of vision, an eye receptive of many illuminated objects. 
i~·~~imilarl:y the knowing principle itself cannot ranain simplex, expeoially 
is d e act of self-knowing: all silent though its self-perception be,, it 
Si Ual to itself. Of course it has no need of minute self-handling 
lyn)e it has nothDng to learn by its intellective aot; before it is (effective-
Intelleot it holds knowle~eof its ovm content. Knowledt;e implies 
(continued on neict page) 
ilace as an inherently meaningtul experience. It is a coming into 
~eaning, an enlightenment in the sense that some understanding 
:omes in reference to situations that were previously not meaning• 
tul or understood. There is a joy connected with it but it is 
lot the same joy as the j9Y that occurs in union with the One. 
1oy in the Divine-Mind is the jioy of discovery ---the discover1' 
of meaning. It is the joy of relaxation from human struggle~ 
release from the tension of intellectual inquiry, and the sheer 
Lntellectual pleasure of seeing experiences unified in meaning. 
In it, there is no loss of identity and intellection contin~es to 
t~ke place. The soul retains its own self-consciousness at the 
same time that it is aware of its identit~ and interactio~ with 
another entity seen as a larger value-whole. 
The final phases of the third stage of Salvation aocording 
bo Plotinus is an absolute union of the soul with the O~e· This 
union is not the same as the sort of intellectual union, describ-
ed above for it is a literal_ merger of two entities. ~uch is the 
sunnnum bonum for man, the complete absorption of the ~oul into 
cont. 
~es~r~ for it is, so to speak, discovery orcmnhJg ' search; t~e utterly 
l'ldirrer<?ntiated remains self-centered and makes no enquiry about that self:· 
anythint; capable of analysing its content,, must be a manifold• er 
v. 3, 10. 
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that which is its original source, a joyful reunion of that which 
is not different in any respect. 
Plot1nus describes union with the One in terms of sheer 
ecstasy. Such ecstasy is pure joy, positive and unmixed, above 
reason, above beauty, and above any categorical conception of good-
ness. It cannot be described as a process for there is no change 
occurring at any time, no struggle, no relaxation, no movement of 17 
any sort. 
17. "Now it rests: instructed and satisfied as to the Beirgin that 
f:>here, it is no longer busy about many things:·· it has arrived at Unity and 
it contemplates: it leaves to another soienoe nll that ooil or premisses and 
oonolusions called the art of reasoning." I. 3. 4. 
11 
••• the highest has come to her, or rather has revealed its 
presence; she has turned away from all about her and made herself apt., 
beautiful to the utmost, brought into likeness with the divine---by those 
preparations and adorning which come unbidden to thos a grov1ing ready for the 
vision---she has seen that presence suddenly manifesting with her, for there 
is nothing between: here is no longer a duality but a two in one; for, so 
long as the presence holds, all distinotion fades: it is as lover and beloved 
here, in a oopy of that union, long to blel1d; the soul has now no further 
awareness of being in body and will give herself no foreign name, not man,. 
not living being,. not being, not all; any observation of such things fall 
away; the soul has neither time ~or taste for them; This she sought and This 
she has found and on This she looks and not upon herself; and who she is that 
looks she has not leisure to know. Once There she will barter for This nothing 
the universe holds; not though one would make over the heavens entire to her; 
than This there is nothing higher,, nothing of more good; above Thia there is 
no passing; all the rest however lofty lies on the downtping path: she is 
?f' perf'eot judgement and knows that This was her quest, that nothing higher 
19
• Here can be no deoeitJ vJhere could she oome upon truer than the truth? 
and the truth she affirms, that she is, herself; but all the affirmation is ~ater and is silent. In this happiness she knows beyond delusion that she is 
appy; for this !s no affirmation of e.n excited body but of a soul become all' . iain what she v1as of old,-•offioe, povier, woe.1th, beauty, knowledge--- of 
a 1 she tells her scorn as she never could had she not found their better, 
(continued on next page) 
What is the underl71ng thesis or Plotinue' wa7 ot SalvationY 
cont. 
linked to This she oan !'ear no disaster nor even know it; let all about her 
fall to pieoes. so she would have it that she may be wholly with This. so 
hu:;r the happiness she has 'WOn to." VI. 7. 34. 
"Suoh in this union is the soul's temper that even the act or 
Intellect onoe so intimately loved she now dismisses; Intelleotion is movement 
and she has no wish to move, she has nothing to say of this very Intellectual• 
Principle by means of whioh she has attained the vision, herself made over 
into Intelleotual•Prinoiple and beooming that principle so as to be able to 
take stand in that Intelleotual space. Entered there and making herself over 
to that, she at first contemplates that realm, but once she sees that higher 
still, she leaves all else aside.... In this state of absorbed oontenplation 
there is no longer question of holding an obj eot: the vision is continuous 
so that seeing and seen are one thing; obj eot and aot or vision have become 
identical; of all that until then filled the eye no manory remains." 
VI. 7. 35. 
"•••There were not two; beholder ·was one with beheld; it was 
not a vision compassed but a unity apprehended. The man formed by this 
mingling with the Supreme must·-·ii' he only remember•••Oarry its image 
impressed upon him: he is become the Unity., nothing within him or without 
inducing any diversity; no mo'V'ement now. no passion, no outlooking desire, 
0noe this ascent is achieved; reasoning is in abeyance end all Intelleotion and 
even. to dare the word., the very self 1 oaught away. filled with God, He has 
Perfect stillness attained isolation; all the being oalmed, he tums neither ~o this side nor to that, not even inwards to hims elf; utterly resting he has 
eoome very rest. He belongs no longer to the order of the beauti:f'ul; he ~as :ia en beyond beautyJ he has overpassed even the ohoir of' the virtues J he 
11 hke one who. hav:lmg penetrated the inner sanotuary. leaves the temple ~ages behind him·-· though these become onoe more first objects of regard 
~en he leaves the holies; for There his oonverse was not with image. not 
rth traoe, but with the very Truth in the view of whioh nll the rest is but 0 
secondary oono ern. 
l!I ••• This is the life or gods and of' the godlike and blessed among 
i:n,, liberation from the alien that besets us here, a lif a taking no pleasure 
tne things or earth; the passing or solitary to solitary. n 
VI. 9e 11. 
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It 1s that the soul may come to see that it is divine. When soul 
is disciplined by mind, when it comes to function according to 
the inherent stability of mind and the final unity of the One, 
its way of self-control has reached its peak. It can of itself 
do no more to effect its salvation. Then, it is that the final 
insight comes, namely, the insight that the soul itself, through 
its inherent identity with mind, is itself identical with the One. 
Soul is itself divine, man sharee in his order a part of that 
which is the supreme value. In a figurative sense, man is part 
of the One; in a literal way , the One is a part of man. 
The Salvation of Plotinus resolves, then, to a self-intellec• 
tive process, an intellectual re-evaluation of the nature of the. 
soul. The ascent of the soul in its final stages is but a jour-
ney or the mind in its process of introspection, a journey that 
ends in a final iilumination and merger of mental orders into a 
pure unity. There is no change in the fixed positions and re-
lations between soul, mind, and unity, and the soul remains in 
its same order and with the same body that it has until the body's· 
death. Rather; it is the case that soul, by introspection, makes 
itself over into mind, assumes to its highest extent its inherent 
possibilities as mind, and so comes to reach its full mentality 
until eventually it climaxes into the order or sheer unity itself. 
~n this final ecstasy, Plotinus is convinced that that there is a 
passage from the level, or order, of intellectual harmony or 
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mental identity to a virtual merger with the One itself. This 1& 
to say that the so called §._oul tg Cn~ identity, in the final 
analysis, is in reality not a soul to One identity but a one to 
' One identity. A virtual union or merger with the One is possible 
only because the soul ia itself but a part of the One. There can 
be complete identit;y or merger only among parts that are them-
selves completely the same in order. It is the message of 
Plotinus, derived through the mystical experience itself, that 
man's most real nature, if he but knew it, ~ QQg Himself. 
In its journey up the way of Salvation, the soul first clean-
se~ itself, removes from itself all impurities. Then, it devotes 
itself to positive enterprizes, self-edification processes, and 
eventually to careful mental discipline. As a result of the 
precision of the dialectical process the soul gradually comes to 
have a new realization of itself --- a new opinion of the basis of 
its inherent nature, a new opinion or its over•tll meaning and 
destiny. Yet, it is not,actually 1 the gaining of something new, 
~ut the regaining of something once known but lost. In its 
purification processes it comes to see itself' as '"not body but 
soul." In its realization of its identity with the World Soul it 
comes to see itself as not an individual but a part of the whole. 
In its identity with the Divine -Mind, it comes to see itself 
as "not soul only1 but also mind." In its eventual union with 
the One it comes to see itself as "not only soul and mind but 
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0 n also the ne, In the case of its union with the World-Soul, the 
·-
relationship understood is that of soul to Soul. In the case of 
union with the Divine-Mind, the relation is that of mind to Mind. 
In the case of identity of the hum.an soul with the One, the rela.-
bion that of one to One. All three processes take on the form 
of a religious experience---an identity of the soul with God, 
which, in the final analysis is but the self-reali~ation of the 
., 
soul that it is itself a oart of God, and that without getting 
beyond itself, it may know in actuality that.which is the Supreme 
value in and of the universe: it may so directly know Ultimate 
Reality Itself. In the most technical sense, soul must cease to 
be characteristically soul', and mind must c·eaae to be o:qi;i.racter-
istically mind at the nrecise time of the one to One relationship. 
Man must cease being man in order to become God: it is impossible 
18 
to be characteristically man and God in the same instance. 
18. "In our self-seeing There, the self' is seen as bellbnging to that 
order, or rather we are merged into that self' in us whioh has the quality or 
that order. It is a knowing of the self restored to its purity. No 'tloubt · 
we should not speak of seeing; but we oannot help talking in dualities, seen 
and seer, instead of holding, the achievement of unity. In this seeing, we 
neither hold an object nor traoe distinction; there is no two. The man is 
changed, no longer himself' nor ssli'-belonging; he is merged .nith the Supreme, 
s~nken into it, one with it: oentre coinoides with oentre, for on this 
higher plane things thQt touoh are all one; only in separation is there dun~ityJ 'B:9' our holding away, the Supreme is set outside. This is why the 
Vision baffles telling; we cannot date.oh the Supreme to state it; if vie have 
~en something thus detaohed we have failed of the Supreme 'Whioti is to be 
ov.n as one with ours elves•" VI. 9, 10 
i 11The soul in its nature loves God and longs to be at one with Him 
11 the noble love of a daughter for a noble father; but corning to hiiman birth 
(continued on next page) 
Plotinus claims to have had such a self-identity with 
divinity a number of times. He writes: 
11Maey times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself 
[note that he did not go out of himself but into himself] J becoming 
external to all other things and s elf•oenter~ beholding a. marvel-
lous beauty; tnen" mere than ever, assured of' community with the 
loftiest order: em.oting the noblest life, aoquiring identity with 
the di~ina; statir.nlng within It by having attained that activity; 
poised above whatE'oever within the Intellectual is less than the 
Supreme • • • • 11 eto • IV. 8. 1. 
Again he argues that we could not know that which is above thought 
unless it were like (or of the same order as) that which we have 
within ourselves: 
11 
••• but this Entity [The One, The Goodl transcends all of the 
intelleotual nature; by what direct intuition, then, oan it be 
~rought within our grasp? 
To this question the answer is that we oan know it only in the 
degree of human f'aoulty: we indicate it by virtue or what in 
ourselves is like it. For in us, also, there is something of 
that Being; nay, nothing, ripe for that participation, can be 
void of it •••• 11 III. 8. 9. 
The point :ta further defended in Plotinus' own explanation of 
Qont • 
.and lured by the courtships of this sphere, she takes up with another love, 
a mortal, leaves her father and falls. But one day coming to hate her shame, 
ahe puts away the evil of earth, once more seeks the father, and finds her 
Peace •• ,. Thus v1e have all the vision that may be of Him and of ourselves; 
but it is of a self wrought to splendour, brimmed with the Intellectual 
light, become that very light, pure, boµyant, unburdened, raised to Godhood 
or, better, knowing its Godhood, all aflame then.•••" 
VI. 9. 9. 
~his same ideal is borne out in the report of Plotinus last words. Eltstoohiua, 
.
1s Physician, reports that he said& 111 am striving to give baok the Divino 
in myself' to the Divine in the All." quoted by Porphyry, Life of' Plotinus, 
p. 2, in the Maokemia translation, op. oi t.:; Vol. I., P• 2.- -
--
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the difference between the sort of union that occurs in the soul's 
union with the Divine Mind (mind to Mind) and the kind that occurs 
in the union with the One (one to One) : 
" ••• since the souls are of the Intellectual, and the Supreme still 
loftier, we understand that contact is otherwise procured, that is 
by those powers which connect Intellectual ag .nt with Intellectual 
Object; this all the more, sinoe the Intelledt grasps the Intellectual 
object by tho way of similarity, identity, in the sure link: of kindred. 
Material mass cannot blend into other material mass: unbodied beings 
are not under this bodily limitation; the:i:r separation is solely that 
of otherness, of differentiation; in the absence of otherness, it is 
similars mutually present. Thus the Supreme as containing no otherness 
is ever present with us; we with it v1hen Y1e put otherness away •••• u 
VI,,. 9. 8. 
It is to be emphasized that Salvation is purely something 
that the soul does in and to itself. Man, alone, begins the whole 
enterprize, solely within his own initiative. Every step along 
the way, every development, every result, is something that man 
does in and by himself to himself. Thus, the way is a. technique 
ot self-discipline and self-control that may enter into and works 
out totally by his own powers. There is actually nothing un-
natural, abnormal, or "numinous" about it: Man simply saves 
19 
himself. And what is the meaning of Salvation: what does it 
19. "It is not that the Supreme reaches out to us seeking our communion:. ~e /eac? towards the Suprane: it is we that become present. We are always 
a.~ ore it: but we do not always look: thus a choir~ singing set in due order 
1 ~ut the oonduotor,, may turn away from that center to which all should attend: ~6,.it but f'aoe arigh~ and it sings with bea~ty,, present effectively. We are but~ before the Supreme---out off is utter d1ssolut:i!on; we oan no longer be--• 
err we. do not always attend; this is rest; this the end of singing ill: 
-ectively before Him, we lift a ohora.l song full of God." VI. 9. a. · 
"God---we read---is outside of none,, present unperceived to all; 
(continued on next page) 
mean to be saved? Plotinus' answer is that it is the knowledge 
that man is a thing of value: of Supreme value. It is the real-
ization by means of ecstatic experience of the astounding fact 
that the soul is a nart of God. From this a philosophy of life 
may be deduced wherein man finds new courage to face the hardships 
of this life. Now he knows that there is some deeper meaning to 
life than that which comes from routine obsefvation. Now he knows 
that there is some righteous destiny for the soul---that there ia 
something of ultimate goodness at large within our universe. He 
knows, and he knows most convincingly. He knows because he has 
20 
had direct experience of that value. 
cont. 
we break away from Him. or rather :f'rom ourselves; 'V1hat we turn from we cannot 
r~aoh; astray ourselves. we cannot go in sear oh of another; a ohild distraught 
Wlll not recognise its father; to find ours elves is to know our source." 
VI. 9. '1. 
_20. iictinus writes:. "Our being is the fuller for ourtuirurg .• Thitheri 
this is our prosperity; to hold aloof is loneliness and lessening. Here is the 
aoul•s peace. outside of evil. refuge taken in the plaoe clean of wrong; here · !~has its Aot. its true knovdng; here it is immune. Here is living. the true: 
t at of today, all living, apart from Him, is but a shadow., a mimiory. Life in 
bhe Supreme is the native activity of Intellect; in virtue of that converse it ~ings forth gods., brings forth beauty. brings forth righ'heousness, brings forth 
Wl.thmoral good; for of all these the soul is pregnant when it has been filled 
it God. This state is its first and its final. beoause from God it comes. 
h s go~d lies There, and once turned to God again. it is what it was. Life 
r~r; riith the things of earth. is a sinking. a defeat .. a .failing of the wing. 
80 \ our good is There is shown by the very love inborn with the soul~ ••• the Thu' 0~her than God but sprung of Him must needs love. So long·as it iG 
ere, it holds the heavaiily love; here its love is the baser .... 
or Those to Wllom all this experience is strange may understand by way re111:~ earthly longings and the joy we have in w~nn~ng to what we most desire---lov· ering always that here what we love is perishable. hurtful., that our 
ing is of mimiories and turns av~y because all was a mistake, our good was 
(continued on next page) 
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Salvation, then, is to know God ( either the One or possibly 
the whole godhead of One, Divine-Mind, and World-Soul), to be in 
touch with God ----to have an estatic experience (or· experiences) 
as a convincing point o:f' reference as to the real existence o:f' 
items o:f' true (enduring?) value. It is to know the Ideal exis•· 
tentially to the extent that a new moralizing process begin.a to 
take place. Having known a new meaning of what is Good the so'tll. 
.,.... 
attempts to re•educate itself into a new order, even striving to 
be consistent with That order. 
Such a system of salvation by means of sel:f'-discipline is 
' -
reminiscent o:f' the Raja Yoga, or science of the soul, of phil-
osophical Hinduism. Both Plotinus and Hinduism affirm the in~ 
herent dignity of man and suggest away for the realization of 
~ . 
the self as God. Both suggest a tyPe of religious experience 
. -
wherein a ll sel:f'•individuations cease in a complete merger of 
'I' and 'Thou r into a 11Thou art Thou. 11 (\'That art Thou," in the 
cont. 
not here, this was not vvhat we sour;ht: There only is our veritable love end 
There we may hold it and be with it, posses in it its verity no longer submerg-
ed in alien flesh. Any that have eeen khov1 what I have in mind: the soul 
takes another life as it approaohes God; thus restored it feels that the 
dispenser of' true life is There to see,, that now we have nothing to look for 
bu~ far othervds e, that we must put aside all else and rest in this alone. 
~his beoome, This alone, all the earthly environment done away, in haste to 
be free, impatient of aey bond holding us to the baser, so that with our 
. eing entire 've may oling about This, no part in us remaining but through 
it we have touoh with God," 
VI. 9. 9e 
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Upanishads ) • 11The One" or "That One" (liQ; eka;m) of the 
Upanishads is an inexpressible Absolube and exists as "The All11 
without differentiation of be1~ from non-being. This is quite 
similar to The One ot Plotinus with the exception that Plotinu.s 
does attempt to explain its differentiation. The Divine-Mind, 
or First Principle ot Plotinus is quite similar to the Vedantic 
"Ishvara11 or Universal Mind. World-Soul is similar to the 
Hiranyagarbha or "resplendent germ" of the Upanishads. 
It will appear, then, that the mysticism of Plotinus is a 
rational mysticism in all but its final stege. It is a rational 
w~y of lite that culminates in certain rare instances in an 
ultimately irrational sort of ecstasy. All processes along the 
way of Salvation: catharsis, dialectics,. and even union with 
the Divine-Mind, may be termed essentially "rational." Only 
the summum bonum itself is irrational. 
•. 
Such, then, are the views of Plotinus concerning Salvation~ 
Salvation on the human scene, and, as a matter of fact, salva-
tion for everything that is a soul. If religion may be. seen, 
~n the final analysis, as a way of Salvation involving a 
peculiar ontology, epistemology, and axiology, and resulting 1n 
a distinctive philosophy of life, we may take the above views 
or Plotinus to be his religion. 
,-
Chaptor IV 
The Motaphysios of Augustine 
'rho root conoopt in tho toachings or Augustine is 11God. 11 
Everything bogins and onds in God. God is the only genuine 
roal!ty. ·.·God is reo.l1ty. o.nd roo.lity ·1a Ge>d. · A1·1· things ·tho.t 
have reality do so becauso God is either present in them or with. 
thom. God is rosponsiblo for the existence of the universe, 
being its chief nnd only cause. However, God can not be iden-
tified simply with the universe. Neither cnn the universe be 
identified simply with God. .Go~ 9xists in his own right apart 
from the universe. All tho.t o:nnea:rs to be real is not necessar--
1ly God, only that which may be extablished as genuine reality 
cnn be identified directly with God. 
Augustine's metaphysical system 1e toulded directly upon 
his ~articular doctrine of God. In effect, Augustine makes 
ontology and theology one and the same discipline. In the 
strictest sense, God may not be said to be within Augustine's 
system---Re is outside of it holding it together.1 As the 
S\'l le "Indeed tho power of the Crea.tor and His omnipotent and nll• 
ex~Y!ng strength is for enoh and every creature the oause or its continued 
8 enoe; and it this strength wore nt aJ]r time to oen&e from directing 
· (Continued on next page) 
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cause of all that has been made, he is not a part ot that which 
is made. He is a cause of the system, the first-r.eq~rement for 
its existence, its source, its solidarity, its final meaning. 
2 • 
The universe was brought into being by an act of God. God, not 
cont. 
the things whioh-have been created, at one and the same time both their 
species would oease to be and their whole nature would perish ••• , Since 
we are other than He, we are not in Him for any other reason exoept that He 
oaus eel it, and this is His work, whereby He contains all things... • • And 
by this disposition 'in Him we live and move and are' (Acts xvii, 28). 
Whence it follows. that if this His working were withdr·awn rrom··things, we 
should neither live nor move nor be." ·· 
De ~.!9 litteram,, IV, xxii, 22, 23, Translate<! by 'Sx"ioh Przywara. in· 
Tn Augustine Synthesis, p., 117. . 
- 2. 11As in the seed there are invisioly and at one time all the things 
vi~ch in oourse oi' time viill grow into a tree, so the universe must be o-on-
ceivea -- sinoe God created all things at· 'fhe same""time--- as having had at 
the same time-·all the things whion were made in it and with it,, when the dey of' 
oi' ·creation oame, not only the hea'Y'ens with the sun and the moon arid the 
stars, whose species remain in their retary motion, and the earth and the 
deeps, which suffer changing movelllents. and joined together below produo e the 
other parts of' the v.'Orld; but also those things whioh earth and water produce 
potentially and causally, before in the course or time they oame into being 
in the shape of' whioh they are now known to us in those works which God 
•worketh until now•--(John v, 17)." - . 
E!, Genesi ad litteram, v, xx iii, 45. Translation by Przywara, op.oit.,p.119. 
..... . -~ 
"Of' all visible things, the ·world is the greatest: of all invisible, 
the greatest is God. But that the world is, we see; that God is, we believe. 
That God made the world, we oan believe from no one more safely than from 
God Himself. But where have we heard Him? Nov.here more distinctly than in 
the Holy Scriptures,, where His prophet sad, 'In the beginning God created 
the heavens and the earth.' ( Gen. i, 1.) Was the prophet present; when 
Goa made the heavens and the earth? Not but the wisdom or God, by whom all 
things were made, was there,, ( Prov. viii, 27) and wisdom insinuates it-
self into holy souls,, and makes them the friends of God and His prophets,, 
e.na noiselessly informs them or His works. They-are taught also by the ·· 
angels of God who always behold the i'aoe of the Father.; {Matt.xviii, ·-ior·and 
announce His will to 'Vthom it befits. Of these prophe·.;s v1as he who said and 
·wrote, • 1n 'fihe beginning God or eat ea the heavens and the earth.' And so fit 
: Witness was he or God,, that the same Spirit or God, who revealed these ·· 
hings to him,, enabled him also so long before to predict that our faith also 
would be· forthooming." De Civitate Dei,, XI, iv. Translation in Nicene 
~~~·Nicene Fathers,Philip Schatt,"" editor, Vol .. II. P• 206. 
see also De Genesi ad litteram, VI, vi. 
----
the universe 1s et.al'n.al,. ish.e only et.e.J'na.1 being. He is that 
which 1s1 was, and always will be. The world begins, and so 
does metaphysics, as Augustine sees the situation, in God's 
primal act of creation. The universe did not just happen. It 
was made, and there is reason, purpose, and end-in-view in its 
making because it all comes from a source that has meaning. As 
genuine reality, or true reality, God may be considered as the 
~ctual reason, energy, power, force and meaning in and behind 
all there is, the factual under-support of all that exists. 
3 The whole of reality may be said to be within God. 
God's chief attribute is his eternality. He is that which 
always was, is, and ever wil;t. be without any degree of change 
whatsoever --- the only absolutely steady individual. 
3. "Because therefore the Word of God is One, by whioh all things v1ere 
made,, whioh is the unol'-:angeaole truth, all things are simultaneously therein,, 
potentially and unohangeably; not only those things which are now in this 
whole creation, but also those which have been and those which are to be. 
And therein they neither have been, nor· shall be,, but only area ana all things 
things are lite, and all things are one; or rather it is one being end one 
lire. For all things were so ma.de by Hinl, that whatsoever was made· in them 
was not made in Him, but was life in Him. Sinoe, 'in the beginning~ the 
Word was not made,, but 'the ·word was with God, and the Vford was God" and 
all things were made by Him:• neither had all things been .made by Him, unleH 
lie had Hilllseli' been before ~11 things and not made. But in those things 
"'~ich were made by Him, even body, whioh is not life, v.'Ould not have been ma4e 
by Him, except it had been l:Ue in Him before it was made. For 'that which 
was made-·was already li.fe in· Him; t and not lii'e of any kind soever: for 
the soulalso is the life of the body, but this too .. is made, for it is ohang•• 
able; and by whdi was it made,, except by the unchangeable Word ot God? 
For 'all things were made by HimJ and without Him was not ati:{thing made that 
Vias lllade.' 'What ther afore, was made v:aa alrendy life in Him:' and not acy 
kind of lif'e., ·but •the life (v1hioh) was the light or men; the light oer• 
tainJ.y or rational minds,, by whioh men differ from beasts,, and therefore 
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Nothing in, on, or about God Himself evolves in any 4 respect. 
Rather than being devoid of qualities, He is supremely rich in 
them, the chief ones being His goodness, justice, and love. He 
is at least like the order of mind, existing in himself as a 
unity, infinite, omnisoient, omnipotent1> and c1"eative. He is a 
positive being, his state being rich, intense, and noble. He 
ooiit. (it was) 
are men. Therefore/not corporeal light, whioh is the light or the flesh, 
whether•it shine from heaven,, or whether it be lighted by earthly fires;; nor 
that of human f'lesh only, but also that or beasts,, and 'doml even to the minutest 
or worms. For all these things see that light: but that life was the light of 
men: nor is it tar from any one or us, for in··1t •we live, and move., and have 
our being.' (Aots xvi, 27, 28.)" DeTrinitate libri guindeoim, rv, i,. 3. 
Translation by Arthur West Haddan inNioene Fathers:-o '• cit • ., Vol. III, p.70 
· 4e "'What is the same, save that which is? 'What is-°thatWhieh is? That 
which is everlasting. ~r vJhat is always different at different times, is not, 
because it abideth not. Not that it altogether is not, but is not in the 
highest sense. And what is that whioh is , save He wno when He sent Moses, 
said unto him, I AM WHO AM (Ex:od. iii, 'ii} ? " Eharrationes in Psalmos, CXXX,5. 
Translation by Preywara:, op. cit. p.- 93. 
--
"• •• for anything, whatever in short be its exoellenoe, if it is change-
able, does not truly exist; for there is no true existence so far as ohanged, 
is not that which was: if' it is no longer what it was, a kind of death has 
therein taken place; something that was there has been. eliminated,, and atlsts U more ••• • Whatever changes., and is what it vias not. I see there a kind ot 
re in that whioh is, and death in that ir1hioh was • ••. Sift the mutations of ~ings, thou wilt find WAS and WILL BE: think on God., thou wilt find the IS, 
ere WAS and WILL BE cannot exist." In Joannis Evangelium traotatus. 
XXX'VIII, lo. Translated by John Gibb an"d9James Innes in Nioene Fathers, 
0
.£.:. ~·· Vol. VII, P• 220. 
"God always is,, nor has He been and is not,, 
;s He never will not·oe: so He never was not." 
ranslation by Przywara., .2• ~·" p, 97 • 
nor is but has not been, but 
De Trinitate, XIV,, xv. 
-----
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1worporates a fundamental holiness in the whole ot his order. 
being ot the highest righteousness and dignity. 
The qualities or attributes of God occur in or with him in 
their sunreme state o~ ccou:t>::·er..~e., It 5.s '='. situat:J.on in which 
the qualities ths:rr.sel.~:es ocm,_'.'J'.' ~ .. n E. 3t:n.to cf.' intensity beyond 
the limited level ot: h..m1an comprehension~ The c9.so is not that 
"qualities" are inadequate to describe God's na.tru.--e., but rather 
that there is a lack of human capacity to realize the infinite 
character of the qualities that God possesses. God's qualities 
never change in any respect; but man's awareness of them may do so. 
Te~hnically, according to Augustine, the world begins in 
.5 
nothing. All reality other than God came into being out of 
. 
nothing for there was absolutely nothing existing before it out 
ot which it was made.. God ma.de both the matter of the universe 
as well as the forms of the universe, and made them both out of 
s. "That out of' which God has created all things is what possesses 
neither species nor :f'onn; and this is nothing other than nothing. For that 
which in comparison with completed things is oa'.'J.ed formless, is_. if' it have 
ally i'orm however slight, howeve:r inchoate~ not quite nothing, and oonsequGntly 
this also, in so far as it is, is only from God., Wherefore, even if the 
~iverse was oreated out of some :formless ma·ater, this very matter was oreat-ed 
b ro111. sornething which vms wholly nothing. l'br that which is not yet fanned_. 
! ut is nevertheless in an inchoate state, so that it oan be given form. is 
t~rmable by the goodness of God; for it is a good to have form. Consequently 
e ca.paoity to be formed is also some good. Hence. the Author of all good. ~~o gives the f'orm,, also gives the power to receive the form. Thus everything 
h ~t is. in so far as it is,, and everything whioh not yet is. but which can be, 
'l 0 ds this from God .... m De vera religione libri i, xviii, ss .. za. 
ransiation by Przywara,, op. OI't., P• 122. See also7 Confessiones,, XII 
--
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absolutely nothing --- all by his divine fiat. Anything short 
of the making of both matter and forms would fall short of actual 
creation and be only the arrangement of that which would logically 
demand a still more prior creation. God ia the ultimate source 
of the existence of everything that exists. Be7cnd such a eonce~t 
of ultimate beginning only nothingness could occur. 
The world not only came into being by an act of God, it is 
sustained in its ordered condition by God. It is God's under-
girding or over-reach~ng support that keeps the unjverse as it i~. 
Without this sunnort, that which is real would immediately lapse 
into nothingness. The Creator is ever behind the world, his 
6 
creation. 
-. 
Creation is predominantly an act or an event. It is a 
process occurring within an event. The six days in which God 
created the universe, as recorded in the book of Genesis, are 
to be treated as six episodes or eras occurring within the orie 
creative event. All creation took place 11 :1.rt the beg:lhn1ng• 1~ 
Nothing is created now 1 although that which was formed potentially 
in the beginning can come to be realized in its actual manifes-
tation in the due course of time. 7 
6. See footnote # l. 
1 7. "For it is one thing to make and administer the creature from the Gonnermost and highest turning-point of' causation, which He alone does who is 
1 d the Cr ea.tor; but quite another thing to apply some operation i'rom without 
n Proportion to the strength and faculties assigned to each by Him, so that 
(continued on next page) 
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Creation~-does not ooeur- within" time. It ocours "in the 
8 
beginning,, 11 that is, at the time at which time began., The 
world exists in time., but it was not created ~-n time for time 
was created along with t!le world when lt wafl c:-.:-en.t ed. Time is 
itself a creation, a creat'..1!'e ·> It once came ·t;o be and it,, like 
the world will pass a'iay. From Augustine's -poi:1'i:i of -view 1 time• 
continuity is not the primary concern in creation. The main 
cont. 
"1hat is oreated may oome forth into being at this time or at that, and in this 
or that way. For all these things in the way of origin and beginning have 
already been created a kind of texture of the elements, but they rome forth 
when they gab the opportunity._ For as mothers are pregnant with young .. so 
the world its elf is pregnant with the oaus es of things that are born; whioh 
are not created in exoept from that highest essence. where nothing either 
springs up or dies,. either begins to be or ceases." De Trinitate, libri xv, 
iii, 16. Translation by Haddan in ,?Jic~ Fathers, ~:-oit., Vol. III. p.62. 
"But, in truth, somme hidden.seeds of all things that are born 
corporeally and visibly, are oonoealed in the corporeal elements of this 
world. For those seeds that are visible now to our eyes from fruits and 
living things, are quite distinct from the hidden seeds of those former seeds; 
trom '\'hioh at the bidding of the Creator, the water produoed the first 
living creatures after their kind. (Gen. i.20-25). For neither at that 
time were those seeds so drawn forth into products of' their several kinds, 
as that the power of produotion was exhausted in those products; but often-
times. suitable combinations of circumstances are wanting, whereby they may 
be enabled to burst forth and comp:.ete their species,, •• :lFor the Creator or 
these invisible seeds is the Creator of all things Himself'; since whatever 
oomes forth to our sight by being born, receives the first beginnings ot its 
course from hidden seeds, and takes the successive increments of its proper 
;ize and its distinctive forms from these as it were original rules." De fu1ni tate, libri xv, iii, 8. Translation.. Ibid., P• 60 -
ugustine would say, for example, that an airplane or the Hydrogen Bomb was 
~re~ted •in. the beginning." Everything that comes to be was created in the 
eginning ~ut its aotual formation waits until its ooourenoe in time. 
ti a. "For if' eternity and tiltla are rightly distinguished by this, that th~e d?es not exist witho\ t some movement and transition, v:hile in eternity 
notre is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had 
aome creature been made, which by some motion could give birth to change, 
{continued on next page) 
point in creation is the fact that it is something that God does. 
"Primacy 11 seems to be more of a key to his thought about creation 
9 
than does "continuity" or"routine. 11 11 In the beginning " for 
him means "foremost in rar..k, orde::> _, or ce:1.1snli t7 ,,!! The beginning 
of time is only of a secondary concern,, having irn:portance only 
.• 
cont. 
··-the various parts of which motion and change, as they cannot be simulta-
neous, sucoeed one another.,-·-and thus, in these shorter or longer intervals 
of duration,. time would begin? Sinoe then, God, in whose eternity is no 
change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do :cot see how He can 
be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless: 
it be said that prior to the world there was some oreature by whose movement 
time could pass. And if the sacred and infallible Scriptures say that in 
the beginning God created the heavens and the ea.rth, in order that it may be 
understood that He had made nothing previously, for if He had made aeything 
before the rest., this thing would rather be said to have been made 'in the 
beginning., ' --- then assuredly the v1orld was made., not in time., but simul tan• 
eously with time." De Ci vi tate Dei, xi, 6. rranslation by Dods in 
Nicene Fathers, op. cit-:; Vol .. IL p:-"2oa. 
9. 11 God, Whom-a!l things serve, that serve, to whom is compliant every 
Virtuous soul. By whose-laws the poles revolve, the stars fulfill their 
oourses, the sun vivifies the day, the moon tempers the night: and all the 
framework of things, day after day by vicissitude of light and gloom., month 
after month by waxings and wanings of the moon, year after year by orderly 
successions of spring and summer and fall and winter, oycle after oyole by 
accomplished ooncurrences of the solar course, and through the mighty orbs of 
t~ine., folding and refolding upon thans elves, as the stars still recur to their 
first conjunctions, maintains, so far as this merely visible matter allows, 
the. mighty oonstanoy of things. God, by whose everduring laws. the stable 
motion of shifting things is suffered to feel no perturbation, the thronging 
course of circling ages is ever recalled anew to the image of immovable quiet: 
by whose laws the ohoioe of the soul is free, and to the good rewards and to 
the evil pains are distributed by neoessi ties settled throughout the nature 
0 1' everything. God, from whom distil even to us all benefits, by whom all 
evils are withheld from us. God, above whom is nothing, beyond vhom is 
~othing, without whom is nothing. God., under whom is the whole, in whom is 
The whole, and ;.vi th whom is the whole .... " Soliloquiorum., libri ii, I, i,4. 
Vranslation by J ,hn Gibbes and James Innes in Nicene Fathers., op. o"ft., 01
• VII., P• 538. - -
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in reference to the hiat0'!7 of man and the universe, and not 
applying 1'l any significant way to God, who :ts eternal" Time 
has meaning only in reference to the b.isto::.-y o:i:> c~nttm'.1.lty of. 
individual created things~ 
Augustine is not so int;eresi;ed in t1;e rnutine cf IJl"eation 
as He is in the f'act .')f creation.. C:reat:ton :1-s s:trr~ply "the begin-
ning of things • 11 When thinking of' the b eginn:i.ng of t.hings we 
must go back beyond their actual occurrence in time as an indi-
vidual existing thing to their ultimate beginning ln the w:tll of 
10 
God. Creation is the ultimate beginning or origin of all 
things (other than God) in God's primal act of creation. This 
10. "When anything is to oome 'into being.. is an eternal in the word of' 
God, and it oomes into being at the time when 'it ought to oorne into being, 'it 
is in that Word .. in which there is no then and sometime, sinoe this Word in 
its entirety is eternal. 11 De Genesi ad li tteram, I, ii, 6. Translation by 
Pr - -eywara .. .2.E,• ~ ... P• 113~ · 
" ••• the will of God., 'who ma.keth His angels spirits, and His 
ministers a flaming fire,' (Ps. oiii. 4) presiding among spirits which are 
joined in perfect peace and friendship, and oombined in one will by a kind 
of spiritual fire o:f ohari ty,, as it were in an elevated and holy and seoret 
seat, as in its o'l'Jll house and in its own temple, theno e di ffus 00- its elf through 
al~ things by certain most perfect:y ordered mo"Vanents of the oreatures; first 
spiritual, then corporeal~ and us (:)5 all according to t:he unchangilable pleasure 
of ~ts own purpose, whether incorporeal things or things corporeal .. whether 
rational or irrational spirits, ~hethe~ good by His grace or evil through ~?eir own will.- • .,. And so it comes ·to pass that the will of God is the 
T l.:s~ and highest cause of all oorporee.l appea.ra.noes and motions." Da 
012...~~~ libri quindeoim, III, iv, 9 Translation by Haddan in Nio"ene Fa.them. 
..!• ~... Vof • III. p;,58" 
1 "The proposition holds that that which came into being through Him 
'as to be understood as being life in Him., in vhich life He saw everything when 
\made it; and as He saw it, so He made it: not seeing anything exoept Him• 
lsietr, He enumerated in Himself all the things that He ma.de .. " De Genesi ad te · - -~" V, xv, 33. Translation by Przywara, 22.." 2..!.!•1 p .. 112. 
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occurred for all things in the universe in the- samo. primal 
creative event " in the beginning~" All things were created "in 
the beginning11 in God's six era.a of creative actty:'V..:7 ( in one 
event) in the sense that the fundamental order of all items of 
being was determined altogether in the one, ancient~ creative 
event. Augustine does not suggest that we take the Genesis 
story literally, with the consequent imolication that everything 
in the universe always has been as it now is since creation~ 
He rather suggests that in it there is the figurative meaning 
that the world ultimately begins (began) in an act of will on 
the part of God in producing everything potentially in both 
matter and form, that is to be-realized actually in some individ• 
ua1 form in due time. The fundamental principles or "seeds" as 
he calls them ( ratlones ~eminales, rational principles) are 
determined in creation in the beginning and individual things do 
not alter from their seed principles. Creation is to be thought 
ot more in terms of design and basic functioning principle, the 
beginning of the ultimate principle of a thing~ than it is in terms 
terms of the specific occurrence cf a thing in time. Creation, 
for Augustine, means that the 11 seeds 11 or rational principles of 
all things that exist were made along with all 11 spiritual matter" 
and spiritual beings in both matter and form and all brought 
into a meaningful pattern and ordered arrangement by activity 
-io6 .. 
ll 
on the part of God a:s Iidgos '*in the begihningiii 
In no sense may the universe be thought of as devel0ping 
out of God. It is not an overflow of God nor any automatic 
exnression dr division of God. Although God is the cause of the 
world, 1~ did not of necessity come out of him. The world came 
lr..Qm God but it is not or God. It came out of nothing. Since 
the created universe and God are two separate things there is no 
need to speak of one as being a part of the other. Perhaps this 
. 
. 
u.· "Just as in that seed there were together {simul) invisibly all the 
things whioh would in time develop into the tree., so the vJorld its elf is to 
be _thought to have had. together---sinoe God oreated all things together---all 
the things whioh were made in it and with_it when the day was made. not only 
the heaven with the sun and the moon and the oonstellations ••• and the earth 
and the abyss es•. ~but also those things which the water and earth pro duo ed 
Potentially and dausally. before they shold arise in the oourse of time in the 
'l'lay vie now know them, through those operations whioh God carries on even 
till 'now." De Genesi ad li tteram. V, 23. ·· Translation by William A. Christian., 
in an artioleenti tled-wAurustine on the Creation of the 11orld.," in Harvard 
~eological Review., Vol. xLVI. no. l {January, 1953)., P• 16. 
«That whole ordinary couree of nature has what one might oall 
its own natural laws., aooording to \'.l:ioh even the spirit of life., tmioh is 
a 0 reat ed thing., has what one migM oall its own appetite~ determined in 
sorne way., so that even the evil will oannot go beyone them. And the 
elements of this oorporaal world have their established power and quality, 
defining hov1 much eaoh one rd.11 flourish or not. and what may or may 
ft arise• so eaoh in its ov:n time and of its own kind., they enter upon 
G hetr. comings forth and progressions and limits and d eoreasings." De 
__ ene~ ad littetam; IX, 17. Translation, Ibid., P- 17. 
- . -
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can be expressed diagramatically as follows: 
-
- • G -: 0 D 
//~ 
/ \ I WORLD 
'~ 
The world can .never be identified simply with Ubd ~br God and ·ifue 
12 
v1orld are two dif.:f'erent "things." : Yet, the reality ~off.I 1hfu 
12. " ••• if God is the soul of the world, and the world is a body to 
Him, who is the soul, He must be one living being consisting of soul and body., 
and that this same God is a kind of womb of nature containing all things in 
Himself', so that the lives and souls of all living things are taken, aooording 
to the manner of enoh one's birth, out of His soul v1hioh vivifies that whole 
tnass, and therefore nothing at all remains whioh is not a part of God. And 
if this is so, who oannot see what impious and irreligious consequences f'ollow, 
suoh as that whatever one may trample, he must trample n part of God, and in 
slaying any living creature,, a part of God must be slaughtered? But I am un• 
Willing to utter all that may occur to those who think of it, yet cannot be 
spoken without irreverence. But if they contend that only rational animals. 
~Uch as men,, are pnrts of God, I do not r enlly see hov:, if the whole world is 
od, they oan separate that? Concerning the rational animal hims elf,,---that is, m~n·••what more unhappy belief oan be entertained than that a pa.rt of God 
b s whipped when a boy is whipped? ;'md who, unless he is quite mad, oould 
. ea: the thought that parts of God can b eoorne lasoi vious, iniqui tious, 
~lllPJ.ous, and r:1ltbgether damnable? In brief, why is God angry e.t those who 
C~ ?0 t worship Him, sinoe these offenders are parts of Himselr ••• 211 De 
_vitate Dei, IV,, 12,, 13. Translation by Dods, in Nioen.e Fathers, -~·$.Vol.. II, P• 71. 
L 
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world lies in the immanence of·-God within it.13 Value in the 
world is by virtue of a richer connection with that which is 
more like the nature of God, and ultimately by direct connection 
with God himself. ·In the relation of God and the world there 
is an identity of causality without an identity of content. 
Even though the world does not rise out or God by necessity, 
the world is still rigidly ·determined by God. Every thing that 
exists in every place does so because Go~ has desired that it 
should be as it is and where and when it is. Everyt~ing that 
there is has Ef.. meaning within the mind of God, even though man 
may not be able to see it,. Most items in the created order have 
no possibility of changing themselves from their fixed patterns 
and routines of life, but the higher creaters, men and angels, 
possess a freedom to will and to act according to their own 
decisions. Both men and angels can sin, that is, they can 
refuse to act according to their predestined plan for their 
particular lives and histories---they can refuse to follow the 
plan that they should follow. Not only does God have a plan 
for all particular things. he also has knowledge of how the 
"t It ree creatures are going to choose at each future time when 
they, -.under their own free will, make their actual decisions. 
th h 13. "I beheld all other things that are beneath Thee, and I saw that 
Th: had neither any absolute being, or that they had absolute no b~ng at all. 
be not ave a being because they- are of' Thee; and they have no being because thfV 
Con:r ~ha.t whioh Thou art. For that truly is, whioh doi?h immutably remain " -.;;;,:_ession~ libri tredeoim, vu:, xi, 17. Tr., Preywara, op. oit., p. 123. • 
--
l 
j 
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II 
~ngels are the second major 1t~m fn the meta~hysics of 
Augustine. After Gods they rank next l:U.gheat in order. Angels 
are n:ot in any sense equal with God. They are not co-eternal 
with God although they are everlasting. They are creatures, they 
were created by God, yet they do not share in the temporality of 
the world in the sense that they will ever nass away. They are 
special creations or a special order different from the exact 
nature of God, the world , matter, man or souls. They exist in 
their own order with their own special natures created as such 
by God. 
Angels are the first of God's creations both in rank and in 
order of creation. They came into being by the very pronouncement 
11 Let there be light 1 11 and are to be identified with both the 
scriptural ideas of n day11 and 11 light." l4 They were both 
14. ttThe angels therefore existed bef'ore the stars: (Job xxxviii~ 7) 
and the stars were made the f'ourth day. Shall we then say that they were 
!!lade the third day? Far from it; for we know v1hat was made that day. 
The earth was separated from the water1 and eaoh element took its own 
distinct form, and the earth produced all that grows on it. On the second 
day, then? Not even on this; for on it the firmament v1as made between 
the viaters above and beneath, and vias: called •Hea~en,' in which firmament 
the sters were made on the forth day. There is no question, then, that if 
the angels are included. in the ?.Orks of God during these six days, they 
are that light which -was called 'Day,' and whose unity Scripture signalizes ~y calling that day not the 'first day,• but •one day.' Fbr the second day., 
he third, and the rest are not other days; but the same •one' day b 
~eated to complete the number S'ix or seven, so that there should be 
'l'iledge both or God •s 'V.()rks and of His rest. Fbr when God said, 'Let 
there be light., and there was light t ~ if we are justified in understanding 
--
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created and formed at the same instance, coming into form out of 
formless matter by the expression of the ~ord of God. Because 
of their close connection with God they share directly in the 
wisdom and knowledge of God. Their formation is due to their 
direct illumination. by the Logos,, for illumination by the Word of 
God 1s itself fern gi·1ing. ·Like a light shining on ohosphorous 
material, the Word of God, the Divine Logos, deflects itself upon 
formless matter, so that it takes on a radiance akin, more than 
anything else created, to the order of God. It is as if God 
were radioactive, and having become associated with formless 
matter, caused4it to take on a degree of radioactivity. The 
directness of the relationship between God and angels accounts for 
15 
their more holy orde~ and superior condition as a created thing. 
cont. 
in this light the creation of the angels, then certainly they were orea.ted 
Partakers of the eternal light v1hioh is the unchangeable Wisdom of God, by 
which all things viere made, and whom ·ne oall the only-begotten Son of God; 
so that they., being illumined by the Light that created them might themselves 
beoome light nnd be oalled 'Day,' in participation of that unchangeable Light 
and Day which is the Word of God, by whom both th ems elves and all else were 
lll(ade, 'The true Light, whioh lighteth every man that oometh into the world., 
John l, 9)---this Light lighteth also every pure angel, that he may be light 
not in himself, but in God; from V!hom if an angel turn away, he. becomes i~pure, as are all those who are called unclean spirits, and are no longer 
1 1 gh~ in the Lord, but darkness in themselves, being deprived of the partio• lat1on of' Light eternal." E_! Civitate ~ XI, 9. Translation by Dods;• 
.:...10~ Fathers, ~s oit., Vol. II, p.210 
i 15. · Likewise has Thou said to me# with a strong voice, in my 
T.nner ear, that oreature, v1hos e will Thou alone art, is not co-eternal unto 
dhee, and v1hioh,v1ith a most persevering purity drawing its support from Thee, 
both, in plaoe and at no time, put forth its own mutability; and Thyself 
eing ever present with it, unto ·whom with its entire affection it holds it• 
~el!', having no future to expect nor conveying into the past ·what it remem-
ereth, is varied by no ohange, nor extended into any times." Conf'essionum 
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Although the inherent· -nature of angels 1e mutable it is 
made less mutable by their direct association with the Word of 
God. This is why angels, as created things 1 may be everlasting. 
They can, however, suffer change and are free beings, their 
freedom being more assured by closer connection with God. 
Although they are everlasting, that is exist with time and 
beyond time, they are not themselves conscious of time. Among 
them there is no worry, no striving, no goals, no su~erior and 
inferior states of consciousness. 
Angels possess both bodies and souls. Their bodies are 
unique bodies, existing in greater obedience to their souls than 
human bodies in obedience to human souls. Augustine speaks about 
the difference of the bodies of angels from the bodies of men, and 
also, ot the difference of the souls of angels from the souls or 
men, at various times in his writings. Angels have bodily 
senses superior to those of the human body. Their sense or 
perception is so very keen that perception in man does not begin 
to comnare with it. When angels appear to men they have the 
ability to assume a sort of body that is perceptible to man, 
sometimes being mistaken for a human body. Augustine states that 
cont. 
~ ~redeoim. XII, xi, 12. Translation by Pilkington, Niaene Fathers. ~· 
lt., o1. 1. P• 178. 
u also · 
t For •• He who in the beginning created the vorld full of all visible alld in• 
d elligible beings ••• created nothing better than those spirits whom He en-
~~ed vrith intelligence, and made capable of contemplating and enjoying Him.•• 
D in which the materiel of their 6uatenauoe and blessedness is God Himself • 
...! £!.!itate ~ .XXII, 1. Tr. by Dods, Nicene Fathers, 2.E.•.2!!•• Vol.II, p.479. 
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there is a difference in the matter or angels and the matter of th~ 
16; 
the firmament, or earthly matter and may be termed "spiritual." , 
He also clearly states that the form of heaven is not the same 
form as that of earthly form. From this the conclusion would log-
ically follow that the form and matter of angel bodies differ from 
the form and matt er o.f human bodies. It will also appear to be 
the case that the form and matter of angel souls difi"er 1n order 
from the form and matt er of human souls. Augustine asserts that 
the form or souls is always different from the form of bodies. He 
also makes quite a ~ifference in the condition or matter in 
the heavenly order and matter 1n earth. Since he established a 
parallel between human body and human soul and the case of angel 
body and angel soul, indicating, among other things, the superior 
allegiance of angel body to angel soul, the final result of the 
general comparison of angels and men in this respect would appear 
to be a rather complex collection 0£ a number 0£ items each 
differing in kind from the other, namely: angel souls with their 
special form and special sort of matter, angel bodies with their 
unique form and unique matter, human souls with a form different 
16. In De Genesi ad litterum, IV. 2~Augustine explains the creation of 
light in terms-Or the fonnation of spiritual matter. Since he has already i~entified the creation or angels with the creation or light (!!_! ~· ~· --~., II, 8), it follows that the matter or angels is the same as spiritual 
matter.·· The designation •purely intellectual creatures' applied to angels 
~~ the strong assertion thi'l.t. all created things are composed of some sort 
or matte: leave no other alternative than the o~noeiving or a unique kin~ 
angelic spiritual matter. In De Genesi ad 11tterum, III, 10# Augustine 
Collllnents that angels have "etherea!"" bodies wnereas demons have "aerial" bodies. 
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~rom that of the form of angel souls and with a matter differing 
~rom the matter of angel souls, and human bodies with a form and 
~atter differing as form and matter from any of the other men-
;1oned tYPes. Thus, there would be eight different items, each 
liftering in kind, involved in the comparison of angels and men. -
~n overall': summary description that Augustine uses to distinguish 
>etween the heavenly order and the earthly order 1s the assertion 
;hat the heavenlt:y order 1s more spiritual than the earthly order. 
~he conclusion would logically follow that the matt er of angels, 
10th soul matter~ and body matter is more "spiritual" than the 
iat~er of men, and that the same suggestion would apply in the 
:omparison of human soul and angel soul, the point here being 
;hat angels are more like the order of God as pure spirit than are 
1en. Yet, it must be remembered that the overall dualism of 
'p1r1t and Matter between Creator ( pure spirit) and Cr~ature 
:matter) does not n~cessarily a?>ply in the case of the comparison 
~t angels and men for then the comparison is between C~eated 
~hings1 all of which are matter (formed matter)4 
Angels do not know things by means of their bodily senses, 
or at least, not so in their characteristically superior way of 
knowing. If their bodies are keenly sensitive, as Augustine 
suggests, their sense knowledge is superior to the sense know-
ledge of men, but this does not constitute the reason for the 
superior level of knowledge they possess. Their highest way of 
i 
L 
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knowing is by means ot their direct illumination by the Word 
of God. Through their souls they know in a way su'Perior to that 
17 
possible through even their kind of bodies. 
The abode of angels is in heaven. In fact, Augustine defines 
heaven as the realm where the angels are. He explains that by 
heaven he does not mean the sky of the earth, the natural, or vis-
ible firmament of the heavens --- the heaven or this earth or 
11 sidereal heaven. 11 He rather means the "intellectual heaven" 
18 
that was created before our world was created. This hea van· 
17. "I run of the opinion that 6Very act of our mind produces some 
effect in the body. and that, hoviever heavy and slow our senses may be. they 
reel this effeot, in proportion to the intensity of the mental aot. as when 
Vie are angry or sad or joyful. From this it may be concluded that, when 
we think something uhioh has no apparent effect on our body. it oan never• 
theless be apparent to the supernatural and heavenly spirits, whose perception 
is so very keen that ours do es not deserve the name of perception in 
oomparision with it." t'pistulae> IX. Translation by. Sister Yfilfrid Parsons 
in~ ~.'orks of St. Augustine, Letters. Vol.I, (The Fathers or the Church, 
Ludwig Schopp;-edi to ii, p. 21. - - -
~ 
· "Those-holy angels oome to the lmo-;:ledge of God· n6t by audible 
'\llOrds, but by the pres eno e to their souls of immutable truth, i. e., oi' the 
~nly-begotten ·word of' God •• 0 Thus, too they know the creature also. not in 
tself,, but by this better way, in the wisdom of God, as if in the art by 
~~ioh it was oreated; and, consequently. they know themselves better in God 
. an in themselves, though they have also this latter knowledge." De 
.£:.vitate Dei. XI, 29. Translation by Dods, Nicene Fathers, op. oit:-;- Vol.II, 
p. 222'. -
18. 1'This: heaven whioh I see, and this earth .upon whioh I tread (from ~hich is this earth that I carry about me), Thou has made. But where is that 
heaven of heavens, O Lord, of which we hear in the words of the Psalm, 'The 
eaven of heavens are the Lord's. t but the earth hath He given to the ohildren 
or men? {Ps. cxv. 16) Where is the heaven. which we behold not,, in oom-
Parison of' which all this. which we behold, is earth? For this corporeal ~hole, not as a whole everywhere, hath thus reoeived its beautiful figure 
t~ these lower parts, of whioh the bottom is our earth; but compared with 
at heaven of heavens. even the heaven or our earth is but earth; yea, eaoh 
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1e also n creature, suppoeedly a bo~ only-• com~ose.d. ot a supe• 
rior type of formed matter ---- pdssibly the same matter as the 
matter of the body of angels. Augustine does not . make'·. this last 
suggestion but it is quite consistent with his teachings on the 
subject and a logical deduction from the situation as he describes 
it. 
An interesting teaching of Augustine in this connection is 
that some of the order of heaven laps over into earth. It is 
literally possible to have 11heaven on earth" in a precise and 
technical way as the two orders do not exist in strict isolation 
from one another. It is the case of one order overlapping with 
another order, the heavenly order dipping down into the earthly 
Order rather than that of one order having two different natures 
s1muitaneously. As we shall see laber, this fact shows up prom-
inently in his mystical theory. 
cont. 
or these great b~dies is not absurdly called earlh,, as compared with that,, 
I know not what manner of heaven; which is the Lord's; not the sons of men." 
~nfessionum libri tredecim, XII, 2, Translation by Pilkington, in Nicene 
!!,thers, op. oit., Vol. I,. p. 176. . , 
-n-•• ";Tiiat heaven of heavens, which Thou in the Beginning didst 
create, is some intellectual oreature, which, although in no wise co-eternal 
unto Thee, the Trinity, is yet a partaker of Thy eternity, and by reason of 
the sweetness of' that most ha:i;py contemplation of Thyself doth greatly restrain 
its own mutability, and without any failure,, from the time in which it was 
~:eatea, in clinging unto Thee,, surpasses all the rolling changes of 
imes. Ibid.,, p. 178. 
-
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III 
Physical bodies are the third item in Augustine's system. 
According to Augustine, after God made the angels he made the 
physical world and all that there is within it. Three elements 
were made in creation: (1) angels (day, light), (2) the firma-
ment, and (3) men. The creation of all physical bodies is to be 
identified with the formation and development of the firmament 
involving all of the remainder of the days of creation from the 
second through part of the sixth. 
In the teachings of Augustine, the whole of creation essen-
tially involves the creation of "matter." It is not the situa-
tion of the creation of form and matter as such or the creation 
of spirit and matter. It is a situation of the creation of 
different sorts of matter. As it has already been indicated 
Augustine speaks of the 11 spiritual 11 matter of angels. A. certain 
sort of matter is involved in the nature of souls. Creation is 
always creation of matter. The case at issue in reference to 
the firmament, however, is the specifically physical kind of 
rnatter. The second day of creation wa.s given to the formation 
or bodies out of the same primative 11 formless 11 or 11 unformedtt 
matter from which angels were made. That which takes place 
during the thtrd through the sixth days, with the exception of 
the making of man 1 is but a further more detailed specification 
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19 
in the formation of corporeal matter. 
This physical matter is simply our common sense concept of 
matter, the physical universe all about us: earth, air, stars 1 
fire (aether) water, planets, bones, seeds, flesh, etc. Some 
of it undergoes a process of rapid change and some of it appears 
19. "Hast hot Thou taught me, 0 Lord, that before Thou didst fonn and 
separate this formless matter, there was nothing, neither colour, nor figure, 
nor body, nor spirit? Yet not altogether nothing; there was a certain form-
lessness without any shape.••·• i'Vhat, in all parts of the world, can be 
founder nearer to a total formlessness than the earth and the deep? Fbr, from 
their being of the lowest position, they are less beautiful than are the other 
higher parts, all transparent and shining. Why,, therefore, may I not consider 
the fonnlessness of lnatter----whioh Thou hadst created without shape,, whereof 
t~ make this shapely v.'Orld---to be fittingly intimated unto men by the name 
of earth invisible and formless • .,.? That heaven of' heavens was for Thee,, 0 
Lordj but the earth, which Thou has given to the sons of' men (Ps. cxiv.16), 
to be seen and touched,, was not suoh as now we see and touoh. For it was 
invisible and "without form," (Gen.i.2) and there was a deep over which there 
'\'las not light; or darkness was over the deep, that is, more than in the deep •• 
•• But the entire deep was almost nothing, sinoe hitherto it was altogether 
fonnless; yet there was then that whioh oould be formed. For Thou, 0 wrd, 
hast made the world of a formless matter, which matter,, ou'b of nothing,,. Thou 
hast made almost nothing, out of vhich to make those great things which we, 
sons of men, oonder at. For very '"'Onderful is this corporeal heaven,, ot 
whioh finnament, between water and water, the s eoond day after the creation 
of light, Thou s0.dst, Let it be made,, and it 't'1as made, (Gen. 1.6-8.) Which 
finnarnent Thou oalledst heaven, that is, the heaven of this earth and sea,, 
'nhioh Thou madest on the third day, by giving a visible shape to the formless 
matter which Thou rnadest before all dn.ys. For even already hadst Thou made 
a heaven before nll days, but that vms the heaven of this heaven; because in 
;he beginning Thou hadst made heaven and earth. But· the earth itself which 
hou hadst made was formless matter, beoause it was invisible and without 
fonn, and darkness was upon the deep. or which invisible and formless earth, ~f ·which formlessness, of which almost nothing, Thou mightest make all these ~lngs of '~hi oh this changeable world consists, and yet oonsisteth not; 
"1 ose very ohane;eabl eness appears in this, that times can be observed and 
;umbered in it." Conf'essionum libri tredeoirn, XIII,, iii. vii. 
ranslation by Pilkington, in Nioene Fathers, .2E_• 2.!,!• .. Vol. I, P• 176-177. 
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very little, yet, all of it changes to some extent• The whole of 
the physical universe was created within the six days of creation 
but this does not mean that everything in it was formed at that 
time in its present state and condition. As has already been 
suggested, creation is to be thought of more in a potential sense 
than it is in an actual sense. Some of the items of the physical 
world undergo a development in time of their potential orders and 
and other items were completely produced in creation. Those 
things created first in the routine ( although there was actually 
no routine) were usually finished at creation, eg. the Seas, 
trees, seeds, stars, planets, etc. Some of the species seem to be 
com~lete at creation.and some do not. Trees remain as they were 
but there is room for variation as to the various types of trees. 
However, even the technical variations among the types of trees 
was so constituted potentially in creation that its actual real-
ization in time is but a development from its seed principle 
(~ationes seminales). There is no variation among the seed 
20 
principles themselves. 
20. "And, under these names heaven and ee\rth:t the whole creation is 
signified, either as divided into spiritual and material, which seems the 
tnore likely. or into the two great parts of the world in whioh all oreated 
things are contained so that, first of all. the creation is presented in 
sum, and them. its pa~ts are enumerated according to the mystic number of days." 
~ .£2.vi tate Dei, XI, 33. Translation by Dods, Nicene Fathers, 2.E,• ill·• 
Vol. II, P• 224. 
"For neither at that time {{creation)) were those seeds so drawn 
forth into products of their several kinds, as that the power or production· 
Vlas exhausted in those products; but oftentimes,, suitable combinations of' 
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As has already been suggested, the physical world exits 
within time only, or more technically, along with time, so that 
it both comes into being in Creation and passes away in some 
final consumation. History only makes sense in reference to 
physical things for history is but the record of the continuity 
or the change of a thing. As has already been suggested, .r-. 
Augustine considered the firmament of the heavens, the sidereal 
heavens,as physical. 
Generally speaking, Augustine seems to be able to incorpo-
rate souls as a part· of physical bodies. The one major exception 
is Man as a soul. The creation of man, however, as we shall see~ 
is quite a specialized kind of creation and it may well be argued 
that the soul of man does not fit in with Augustine's general 
understanding and meaning concerning "soul•" Some bodies 
have life and are directed by souls. He readily grants the 
existence of rational souls in or with bodies and even ex~resses 
his own uncertainty as to whether the world as a whole is ani-
mated by a world-soul. In any case, such is not God. He 
cont. 
Oircumstanoes are wanting, whereny they may be enabled to burst forth and 
0~lnplete their species. For consider, the very least shoot is a seed; for ii' ~ltly consigned to the earth, it produces a tree •••• But of this grain also 
here is further still a seed, which al though we are unable to see it with our 
~es, yet we oan conjecture its existence from our reason; because,, except 
ere viere some such power in those elements, there would not so frequently be 
r~d~oed from the earth things which had not been sovm there." De Trini tate, ~ ~~ iii., a. Translation by Haddan, Nicene Fathers, 2l?,• cit., Voi.III.p.60. 
-120-
assum~s the existence of animal soul and further indicates that 
plants do not have souls even though they possess an immanent 
principle of life. He even points to the similarity or the souls 
of men and the souls of brutes in his process of contrasting their 
differences, one difference being the dependency of the brute soul 
unon its body in contrast to the independency of the human soul. 
He indicates that botn man and beast have a higher faculty of 
reason. In short, Augustine seems to take soul for granted as a 
21 
part of the physical universe. 
. 21-. "Come now, and let us s-ee where lies,, as it were,, the boundary 
line between the outer and inner man •• For whatever vie have in mindl common with 
the beaata, thus much is rightly said to belong to the outer man. For the 
outer man is not to be oonsidered to the body only,, but v1ith the addition also 
ot a oertain peouliar life· of' the body, whenoe the structure of .the body de-
rives its vigor, and a>ll the senses which he is equipped for the perception 
of outward things; and when the image of these outward things already per-
cehed, that have been fixed in the memory, are seen again by recollection, !t is still e. matter pertaining to the outer man. And in all these things; we 
bo not diff'er f'rorn the beasts, exoept that in shape of body we are not prone, /t upright. And the beast,, too, are able both to perceive things corporeal 
~lll "lithout, through the senses of the body, and to fix than in the memory, 
~ remember than, and in them to seek after things suitable" and shun things 
noonvenient. But to notice these things, and to retain than not only as 
~aught up naturally but also as d·eliberately committed to memory, and to 
0~~rint than again by recollection and conoeption ••• to combine again imaginary 
thi eots of sie;ht. •. to examine after vihat manner it is that in this kind, -
a dngs like the true are to be distinguished from the true •• ---these aots, 
""~' the like, ail.though performed in reference to things sensible, and those ~01~? the mind has deduced through the bodily senses, yet,, as they are p ~ ined with r ea.son,, so are not common to men and beasts:. But it is the 1~0 or the higher reason to judge of "-hes e corporeal things aooording to Tr~rporea.l and eternal reasons." De Trinitate, libri xv, XII, 1,2. 
slation by Hadd an. - -
for t "Many animals surpass us in sense perception, and the reason 
God h his is not to be gone into just now, but in mind and reairon and knowledge 
as Placed us over than. The sense perception of animals, aided by the 
. (oont. on next page} 
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Lite is connected directly with light, as Augustine sees 
it. The degree of life posseased by a created thing is determined 
1 by the degree of lignt (angel nature) in which they participate. 
Life in plants is more static or sluggish than it is in animals 
·22 
and men, since it is not then related in with soul- Light does 
not reach the level of 11knowledge 11 until the higher animal level. 
There is further distinction in the manner in which an animal has 
knowledge, namely, from phjsical things themselves, and the way 
men gain higher knowledge, namely via revelation. 
cont, 
great force of habit. enables them to piok out the things that satisfy their 
souls, and this is done all the more easily because the brute soul is m:>re 
closely bound to the body, and, or course,. the senses belong to the body, 
the senses that the soul uses for food and for the pleasure that it derives 
from the body. But, beoaus e reason and knowledge, of v1hioh we are treating 
now, transcend the sens es. the human soul. by means ot reason and knowledge. 
withdraws itself as: far as it oan from the body and gladly enjoys the de-
lights of the interior life. The more it stoops to the sens es, the greater 
its similarity to the brute.11 De Quantitate Animae. XX.VIII. 54. Translation 
by John J. lioMahon. in The Father's of' the Ohu:roh, op. cit. Vol. II of The 
Writings of Augustine.p. 121. - -
"This can be said, also, of the irrational soul or life, that the 
rational soul oannot be converted into the irrational. If the irrationtrl 
soul itself were not subj eoted to the rational by reason of its interior 
rank, it would assume a fonn in an equal way and be like the latter." De ~ortalitate animae, XVI. 25. Translation by Ludwig Schopp .. in The Fathers ~ !fu? Churoh, op. cit. Vol. II or The Writings of Augustine.p. 45':" 
22. The superior qualities of animals and/or animal souls over 
t(hat of plants seems to reside in the fact that some greater degree ot light 
,,angelic nature) was involved in their creation. Animal souls do not 
know" as do human souls, however, the superior sensory and sentient 
oapaoities of animals over plants give evidenoe to the existenoe o:r some 
greater degree of incorporation of light in their peraen:t; order. 
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IV 
Men constitute the fourth item in Augustine's metaphysics. 
Man was cl,"eated 11 in the image of' Ged" in the latter phase of 
the creative event, the last nart of the sixth day of creation. 
There is strong intimation that the animal nart of man had been 
created already in an earlier stage of creation, but man as an 
animal is not the point at all· Man is not considered as 0me.n" 
until he is created 11 in the image of God." Only m!!!! is in the 
image of God and to be created in the image gf God is to be man. 
Man was completely created on the sixth day of creation. 
He was created both male and female on the sixth day for all 
creation ceased at the end of the sixth day. The story of the 
special creation of woman is but an example of "Hebrew parallelism 
23 
1sm" • It is a renetition of the same situation that has e.1.~ 
ready been described but with more details added. No problem 
really arises concerning the dffference in creation of male 
and female as the story of the creation of Eve is but dealing 
With the special creation ot' sexual differences within the 
same order er man which had already been created. Apparently, 
.• 
23. Trriters statement, not Augustine's,, yet Augustine says essentially-
the same thing in his emphasis that a.11 seven days are to be taken as but 
o~e day---the latter days being but a oontinuity for the sake of explanation ~ b tha.t whioh really happened apart from time. Augustine did not knov1 the 
~ rew language very well, and it is doubtful if' he we.Er avmre of the "par-~ lel'' oharaoteristic of Hebrew literature,, yet his teaohing on the creation 
naorporates the same idea. 
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the implicati·on is that in his earlier stages or etteation man 
(mankind) was either non-sexual or else bi-sexual. The story 
of the creation of Eve is to be taken as a more detailed descr1p-
t1on~or-that·-uh1ch occurred 1m" lihe latter phase of the sixth day 
of creation. 
Man is composed of body and soul. Like the angels he · 
possesses two kinds ~f matter: spiritual matter and physical 
matter. His physical matter is a part of the physical universe 
of the order of animal nature • His sniritual matter is his 
soul, a unique sort of· soul not the same sort or soul as animal 
soul or the same sort of matter as the spiritual matter or · 
24 25 
angels. Human soul is immortal. Animal soul, as a part or 
24!. 't.ir matter be used as a term denoting everything which in any :tonn 
has a separate existence, ·whether it be called an essence, or a substance, or 
by another name, the soul is material. Again, if you ohoosa to apply the epi-
thet immaterial only to that nature which is supremely immutable and is ever-
where present in its entirety, the soul is material, for it is not at all en-
dowed with such-·qualities. But if matter be used to designate nothing but that 
Tihioh, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and height. so 
· t~at with a greater part of itself it oocupies a greater part of space, and 
With a smaller pa.rt a smaller spaccJ and is in every part of it less than the 
'l'lhole, then the soul is not material,. •• Whence it is perceived that the soul,, 
'l'ihether it be termed material or immaterial, has a certain nature or its own,, 
oreated from a substance superior to the elements of this world,•••a substance 
'Vlhioh cannot be truly conceived of by any representation of the material images 
Peroei ved by the bodily sens es, but which is apprehended by the understanding 
and discovered to our consciousness by its living energy." Epistolae, CLXVI.4e 
Translation by J •. G. Cunningham, in-Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I.. P• 524. 
25. "The soul of mah is in a sense proper to""'!tseI1' immortal. It is 
?lot absolutely immortal, as God is ••• but because when alienated from the life 
~1' God it so dies as not wholly to cease from living in its own nature, it ia 
ound to be from a certain oause mortal, yet so as to be without reason ~alled 
at the same time immortal. 11 Ibid, P• 523 
-
the universe,is not immortal. 
Although man was created completely in the sixth day of 
creation the meaning is not necessarily that he was then formed a 
as now. Both the body and the soul of man were completely 
created, at the same time, on the sixth day of creation, but body 
2b 
undergoes a process of formation in time. This is contrary to 
the creation or angels who were created completely formed in 
both spiritual and bodily natures at the original creative act. 
Augustibe notes that man was formed (not created) from the 
dust of the earth. This, he believes, refers to the formation 
of man's body in time according to its potentialities of creation. 
Although Augustine is not very specific on this point, the likely 
conclusion is that something special occurred in the case of the 
formation of the body of man that did not occur in the formation 
or the bodies of animals. The implication is that there was 
some further direct activity on the part of God in the formation 
Of man's body, unless, perhaps, it might be concluded that a 
substantial portion of man's formation occurred also at the 
time of his creation. Certainly the formation of sexuality 
1n bodies required some special activity on the part of God~ 
but again, much of this, if not all or it, might have occurred 
26. In De Genesi ad litteram, VI, Augustine explains in some detail · 
!Us opinion that the formation of man from the slime of the earth took plaoe 
in the time and does not refer to his oreation in a technical or ultimate 
sense. 
27 
at .the time of creation. 
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The formation of the soul of man, on the other hand• occurs 
itself in creation at the breathing of the breath of God into 
man. Hence, the soul is formed before the body is completely 
for~ed and must be united with the body in time. The soul ot 
man in nowise arises out of the bodily order. Its nearest or 
kin is angelic nature, yet,. it was created after angels were 
created and is more changeable in its order being situated 
not as close to God as are angels, The manner of the creation of 
the soul is the same a~ that of the creation of angels, namely 
the acting upon matter by light, the Word of God, however, the 
' net result is different due to the difference in order and time 
28 
of the matter. Matter acted unon by the Word of God in its 
primordial formless state results in the formation of nearly 
unchanging angelic matter and form. Matter acted upon by the 
Word of God later in time, after a certain formation has occurred 
results in a type soul-matter nearly like angelic matter but 
considerably mgre changeable. 
27. It is difficult to rspeoify how much of fonnation may have occur 
in the creation. Fbr example. it is not clear whether sexuality is a 
created. or fo nned difference in man. 
28. The mode 0£ the creation or angels and the human soul seems 
to be similar but the material out of '·1hioh they were created vms: diff'erent. 
The resulting matter of s:ouls and matter of angels is different. See De 
~nesi ad litteram, VII, 27.39. -
-------
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Although the soul of man is composed or a unique sort of 
soul-matter different from angel matter, it is distinctively 
spiritual and in no wise similar to the corporeal souls of 
animals. It is 1 yet, distinctively a creation or creature, not 
itself a part or God. It was specially made, both cr~ated and 
formed, exactly as it is with no process, change, or evolution 
29 
' whatsoever occurring in its own case. It was created not out 
of God but out of nothing, yet is itself everlasting (immortal) 
like the angels. Man is like God only in his soul. 
Apparently, the conclusion from Augustine is that the union 
of the soul of man and the body of man occurs 1n time after 
creation. He explains that the soul of man, although already 
formed lies hidden in the worka of God until united with a 
human body. Between the human soul and the human body there is 
a rigid dualism. ·either caused the other. However, this is 
not reason to assume that they exist in opposition or conflict 
With one another in any necessary sense. The body is not 
29. " ••• Thou has not said~ •Let man be bade after his kind,• but. 
'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness'•.• .And therefore this b~ng said in the plural, •Let us make man,' it is yet subjoined in the . 
singular, 'and God made man; 1 and this being said in the plural, 'after our 
likeness,• is subjoined in the singular, 'after the image of God.' Thus is 
lll~n renewed in the knowledge of God, after the image of Him that created ~rn; (Col.iii,10) and being made spiritual, he judgeth all things,--... all things 
Chat are to be judgeds---•Yet he himself is judged of no man.' (I. Cor.ii.15). 
~essionum libri tredeoim, XIII, xii, 32. Translation ~ Pilkington, in ~Fathers, op.-cit., Vol. I., P• 200. See also .B.!• Genesi ~ litteram, 
v!I, 28, 40. - -
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necessarily negative toward the soul and neither 1s the soul 
negative toward the body. To the contrary., Augustine advances 
the very interesting doctrine that the human soul has a natural 
30 
desire to be united to the human body. 
30. "Finally,, united vdth the body (and this not in space,· although 
the body occupies spao e) the soul is affected prior to the body by those 
highest and eternal principles. ohangeless and not contained in spaoe1 and 
not only prior. but also to a greater extent. For,the prior affect in the 
soul occurs to the extent that the soul is nearer to these principles, and. 
by the srune token, the soul nis more greatly af.feoted in proportion to the 
superiority over the body. This nearness is not one in space. but in order 
or nature. In this order, then, it is understood that a form is given by 
the highest Being through tne soul to the body---the form whereby the latter 
m::ists ,in so f a.r as it existssa 
Hence, the body subsists through the soul and exists by the very 
fact that it is animated, whether universally,, as is the world, or individual• 
ly, as is eaoh and evecything that has life within the ioorld. 
This yields the conclusion that the soul, through the soul, oould 
become a body, and that this would be possible in no other way at all. Be· 
cause this does not happen~--as the soul ranains soul in that through whioh 
1 t is soul, mid the body subsists through the soul, whioh gives,, but do es 
not take away, its fonn---the soul oannot be changed into a body. 
Fbr, if the soul does not give the form whioh in turn it re-
ceives from the supreme Good,, the body is not formed by it, and, if body 
1s not formed by it, :i!t is either not forried at all,, or it assumes a form 
as olos e to the Supreme Good as the soul. , it would be like the soul. But 
the important point here is The soul is the more excellent the oloser ((to 
the Suprane Good)) the form is wh.:i.ch it assumes. But, the body also 'Wt>Uld 
have assumed a form close ((to ti1e H:'..ghest)) i.f it had not received its form 
fro:rn the soul. Fbr, ii' there were not an intermediate oause, the body 
~'OUld have assumed a form close ((to the Highest)) if it had not received. 
b ts form from the soul. -·For, ii' there were not an intermediate oause, the 
ody ~~uld have assumed a form quite as olose as the soul. 
w There is nothing between the supreme Lire. whioh is immutable 
; 1sdom and Truth. and that which is brought to life as the last one, i.e._ 
i he body, except the vivifying soul. If the soul gives a i'o:nn to the body 
tn so far as it exists,, it does not, throught this transfer, take away 
he f'onn; however,, by a transformation of the soul into a body the soul 
V:OUld lose· its form. . 
(continued on next page) 
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AugUstine is himself uncertain about the creation or pro-
duction of individual souls as individual souls. He suggests 
that it is nossible that individual souls come from individual 
individual souls just as individual bodies come from individual 
bodies and it is also nossib1.e that each soul is St>ecially 
created as an ind5.v!.d·;id.l whenever it comes into existence. 
Traducianism would apnear to be more consistent with his general 
teaching about creation, namely that all things were created"in 
the beginning." On the other hand, it would seem that souls 
ttiust be "specially created" it' there is no prior existence to 
their individual form and materiality. 
The main point that Augustine seems to be emphasizing is that 
man.!§. a soul. Man is more distinctively to be identified with 
~the image of God 11 nart of his order than with any other part. 
Ot course, man is something else than his.·-soul part, but he is 
most distinctively and characteristically to be identified with 
his soul order. 
In summary 1 the metap.l:lysics of .ri.ugustine incorl'.>orat es four 
.. 
. I 
Henoe., the soul does not beoome body: neither by itself, because the 
body is only made by the soul-" when the soul remains soul: nc.r by another 
soul., because the body is made by the soul only through transfer of a i'onn .. 
~d only by privation of its form would the so·u1 be converted into body,, 
lf' it were oonv ert ed. 11 De immortali·aa1iY animae,XV. 24. Translation by 
Sohopp, op$oit. p.43. - ~.--·-
- -
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main ideas: (1) God, (2) angels, (3)physical bodies, and (4) 
man. All of these items, except God,, are created things and 
material • God alone exists apart from a material order and is 
as such a ~ure spirit. The matter of souls is different from 
physical matt er and 'the mat:·i;; er of angels iB. different from the 
matter of souls. A.J . .J. cf the items,, except God, undergo some · 
degree of change, w!:bh the angels changing the least, and almost 
not changing at all; physical bodies, including the body of man, 
changing a great deal; and human souls changing more than angels 
but not nearly so much a~ physical bodies. God alone is eternal, 
utterly changeless. Angels e.nd the soul of man are everlasting 
and immortal --- like the number series they come into being but 
do not pass away. P~ysical bodies come into being in time (with 
time) and pass away in time ( along with time). History is 
mainly in reference to the continuity of physical bodies although 
1t can in some sense apply to angels and human souls in reference 
to the degree of change ·!:;hat they do have. The over-all dualism 
1s not between form and ma·Gter or body and soul --- these are only 
secondary dualisms. The basic dualism is between Creator ahd 
creature, God and the universe, Spirit and matter. 
Perhaps his metaphysics can be comnositely diagramed as follows: 
G 0 
W 0 R L D 
Man 
Earth 
D 
HEAVEN 
ANGl!.LS 
Chapter V 
The Religion of Augustine 
The religion of Augustine is tho religion of an intellectual 
who was not convinced that religion is solely an intellectual 
.matter. His religion is~ not a religion within the limits of 
renson alono for tho anpeal in religion is over and beyond 
- - ' 
reason. Yet, he is characteristically analytical and critical 
in his outlook even when dealing with reltgion. Although he 
appeals to reason in establishing his philosophyJ his basic 
religious meaning is established on the basis of revelation. 
He sees religion ~s existing in its own right apart from a 
formal system or philosophy, more universal and less technical 
and specialized than philosophy. Rather than conceiving of 
r<;)ligion as a "system, 11 he sees it as the broader raw material 
out of which systems are produced. It is an experience, a 
feeling, an inner meaning, rather than a f orma.l philosophy or 
a science. 
l i 
Religion, for Augustinel is a faith. It 1e a testimony 
to certain beliefs »ather than an argument for the establishment 
of beliefs. It is more a report of a discovery than it is a 
quest for a faith, moreor a witness than an argument. Yet, 
Augustine did not hesitate to argue about religion and always 
seems willing to give an apology for the faith that he asserts. 
It must be understood, however, that the faith is not necessari:cy' 
established on the grounds of the arguments used in its defense., 
His appeal is always ultimately to revelation. 
In the strictest sense, the philosophy of Augustine is 
an outgrowth of his religion, As has been indicated, hia meta-
physics is really "founded upon his religious concepts---upon 
revelation. Augustine can see no clash between philosophy 
and religion·ror he will not adrl:it the right of philosophy to 
stand on its own grounds apart from revelation. Augustine 
never views philosophy as an end-in-itself. It is merely an 
aid·of religion, and in some instances a tool of.religion, 
always entirely subordinate to religious meaning. The problems 
or philosophy are not the same as the problems of religion. 
To solve the problems ·of ph1losoph:t is ·not to·. ~oltie .tl'le·•p~oelems 
or ~&ligton and the solution of distinctively religious 
problems does not necessarily mean the solution of philosophical 
~roblems. Since his philosophy is sep~rated rrom and_subjug~ted 
to his religion, Augustine is more properly termed a philosophi-
cal religionist than a religious philosopher. 
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Although Augustine does not appear to have been intoxicated 
with the idea of God, as has been suggested about Plotinus, 
his idea of God is tha key to the whole of his thought. Just 
as it was the key to the understanding to his metaphysics ,so it 
is also the key to the uno.erstanding of his religion. However, 
Augustine's religious moaning of God is somewhat different from 
his metaphysical meaning of God. In his philosophy he attempts 
to speak of God in a technical, systematic, and objective way. · 
In his religion h~ speaks of God in a more intimate and subject-
ive way. Whereas he waxes 11 intellectual11 when he talks about 
metaphysical matters, he becomes "emotional 11 when he talks about 
l 
distinctively religious meanings. He seems to feel that it is 
1. A.'•good exa111pl e of this is in the Soliloquies 1 
"God,. who art loveci.,, wi t·cingly or un·wi ttingly,. by everything that is 
oapable of loving. -- whom 
God,. in whom are all things,, to/nevertheless neither the vi1mess 
or any creature is vile_, nor its wickedness harmful, nor its error erroneous • 
God,. who hast not willed that any but the pure should know the 
truth. 
God,, the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom_, the Father ofihotiru o 
and orov,ning life,, the Father oi' blessedness,, the Father of that whioh is 
good and i'uir,, the Father of intelligible light_, the Father of our awak• · 
ening and illumination,, the Father of the pledge by which we are admonished 
·to return to Thee • .., 11 Solilcquioru.."n, libri~,_ii, I,i_, 2. Translation of John 
Gibb and James Innes, inASele5FII'Sr~r uf tEe :Hioene and Post-Nicene Fatlns 
~-tho'Christiar.-.. £:huroh,,· pt:rr;p-·fc-1i:'.'"a$t, 'f"0t.1±~~:r;;-Fi~t'S;o~s-;:-:v6L.'•Vf;J;,,::p.53.7 • 
...._..,__ ~ ~--:-- ....... ":';. ·-..-, ... =-.. ---·~: ,····:.. .. ~-··· .. ·~-· ·..;;..~· ·~...- .. • ...... .,.. .......... . 
, , '"God_, whom alf 0 bh.i.ngs ·serve, that serve_, to whom is comph.ant GVf!rY 
Virtuous soul. By whose law13 the poles revolve, the stars fulfill their 
courses, the sun vivifi cs the day., the moon tempers the night: and all the 
framework of tr~ngs. day nfter day by vicissitudes of light and gloom,, mor.rt;h 
after month by waxings and wanings of the moon, year after year by orderly 
successions of spring and s.unmer and fa.11 and winter,. oyole after oyole by 
(continued on next page) 
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one matter to define God categorically as the pivot within a 
metaphysical system, and another to speak of him as Saviour 
and Redeemer. The first is a function of philosophy; the 
latter is a function of religion. Augustine's idea of God 
does not appear to have changed very much after he became a 
Catholic Christian., As he went from religion to.religion, 
he appears to have been really going from idea of God to idea 
of God1 and it might also be suggested that changes in his idea 
of God were the reasons for his changes of religion. 
As has been suggest~d, Augustine conceives of God metaphysi-
cally as pure spirit, mind, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, 
and creative. He is not a soul or the soul of the worldJ yet, 
he exists over the world and beyond the world in a manner so 
as to be both apart from the world and also with it, and even 
to some extent in it. In his religion, however, Augustine 
cont. 
aocomplished oo nourrenoes of the solar oourse, and through the mighty orbs 
of time. folding and refolding upon themselves, as the stars still recur to 
their first oonjunotions, maintains, so far as this merely visible matter al-
lows, the mighty oonstanoy of things. God, by whose everduring laws the strble 
motion of shifting things is suffered to feel no perturbation, the thronging 
00urse of' oiroling ages 6Ver recalled anew to the image of immovable quiet: by 
whose laws the ohoioe of the soul is free, and to the good reward and to the 
e"lil pains are distributed by necessities settled throughout the nature of 
e,,erything. God, from v,hom distil even to us all benefits, by whom all evils 
are Withheld from us. God, above whom is nothing, beyond whom is nothing, ~thout whom is nothing. God, under whom is the whole, in mom is the whole, 
~~h whom is tho whole •• ••'' Soliloquiorum, libri ii, I, i, 4. Translation# 
~., P• 538. -
•l35 
emphasizes the nature of God as complete goodness, complete 
justice, and complete love. Perhaps his teaching concerning 
the love of God may be considered his ma.jor rP,ligious emphasis. 
Around it is focused his doctrines of Christ, mediation, re-
demntion, election; sanctification, and his mystical theory. 
The theology o:r Augustine is unified around the cone ept of' 
the triune God~ IDhe whole Trinity: Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
were involved in Creation. God, the Creator, exists eternally 
as the Trinity, the unity of the Godhead and the multiplicity 
of deity. Augustine suggests that the term 11 peraon" is not 
an exactly correct one to anply to the ~rinity but that it is 
2 
the nearest term we have to describe the situation. Augustine 
thinks of God as a person and usually ref'ers to him as a mind 
or a will. Augustine sees God's relationships as essentially 
2. "Ylhy ••• do we not call these three together one person. as one 
essence tmd one God~ but say three persons. while we do not say three Goda or 
three essenoes; unless it be beoause we wish some one word to serve for that 
lll?aning whereby the Trinity is urE1e:rstood, tha:t we might not be altogether 
~llent, when asked, what three$. while ·we confessed that they- are three? For 
if' essence is the genus, and substance or person the species, as some think, 
then I must omit what I just now said, thot they ought to be oalled three 
essenoes. as they are called three substances or ptlrsons; as three horses are 
called three horses,, and the same are called three animals,, sinoe horse is 
the species, animal the genus. For in this oase the species is not spoken 
0 ~ in the plural, and genus in the singular, as if we were to say that three 
hors es were one animal; but as they are three horses by the special name, 
130 they are three animals by the generio one. But if they say that the name 
of' substanoe or person does not signify species, but something singular and 
individual; so that ary one is not so oall ed a substanoe or person as he is 
Called a man, for man is common to all men, but in the same manner as he is 
Called this or that man, as Abraham, as Isaao, as Jaoob, or anyone else who, 
(continued on next page) 
per!onal, and even 111ntimate. 11 This is why he emphasizes 
cont. -- - -· 
if present, could be pointed out with the fingeri so will the same reason 
reaoh these too. Fo.r as Abraham., Isaac, and Jaoob are called three individuals 
so are they called three zr. en, and three souls. Why th en are both the Father 
and the Son and the Holy Spirit~ if -we" are to reason about them also aooord• 
ing to genus and species and individual, not so called three essences, as 
they are called three substances or persons? But thiS.- as I said, I pass 
over: but I do affirm,, that if essence is a genu's, then a single essenoo has 
no species. Therefore the Father, Son, and Roly Spirit are not three species 
of one essesce. But if essence is a species, as man is a species, but those 
are three whioh Y1e call substances or persons, then they have the same specie 
in common, in such . as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have in common the species 
whioh is called man; not as man is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob~ 
so oan one man also be subdivided into several single men; f'or this is alto-
gether impossible, since one man is already a single man. ~ihy then is one 
ess enoe subdivided into three -substances or persons? For if' essence is a 
species,, as man is, th en one essence is as one man is: or do we, ·as we say 
that any three human beings of' the same sex, or the same oonstitu'bion or body, 
of' the same mind, are-one nature,---for they are three human beings, but one 
nature,--•so also say in the Trinity three substances one essence, or three 
persons one substance or essenceH.? Heither do we so call the Trinity three 
persons or substances, one essence and one God, as through three somethings 
subsisted out of one matter (leaving a remainder, i.e.); although whatever 
that is, it is urfolded in these three. For there is nothing else of that 
essence qesides the Trinity. Yet, we say three persons or the same essence. 
or three persons of one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the 
same essence, as though therein essence were one thing,, and person another., a 
as, we o an say three st a tu es out of the same go Id; for th ere it is one thing 
to be gold, another to be statues. ~\nd when we say three men of one 
nature, or three znen of the s nme nntue., they also can be call eel three men 
out of' the same nature , sinoe out of the same nature there can be also 
three other suoh men. But in that essenoe of the Trini "1?11 in no way oan any 
other person TJhatever exist out of the same essence. Further, in these 
things, one man is not as much as three men together; e.hd two men are some-
thing more than one man: and in equal statues, three together amount to 
znore of gold than eaoh sin~iy, and one amounts to less of gold than two. 
But in God it is not so; for the Father,, the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
together is not a gre9.ter essenoe than the Father alone or the Son alone; 
but these three substances or persons, if they must be so o~lled, together 
are equal to eaoh singly: which the natural man does not comprehend •••• " ~ !;initate, VII, vi. 11. Translation by Arthur Vlest Haddan, in the 
2._oe1l! Fathers, tt>p. ~' Vol. III, P• 112, 113. 
"They ((the Greeks)) indeed use also the word hypostasis 
); but they intend to put a dii'i'erenoe,, I know not what.between 
(continued on next page) 
the love of God, for in love there is the expression of will in 
intimate relationship. 
The whole of the Trinity exist eternally in itself ar.d is 
both apart from the world and immanent within it. Father, S_on,. 
and Holy Spirit are three equal orders of the same thing, being 
compared to memory, understanding and will---or memory, under-
standing and love---instaad of to three men.3 The Father is the 
cont. r 
ousia (6~c;{a) and hypostasis (U4ri"orlt~0 ~t.S ): so that most of ourselves who 
~reat these things in the Greek language, are aooustomed to say,.,'-8v(J'f,n•,-rl'trs 
tirroutM-i1s , or in Latin, one essence, three substances. But because with 
us the usage has already obtained, that by ess enoe we understand the same 
thing Which is understood by substance: we do not dare to say one essence, 
three substances, but one essence or substance and three persons: as many 
'Writers in Latin, who treat of these things, are are of authority, have 
said, in that they oould not find any other more suitable vmy by 'Vh ioh to 
enunciate in words that whioh they understood vtithout VK>rds. For, in truth. 
as the Father is not the Son,, and the Son is not the Father, and that Holy 
Spirit who is also oalled the gift of God is neither the Father nor the Son. 
certainly they are three ... 0 Yet, when the question is asked, w:hat three? 
human language labors altogether under great poverty of speeoh. The answer 
however, is given,. three "persons," not that it might be ((oompletely)) 
spoken, but that it might not be left ((wholly)) unspoken." De Trinitate 
V, viii, 10. Translation, Ibid., p, 92 -
-
3. "But in these three, VJhen the mind knows itself and loves itself', 
there renains a trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trinity is not oon-
founded together by any commingling; although they are eaoh severally in the~ 
~elves and mutually all in all, or each severally in eaoh two, or eaoh two 
in eaoh. Therefore all are in all.... Therefore these three things are 
marveously in separable from each other, and yet eaoh of them is severally a 
substance, all together are one substance or essence, whilst they are 
mutually predicated relatively." De Trinitate, IX~ v) s. Tr. Ibid., P• 128. 
- ' * .........,_ 
t "Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things, of whioh 
the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially oonaid·er- and disouss 
hese three---memory, understanding, will.... Sinoe, then, these three, 
llleniory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor three 
(continued on next page) 
11beginning 11 of the distinction between Father, Son and Holy Spir:it~ 
''Father'nhas meaning only in relation to "Son, 11 and vice versa. 
The Son proceeds from the Father only in a categorical sense of 
a comparison of persons or substances, not in time or rank. 
Since the essence is the same in all of the Trinity, there is 
no "beginning" in the sense of source; there is only beginning 
and subordination in person and relation. Just as the Father 
cont • 
. ·minds ,but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three 
substances, but one substance. Since manory, which is called life. and 
mind. and substance is so called in respect to itself; but it· is called 
memory, relatively to something. And I should say the same also of under-
standing and of will, sinoe they are called understanding and viill relative-
ly to something; but each in respect to its elf is life, and mind, and ess enoe. 
And hence these three are one, in that they are one life. one mind, one 
essence; and whatever else they are severally called in respect to thanselves., 
they are called also together, not plurally, but in singular number. But 
they are three, in that v1herein they are mutually ref erred to each other; 
and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each.. but also eaoh 
to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only 
is each contained by each,, but also, all by each • ., •• .tmd, therefore, while 
all are mubually comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is 
equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as 
whol~:t ·and these three are one .• one life, one mind, one essence •••• " 
~ Trinitate. X xi,, 17, Trans-latio~ Ibid .. , P• 142. 
uBut we have oome now to that argument in which we have undertaken 
to consider the noblest part of the human mind, by whioh it knows or oan 
know God, in order that vie may find in it the image of God. Fbr although 
the human mind is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that 
nature than v1hioh none is better. is to be sought and found in us, in that 
which our nature also has nothing better ..... This trinity ((memory, under-
standing, love)), then, of the mind is ••• the image of God ••• beoause it 
oan also remanber, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And in 
so doing it is made wise itself .... " De Trinitate, XIV, viii, ltI., and 
Xii. 15. Translation. Ibid., P• 189, 191. 
"begets" the Son, so do ~ the Father and the Son beget the 
Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit nroceeds from both Father and Son 
in one beginning.4 Although the persons of the Trinity are the 
same in essence, there is a literal or actual distinction in 
person. This difference is an eternal difference, for the God-
head is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit eternally. Never was there 
any adoption of the Son as Son by the Father, and the relation-
ship is in no senses figurative. 
The three-in-one and one-in-three relationship is quite 
consistent with the doctrine of the fundamental separateness of 
God from the World, of Creator from creation. It allowatbhc 
4. "As therefore, the Father begat, the Son is begotten; so the Father 
sent, the Son was a ent. But in like manner as He who begat and He was be• 
gotten, so both He who sent and He 'Who was sent, are one, since the Father 
and the Son are one. So also the Holy Spirit is one with than, since these 
three are one • libr as to be born, in respeot to the Son, means to be from 
the Father; so to be sent, in respeot to the Son, means to be known to be 
from the Father. And as to be the gitt of God in respect to the Holy Spirit, 
means to proceed from the Father; so to be sent, is to be known to proceed 
i'rom the Father. Neither oan we say that the Holy Spirit does not also pro-
ceed from the Son, for the same Spirit is not without reason said to be the 
Spirit both of the Father and of the Son •••• For the Spirit of God is one, the 
Spirit or the Father and of the Son,, the Holy Spirit, who worketh all in all 
( I. Cor. xii.6). 11 De Trinitate, IV,.xx,29. Translation.~· P• 84. 
"For theSpirit came forth, not as born,, but as given; and so He 
is not oalled a son, beoaus e He was neither born, as the Only-begotten, nor 
made so the by the graoe of God He might be born into adoption, as we are. 
For that which is born of the Father, is ref erred to the Father only when 
oalled Son, anCl so the Son is the Son of the Father. and not also our Son; 
but that whioh is given is referred both to Him who gavO".- and to those to 
whom He gave; and so the Holy Spirit is not only the Spirit of the Father 
and of the Son who gave Him, but He is also called ours, who have rloeived Him 
E.2 Trinitate. V, xiv, 15. Translation. ~._. P• 94. 
possibility:or··~od..to:have self-existence as a personality,.for:fu~ · 
three persons may form their own community. Will, understanding, 
and love could not exist within themselves in utter isolation. 
Understanding, for example, must be of another object or re-
lationship. In order for God to be adequate within himself and 
at the same time of the order of personality, he must possess 
a community within his one essence. Augustine suggests that this 
II 
is what Paul means by tho;·fullnmsof Godhead" (Colloss. I.9) ~ 
The personality or God is established not by logic or reason 
but by revelation. Starting with the revelation that man is in 
the image of God, he deduces the conclusion that God must be 
perfectly what man in his highest state is imperfectly, namely, 
a self-conscious mind or will, capable of me.mory, understan~d 
love.5 It is the very distinction of persons or substances with-
in the Godhead that makes the personality of the one essence 
possible, as has been suggested. To be personal is to be self-
conscious and to enter into knowledge about the nature of the 
self and of other objects in relation. Communion, for example, 
must be between person, between item which exist in distinction 
from one another. The multiplicity of God within his own unity 
allows him to distinguish himself from himself and hence to enter 
into all the relationships necessary in personality. 
5. This is his basio line of argument in De Trinitate. 
-----
~t!God is love is also established.by Revelation.6 That 
God is a will can be easily eatablished from the principles of 
Greek philosophy. Plato also argued that God should be conceiveo. 
of as love on the grounds that anything possessing the complete,_. 
ness of God without the quality of love must be considered of 
the order of a devil, granting that once will be added to the 
order, unless that will be a good will. The scriptures tell of 
the love of God and explain that love is from God, and this 
witness of the scriptures is made effective in human experience 
by the work of the Holy Spirit. Augustine strongly insists that 
-the fact that God is love is from logic or from the experience 
of Nature. It does come, however, from the nature of experience 
for revelation itself occurs within experience as also does 
direct knowledge of God. Augustine attempted to interpret the 
6. "1'1herefore,, if Holy Scripture proclaims that God is love, and that 
love is or God, and works this in us that we abide in God and He in us, 
and that hereby we know this, because He has given us of His Spirit, then 
the Spirit Hims elf is God, who is love. Next, if' there be among the gifts 
or God none greater than love, and there is no greater girt of God than the 
Roly Spirit, what follows more naturally than that He is Himself love, who 
is called both God and of God? :And if the love by which the Father loves 
the Son. and the Son loves the Father. ineffably demonstrates the communion 
or both, what is more suitable than that He should be specially oalled love, 
who is the spirit common to both? For this is the sounder thing both to 
believe and to understand,, that the Holly Spirit is not alone love in that 
Trinity, yet is not specially called love to no purpose, for the reasons 
we have alleged: just as He is not alone in that Trinity and both the 
Father is holy, and the Son is holy,,--as piety doubts not. And yet it is not 
to no purpose that he is specially called the Holy SpiritJ for because Ho 
is common to both. He is specially oalled that which both are in common. 
(cont. on the next page) 
Justice of God, so !:'.tron[)ly elilpha.sized in the Old Testamcnt;in 
te~ns of the actu~l love of God, accordin3 to the revelation of 
the iJoi.7 'l'esto.mont. he \"Jrit es: 
u ••• the end of every corruuandmcnt is charity •••• every 
cor:liULtndrnont hat'1 love for its aim. (I.Tim.1.5) 7 
I.Ian le~.i .. ns that G-od. is love Oj,1ly throuGI1 the (,'hurch, the Gos,,cl, 
a.nd the ScriTr~urcs. Usuc..lly \-:hen .n.usustine snealts of' the love 
of God, he snecks nooticnlly rathor thon deductively or analytical' 
ly.· Y0t, he usually incornoratcs a subjective "hiloso~hical 
meanin,s. 8 
oo~t. 
othenrl1 .. if' in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is love, then-aoubtless 
the Son too turns out to be the Son, not of the Father only, but al:o c£ ·the·. 
Holy Sp11"it. For He is both said and read in oountless places to be so,--
the only-begotten Son of God the Father••••" De Trinitate, r.T, xx, 37. 
Translation, Ibid., p.220. -
7. 'Enolirrrdion, CJ0lII, 121. Translation J. F. Shaw, in Nioene Fathers. 
22.• cit. ~ol. iif. P• 275. 
--W. "Inchoate love, therefore is inchoate holiness; advanced love is 
advanced holiness; great love is great holiness; "perfect love is perfeot 
holiness, "·--but this •love is out of a pure heart, and of' a good oon• 
soienoe, and of' faith unfeigned,' (I. Tim.i.5) •Which is this lite is--then 
the greatest, when life itself is oontenned in comparison with it.' (apparent• 
cited from Pelagius))I 17l'Onder,,hoi'1ever, whether it has not a soil in whioh to 
~:ow after it has quitted this mortal lifel But in what place and at what 
tlllle so ever it shall reach that state of absolute ~erfection, which shall 
admit or no increase, it is certainly not 'shed abrouad in our hearts• 
by any energies either of the nature or the volition that are within us, 
but by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us,' (Rom.v.5} and whioh both 
helps our infirmity and oo-operates with our strength. For it is itself' 
indeed the grace of God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom, with 
the Father and the Hold Spirit, appertaineth eternity, and all goodness, 
for ever and ever ••• " De natura et gratia, LXX. Translation by Peter Holmes 
and Robert 'E. \'Iallis, inNicene Fathers, 2.f •2.!!• P• 151. wl. V. 
" tflhat' I say, •is man.' a creature going astray from the Creator, 
(oont. on the next page) 
The love of God is most significantly demonstrated in the 
fact of' the Incarnat1.on and Atonement. That God 18 'love.is attest3d 
to by the fact that he saves. Christ, as Mediator, was love in 
his mediatorial function~ God's love 1s shown by his provision 
of a way of Atonement. Perhaps it is the case that Augustine 
puts more emphasis upon the love of God than he does upon Christ 
and the work of Christ because he sees Christ and the Atonement 
a~ but an example of that _which is greater even than ... the atone-
men~ namely• the love of the Father, .. the-ultimate source of the 
Atonement. The personality of God is broader than the person 
of Christ and the meaning of God is more than the meaning of 
.\ 
Christ. -As crucial and cataclysmic as was the Atonement, it is 
the message and meaning of God as love behind the fact of the 
Atonement tha~ is to be em~hasized. In a sentence Augustine seems 
to b~ saying that the meaning of Christ involves the concept that 
the power behind the universe is steady, kind, and affectionate---
. even intimate-•-in meeting the deep needs of the human spirit. 
The personal character of God is not only in Christ Incarnate, 
but continues ever active within human experience through the 
cont. 
Unless his. Creator 'be mindful or him., t (Ps.viii.4) and choose him freely1 ~d love him freely? Because he is himself' not able to choose or love., un• 
ess being first ohosen and loved he be healed. because by choosing blind• 
~ess he perceived not. and by loving laziness he peroeiveth not; and by 
OVing lazines5 is soon wearied••• In good men it is the love of God which 
(cont. on naltt page) 
Holy Sp1r1 t • 
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Although Augustine does not give man the same ~eminence 
within the system of the universe as do most later Greek phi-
losophers, he does consider man an object of worth both in body 
and in soul. Augustine courteracts the possibility of idolatry 
by insisting that man is not the ultimate center or item of worth 
within our world as we know it, and that there are items andiiu:fs:' 
within the world more important and more valuable than man .. The 
worth of man lies in the fact that he was created good---both 
in body and soul. However 1 'the unique worth of man lies in the 
fact that he is a soul; and in the fact that he, in his soul, is 
in the image of God.. As a spiritual,being, man's worth exceeds 
everything else that was created, with exception of angels. Be-
cause man is inherently worthy, he is to be loved. Such love 
does not mebll the acceptance of every aspect of any man, but 
rather love for the order of mankind as an order.9 
oont. 
endureth all things, as bad men the lust of the v\urld. But this love is in 
Us by the Hold Spirit whioh was given us •• u" De Patientia, 19,20. Trans-
lation by H. Brown, in Nicene Fathere, op. oit.;-111,p. 53{. 
--------- -
9. "row he is a roan of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced 
estimate of thinGs• and keeps his affections also under strict control, so 
that he neither lo11es what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he 
ought to be loved less, nor loves: that equally whioh ought to be loved 
either less or more, nor loves that less or more which ought to be love 
equally. No sinner is to be loved as a sinner; 
(cont. on next page) 
-Augustine suggests that all 11 things" may be divided into three 
Classes: (a) things to be enjoyed, (b) things to be used, and 
(c) things which use and enjoy. God alone is to be enjoyed.Never 
ls he to be used. It.tl~-:quit-e proper to use man, however, but not 
to enjoy man. Such use that is made of man must be consistent 
with the fact that he is a spiritual being. There must be no 
disrespect to his existence as a will, and he must be respected 
as a soul. This fact not withstanding 1 there· ·is · x.iothingi· inherent ... 
ly wrong!~witlli.·0:.man' s use of man so long as his inherent nature 
is not offended. Man can not be enjoyed as an end in himself' 
because all enjoyment is, in the final analysis, enjoyment of 
God. That which is seen to be of' value in man exists only by 
virtue of the image of God within him. In the case of' God, 
however, God both uses and enjoys---he uses man and enjoys him-
self• Ma-o • s ·-si£itat1on is reversed: lie uses himself' and his · 
and f1Very man is to be loved as a man or God 1s sake: but God is to be 
loved for Hie own sake. And if God is to be loved more than any man, eaoh 
lllan ought to love God more than hfmself. Likewise we ought to love another 
1111\n better than our om body, beoaus e all things are to be loved' in re-
f'erenoe to God, and another man oan have fellowship with us in .the enjoy• 
ment of God, whereas our body oarmoti for the body only live~ through the soul. 
e.nd it is by the soul that we enjoy God." _!?! Dootrina Christiana, 1.:,! libri, 
I, xxvii, 28. Translation by J.F. Shaw, in Nicene Fathers, op. oit., 
Vol. II, P• 530. 
follow man und enjoys God. lO 
Augustine's idea of man is actually rooted iri his doctrfn.e 
concerning the love of' God. If man is in the image of God, he 
may be considered of such inherent value that he should be 
regarded as a worthy ~bject of love. The very capacity to love 
man is itself an outgrowth of the love of God made effective 
within experiece. Man is converted by the experience of the 
love of God into a new man: he is endowed with a new appreciation 
of the human order in general as a value object worthy of love. 
Love for mankind finally leads to a new appreciation of one's 
. . 
self, of one• s neighbo1'.;1 and of the na.tur·e .or s.elf-hood .. in· 
10 .. "Among all these things,, then, thos~ only are the true objects. of· · 
enjoyment which we have spoken of as eternal and unchangeable. The rest 
are for use, that we may be able to arl'ive at the full enjoyment of the 
former. We, however,, who enjoy and use other things are things ourselves. 
Fbr a grearo thing truly is man, made after the image and similitude 0£ God,, 
not as respects the mortal body in which he is clothed, but as respects 
the rational soul by which he is exalted in honor above the beasts. And so 
it beoomea an important question, whether men ought to enjoy, or to use, 
thenselvea, or to do both. For we are commanded to love one another; but 
it is a question whether man is to be loved by man for his own sake, or for 
the sake of' something else. If it is for his own sake,, vie enjoy him; if it 
is for the sake of something else, we use him. It seems to me,, then, that 
he is to be loved for the sake of something else. For if' a thing is to be 
loved for its own sake, then in the enjoyment of it consists a happy life, 
the hope of whioh at least, if not yet the reality, is our comfort in the 
Present time. But a ourse is pronounced on him who places his hope in man 
(Jer.xvii.5). Neith~r ought any one to have joy in himself, if you look 
at the matter clearly, beoaus e no one ought to love even hims elf for his own 
sake, but for the sake of Him who is the true object of enjoyment. For a man 
is never in ao good a state as when his whole life is a journey towards the 
unchangeable life, and his affections are entirely fixed upon that. If, how-
ever, he loves himself' for his own sake, he does not look at himself in 
relation to God, but turns his mind in upon himself, and so is not occupied 
with anything that is unohangeable." De Dootrina Christiania, iv libri,, I, 
JCtii,, 20, 21. Translation, Ibid, P• 527. 
generai. 11 
Augustine teaches that Revelation indicates 1 via the Sc:r.:tpt-
ures, that both parts of man are legitimate value objects wort:r.y 
of love. The body is inherently good, just as is the soul, be-
cause the body was created good. Only a perversion of its created 
nature (sin} can cause either body or soul to loose their "good.,_ . · · 
ness. 11 Such perversions are more likely to come from the nature 
and influence of the soul than they are from the natural order 
of the body. 
Perhaps the most significant fact about man, from Augustine's 
'point.of view, is the fact that he is a will. God is conceived 
or in terms of wil~ as a pure spirit. Man, being in the image of 
11, "Seeing, then, that there is no need of a command that every man 
should love hims elf and his own body,---s eeing, that is, that we rove our• 
selves, and what is beneath us but conneoted vtl th us, through a law of 
nature whioh has never been violated, end whioh is common to us with the 
beasts, (for even the beasts love thanselves and their oun bodies), it 
only remained necessary to ].e.y injuotions upon us in regard to God above us, 
and our neighbor beside us. ''Thou shalt love," He says, "the Lord thy God 
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; and thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself~ On these two commandments hang all the 
law and the prophets." (Matt.xxii. 37-40)0 Thus, the end of the commandment 
is love, and that two-fold:i the love of God and the love of our neighbor. 
M:>w, if you take yourself in your entirety, ---that is, soul md body to-
gebher,--- and your neighbor in his en.tirGty, soul and body together (for 
rnan is made up of soul and body), you will find that none of the classes of' 
things. that are to be loved is overlooked in these two commandments. For 
though, when the love of God oomes first, and the measure of our love for Him 
is prescribed in such terms that it is evident all other things are to find 
their center in Him, nothing seans to be said a.bout our love for ourselves; 
Yet when it is said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' it at once 
becomes evident that our love for ourselves has not been overlooked." De 
.E2_otrina Christiana, iv libri, I xxvi, 27 Translation, Ibid. P• 529. --
- -
God to the extent or exemplifying something of God's spiritual 
nature inoorporates in his soul order God's gift of will. Man's 
rationality, being d:tr·eotly··a::·r.esult of his being a soul, grants 
him the capacity of being a will. Metaphysioally, Augustine 
argues for the case of the nature of the Trinity from the nature 
of man as memory, u11derstancU,ng-.:and:w111. Religiously, Augustine 
nroclaims that man possesses will by virtue of the revelation of 
'· his being in the image of God. 
Man's free will makes him a responsible being.12 To some 
12. "There is, to begin with, the :f'aot that God •s preoepts themselves 
'\\"Ould be of no use to a man unless he had free ohoioe of will, so that by 
performing them he might obtain the promised reTiards. For they are given 
that no one might be able to plead the. exouse of ignoranoe. as the Lord says 
concerning the Jews in the gospel: 'If I had not come and spoken unto thElll, 
they would not have sin; but now they have no exouse for their sin.' {John rJ, 
22)". De Gratia ot Libero Arbitrio,2. Translation by Holmes and Wallis, 
Nicene Tethers, op." cit.,, Vol" P• 444. 
11Hhatis the import of' the faot that in so many pass ages God 
requires all His commandments to be kept and fulfilled? How does He make 
~his requisition, if there ie no free ·will-..? Novi wherever it is said,. 
do not do thisl and 'Do not do that, t and wherever there is aey requirement 
in the divine admonitions for the work of the will to do aeything, or to 
refrain from doing anything, there is at onoe a sufficient proof of free 
Will. Mo man, therefore, when he sins, oan in his heart blame God !'or it,. 
but every man must impute the fault to himself. Nor does it detract at 
all from a man's own will when he performs any aot in aocordanoe with God. I~eed, a work is then to be pronounced a good one when a person does it 
'l'll.llingly; then, too, the reward of a good work be hoped for from Him oon-
oernin~ whom it is writt.en, 'He shall reward every man aooording to his 
works• h'.(Markxvi.27) Ibid, P• 444-445 • 
"Now it was expedient that nmn should be at first so created, as to 
have it in his povier both to 'td.11 what was right and to will what was wrong; 
(oont. on next page) 
extent man is more responsible than the angels and freer than the 
angels, for he more tYPically operates as a will than do angels, 
even though, they, also, possess a will. Angels, being so closely 
connected with that which is changeless, mirror or absorb some-
thing of the changeless quality of God. Hence, they rarely ever 
13 
use their freedom~ Men, being further from God, are more likely 
to misuse their freedom. 
Granting free will, Augustine still believes that more than 
free will is necessary in religion. Free will can make man re-
sponsible before God for his actions but the mere situation of 
free will, in itself, does not afford the extra sunport and 
encouragement that man needs in order to choose the way he knows 
that he should choose. Here. it is that g1"ace 1s important in 
religion. It-!Ls an aid to man, an extra contribution of God 
Cont. 
not without reward if' he will- the i'orm·er,-·: 'and not witbout·:punishment:: ii' 
he willed the latter. But in the future life it shall not be in his power 
to will evil; and yet this will oonstitute no restriotion on the freedom of 
his will. On the oontrary, his will shall be rnuoh freer when it shall be 
\'/holly impossible for him to be the slave of sin.'t Enohiridion, 105 Trans-
lation, by Shaw in:Nioone Fe.thers, opo oito, III,p. 271. 
13. ", • .,That there may be anevil will even without ney spirit either 
seduoing or inciting,, is suffiently olear in the instance of' the devil him-
self,, who is found to have beoome a devil, not through some other devil, but 
of his own proper will." De Patientia, 21. Translation by H. Brown ~ 
in filoene Fathers, E.E·~·III,,p. 534. 
to man as a means of encouragement in leading a moral 11fe•14 
The entrance of grace into religion makes guilt for sin even 
worse than before man realizes God's grace, for in the latter 
instance sin is also a rebellion against love. Men who sin in 
the face of grace are greater sinners than men who sin without 
grace under the law alone. 
Augustine is quite convinced that man is a sinner. He is 
a sinner in two senses, one of which he cannot help, the other 
as a result of his own deliberate action. He ·1s a sinner by 
. virtue of· the original sin in Adam, the ancient "fall" or entrance 
into depravity of the human order, and by virtue of his rejection 
of love and grace. Original sin is to be interpreted as an 
14. • ... What,, indeed,, affords clearer evidence of the grace of God 
than the aooeptance ·or prayer in any petition. If our Saviour had only 
said,, "Yfatoh that ye enter not into temptation,, 11 He would appear to hs.ve 
done nothing further than admonish man's will; but sinoe He added the 
wor~s. ''and pray,," He showed that God helps 1.1s not to enter into temptation. 
It is to the free will of man that the words are addressed: "~ son,, 
remove not thyself' from the chastening or the Lord." (Prov.iii.11). 
And the Lord said: "I have prayed for thee,, Peter,, that thy faith fail 
not,," (Luke xxii.32) • So tho:t a man is assisted by grace in order 
that his will may not be us el es sly comnanded. De gratia et libero arbitrio, 
4
3
, 5,, 9. Translation by Nicene Father,, op3 cit. • Vol. V,, PP• 444, 445, 
47. - ........ -- . - -
i~efection in the order~ a flaw, blemish, or affliction or 
the nature of man .15 It is transmitted by physical generation. 
16 Associated with it are shame and sexual lust (concupiscence). 
15. "Man's nature, indeed, was orented at first faultless and with-
out any sin; but that nature of man in which every one is born from Adam., 
now wants the Physician, beoause it is not sound. All good q~alities., no 
doubt whioh it still possesses in its make, life, senses, intelleot, it has 
of the Most High God, its Creator and maker. But the flaw, whioh darkens 
and weakens all those natural goods; so that it has need of illunination 
and healing, it has not oontraoted from its blameles-s Creator---but from: 
that original sin, which is committed by free will,." E! natura ~ gratia, 
III, Translation in Nicene Fathers, op. oit. Vol. V.pp. 122. 
"From the moment .. ,when TSy one man sin entered into the world, 
and death by si~ and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned,• 
(Rom.v.12) the entire mas-a: of our nature was ruined beyond doubt, and fell 
into the pos:aession of its: destroyer." De peocato originali., contra pelagium, 
34(xxix). Translation by Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis., in Nioene 
Fathers, op. oit. Vol. V. P• 249. 
l6.-.'H0\'(Pelagius)) ••• makes one and the same root productive both 
of good and evil fruit, in opposition to gospel truthand apostolic teaching. 
For the Lord declares that •a good tree oannot bring forth evil fruit.,neither 
can a oorrupt tree bring forth good fruit.• (Matt. vii.18) and when the 
Apostle Paul says that covetousness is 'the root of all evils.,' (I. Tim. 
vi. 10) he intimates to us, or oourse, that love may be regarded as the 
root af all good thingso On the supposition, therefore, that two trees, one 
good and the other corrupt., represent two human beings, a good one anp a 
bad. what else is the good man except one with a good will., that is, 
a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except one -w:i.th a bad 
Vdll, that is, a tree vii th a bad root? The fruits whioh springs from suoh 
roots and trees are deeds,. are words, are thoughts, which prooeej,, when 
good, from a good will. and when evil, from an evil onea. ... The 'oapaoity', 
then, or whioh we speak is not ., • , the one identical root both of good 
things and evil. For the love whioh is the root of good things is quite 
~ifferent from the oupidity whioh is the root of evil things--as different, 
indeed, as virtue is from vioe. But without doubt this 'capacity' is 
capable of either root: beoause a man is not only able to possess love, 
Whereby the tree becomes a good one; but he is likewise able to have cupidity, 
~hioh makes the tree evil. This human cupidity. nowever,. which .ia.a . .vioe, 
as for its author man, or man's deceiver, but not man's Creator. It is 
indeed that 'lust of the flesh, and the lust or the eyes, and the pride of 
lire, which is not or the Father, but is or the world.' (I John ii.16) De 
ifatia Christi, 19,21. Translation by Pete?_' Holmes and Robert 'E. Wallis-;-
11 !fci'ene Fathers, op.cit. Vol. v •• p~224~ 225. 
--
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Ei!ivnr·,iilddiit:icdtiaih ~.1§.,.und6.I!··s!Jil ·bbeatiae· o:llf'thh.~ concuniscence by 
which he is propagated.17 H'Uillan nature, even though created 
perfect I nas been changed by the Fall and goes the way of self-
will, toil, and death. Baptism is necessary to the cleansing of 
all men from this original sin. 
17. "Where God did nothing else than by a just sentence to oond ernn . 
the man who willfully sins, together vii th his stock; there also. as a matter 
of course, whatsoever was even not yet born is justly condemned in its 
sinful root. In this condemn stook carnal generation holds every man; and 
from it nothing but spiritual regeneration liberates him ••• The fault of our 
nature remains in our offspring so deeply impressed as to make it guilty, 
even when the guilt of the self-so.me fault has been washed away in the .parent 
by the ranission of sins---until every de.feet which ends in sin by the consent 
of the human will is consumed and done away in the last regeneration ••• In-
fants. although incapable of sinning, are yet not born withput the oontagion 
o:f sin.---not,, indeed. because of what is lawful,, but on account of that 
which is unseemly: for from what is lawful nature is born; for what is 
unseemly,, sin. Of the nature so born .. Gld is the Author. who created man. 
and who united male and female under the nuptial law; but of the sin the author 
is subtley of the devil who deceives. and the will of the man who consents, •• 
The guilt, therefore, of that corruption of which we are speaking ¢1I re-
main in the carnal off spring of the regenerate,, until in them also it be 
washed away in the laver( (bath)) of regeneration. A regenerate man do es not 
regenerate, but generates,, sins according to the flesh; and thus he trans-
mits to this posterity. not the condition of the regenerated, but only of 
the generated., •• The very sacraments. I say, of the hold Church show plainly 
enough that infants, even when fresh from the womb. are delivered from the 
bondage of the devil through the grace of Christ .... " ~ peooato originali, 
contra Pelagium. 43,44.42.45(xxvii,xxxix,xxxvii,xl). Translation by Holms 
and 17allis in Nicene Fathers.op.cit •• Vol.V. p.253-4) 
--------
Augustine considered sexual intercourse, except for the direct purpose of 
Propagation, an evil, calling sexual desire a 'disease.' In the Soliloquies 
he v1rote: "I perceive that nothing more says the citadel oi' manly strength. 
'Whether of mind or body, than female blandishments and familiarities. There-
fore. if (which I have not yet discovered) it e.pportains to the off'ioe of a 
'~ise man to desfre offspring, whoever for -this reason only comes into this 
00nnection, may a pp ear to me wort~ of admiration, but in no wise e. Irodel 
f'ot- imitation: for there is rnore peril in the essay. than f elioi ty in the 
(cont. on the next page) 
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Augustine f~§her distinguished between "o:r.ig~.nal sin" 
and "actual sin." Free will alone, although it npr;.J ies in 
the case of Adam~ or mankind-in-general, does not; aecount 
entirely for man's guilt as an individual. In the s·trlctest 
sense, the infant is not a sinner, but still is ga!.J.ty"'of sin; 
for actual sin is always a result of an act of will. Actual 
sin is always the result of a free choice. Sin is not the 
result of a mere natural functioning of the body; it is by 
definition an act of will. Even original sin is an original 
act Of will, the guilt or which is transmitted to the individ• 
ual apart from his will in individual instanceso Human 
individuals are under the guilt of original sin by virtue of 
their being sons of an order which exercised an act of will 
in "falling"from the perfection of the created state and 
by virtue of the guilt which the specific individual amwulatoe":" 
by having been sexually generated· Human individuals are 
under the guilt of actual sin by virtue of a rebellion 
against the expressed love of God---the free choice of a 
lower good in the place of a higher one. One of the examples 
Cont. 
'lcomplishment.u Soliloquia,I, 17. Translation by Charles Starbuck, in 
Uicene Fathers, ope oit11 Vol VII1 P• 543. 
He defended the polygamy of' the Old Testament; on the grounds that it 
allowed greater oontinenoe for the wives. E!, nuptiis ~ conoupisentia,10. 
18 • 11 gain, in the olaus e whioh followa, 'In whioh all have sinned, 
(oont.on next page) 
of our 11 damaged11 human nature as a result of original sin is 
our defective will. To counterbalance this defect .:>::':' will 
in us there is the impact of the grace of God in Ch~ist., 
Punisbmen~ for sin occurs both in this life and in the 
' future life. God does not directly take the initiative in 
administering nunishment for our sin. Instead, he allows 
our sins to ounish us• The tragic result of the consequence 
of a lower value when there is a higher value nossible is 
itself a nunishment. Since it is the soul (human soul) that 
sins, it is the soul that will be rewarded and punished, both 
now and in the future, everlastingly. Heaven is the place 
near God where the human soul shall be rewarded at a future 
time for its earthly righteousness, sacrifice, and love. 
Heaven is of the order of the snirit or soul, a creation, 
made the first day. It is somewhat material, but in a minor 
way, as its spirit nature overshadows it existence as a body. 
Since this is the case, the location of heaven in space is 
of minor importance. We must be satisfied with the rather 
loose conclusion that it is not of the order of this world, 
oont. 
{Rom.v.12) how cautiously, right, and unabiguiously is the statement 
expressed& For if you understand that sin to be meant whioh by one man 
·entered into the world. 'in which {(sin)) all have simed,' it is surely 
clear enough. that the sins which a.re peculiar to every man, which they 
(oont. on next page) 
. .t9 
and is located near to Go~. The Kingdon of God on earth, 
which is the Church, is a part of heaven; heaven on earth~ 
Heaven is the final place of rest, reward, and happiness~-­
the everlasting abode---or the true sons of God; a nrepa~ed 
cont. 
themselves commit and which belong simply to them. mean one thing; and 
that the one sin. in and by ·which belong simply to them. mean one th!ng; 
sinoe all were that one man .... " De peooatorum meritis et ranission3,, 
I, II, (x) • Translation by Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, in 
Nicene Fathers. op. oit., Vol. v. P• 19. 
19. "we behOldao great an interval between heaven and earth, there 
is so wide a separation, and so great a space of regions between: we 
wish to climb thither, we see no ladder; do we deceive ourselves,, because 
we sing the Song of Degrees, that is, the Song of ascent? We ascend U:.J.'f;o 
heaven, if' we think of God, who hath made ascending steps in the heart ... 
Yras is to ascend in heart? To advance towards God.•.. If ••• we understand 
by heaven the firmament which v1e see '"i th our bodily eyes,, we shall 
indeed so err, as to image that we cannot ascend thither without ladders, 
or some soaling machines: but if we asoend spiritually, we ought to 
•nderstand heaven spiritually: if ~he ascent be in affection, heaven is 
1~ righteousness. 'i!hat is then the heaven of' God? .All holy souls, 
all righteous souls. For the Apostles also, al thought they were on 
eat-th in the flesh, were heaven; for the Lord,, enthroned in them 
tl'aversed the whole 1'.orld. He then dv_ielleth in heavem. How? ••• How 
long al"e they the temple according to faith? i\s long as Christ dwelleth 
in then throu,~h faith; as the r.postle saith, 'ThaQ Christ may dwell in 
your hearts through faith. t But they are already heaven in whom God 
already dwelleth visibly, who see Him faoe-to faoe; all the holy Apostles, 
all the holy Virtues, Powers, Thrones,Lo.2'dabipa that heavenly Jerusalem, 
'Wanderers from whe:r:ioe we groan, and for Y.hich we pray with longings and 
there God dVJell eth~ Thither hath the Ps~lmist lifted up his faith, 
thither he riseth in affection with longing hopes: and this very lonzing 
oauseth the soul to purge off the filth of sins, and to be cleansed from 
every stain, that its elf' also may become heaven; beoaus e it hath lifted 
up its eyes unto Him "l'lho dwelleth in heaven. For i.f' we have determined 
that that heaven whioh we see vii th our bodily eyes is the dwelling or God, 
the dwelling or God will pass away1 for 'heaven and earth will pass: away.• (Hatt~xxxiv.35) Then before God oreated heaven and earth, where did He 
dwell? But some one saith: and before God made the Saints, where did 
He dwell? God dwelt in Hirns elf" he dwelt vvi th Hims elf, and God is with 
Himself •••• " Ennarotiones in psalmos, CXIII (Lat. CXII), 2, 3. 
Translation by Cleveland Coxe;-in 1'J'1ttene Fathers, 2£_• 2.!!• Vol. VIII.p.596. 
place for prepared peonle. H\llllana do not enter into the 
fullness of heaven until the morning of the resurrectj.on when 
the souls of the faithful will again be united with bodlen.~ 
namely, bodies that are sniritual bodies. The souls of tho 
true sons rest in "Paradise 11 (the bosom of Abraham) from the 
20 
time of doo.th .. until.:thebdily· :9r~ .the·, Re.surrection• · 
20. "• •• The souls of departed saints are not affected by the death 
whioh dismisses than from their bodies, because their flesh rests in ho~oa 
no matter what indiginites it reoei ves after sensation is gone. For ·chErJ 
do not desire that their bodies be forgotten, as Plato thinks fit, b:rt 
rather beoause they remember what has been promised by Him v~ho deoilives 
no man, and wro gave them s eourity for the safe keeping even or the hairs 
of their head,, they ,-.:i th a longing pati eno e wait in hope of the resur .. 
reotion of their bodies, in whioh they have suffered many hardships,, and 
are now to suffer never again.... The bodies of the righteous,, then, such 
as they shall be in the resurrection, shall need neither any fruit to 
preserve them from dying of disease or the wasting deoay of' old age, nor 
any other physical nourishment to allay their cravings of hunger or of 
thirst; f'or they shall be·.invested with so sure and every way inviolable 
an immortality, that they shall not eat save when they choose, nor be 
under the necessity of eating, while they enjoy the power of doing so •• •. 
And so they will be spiritual, not because they shall oease to be bodies,, 
but because they shall subsist by the quickening spirit.... Fbr as those 
bodies of ours, that have a living soul, though not as yet a quickening 
spirit, are called soul-informed bodies, and yet are not souls but bodies,, 
so also those bodies are oalled spiritual,--- yet God forbid we should 
therefore suppose them to be spirits and not bodies,---whioh, being 
quickened by the Spirit, have the substance, but not the unwieldiness 
and corruption of flesh. Man will then be not earthly but heavenly,, ---
not because the body will not be that very body which was made of earth,, 
but because by its heavenly endo\mient it will be a fit inhabitant of 
heaven, and this not b~r losing its nature, but by changing its quality • .._."' 
De Civitate Dei, ;x:i,i, !O,, 22,, 23.. Translation. Ibid .. , PP• 255-257. · 
- - -
"But I suppose every one must see it is to be absurd to imagine 
that only two,, namely, Abraham and Lazarus, were in that bosom of w;>ndrous 
repose before the Lord deoended into hell, and that with reference to these 
tV\O alone it was said to the rich man, •Between us and you there is a great 
gulf fixed, so that they which would pass from he11oe to you oa.nnot, neither 
(continued on next page) 
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Hell is to be distinguished from "Hades. 0 Hell is a 
place of everlasting nunishment for sin, a place prepi:ired 
for the unprepared---a state or condition in whioh both 
oont. 
oan they pass to us that wo11J.d pass from from thenoe.' (Luke xvi,,.26) 
••• What benefit was ccnferred in that oase on them by Him who J.oosed the 
pains of hell,, in whioh ·i;hey were not held,, I do not yet understand» 
especially as I have not been able to find anywhere in Sordlpture the namo 
of hell used in a goo:i sen.Seo And if this use of the term is nowhere 
found in the di vins S~riptures, assuredly the bosom of Abraham, that :i.s.:o 
the abode of a c artain secluded rest, is not to be believed to be e par+. 
of hell. Nay, from these words themselves of the great Master, in vi!~:l.c~1 
He says that Abraham said., 'Between us ond you there is a great g'!lJ.f 
fixed,,' it is, as I think, sufficiently evident that the bosom of thr>"t 
glorious f elioi ty was not any integral part of hello,,..., Whe:refo res :i.:i' 
sacred Scripture had said., v.r.i.thout naming hell an:l its pains., tha~ C!ni::t 
VJhen He died went to that bosom of .Abraham,, I wonder if any onE1 w0ulc. have 
dared to say that He ldescended into hell.' But seeing that plain 
scriptural testimonies make mention of hell and its pains., no reason oa:..i 
be alleged for believing that He who is the SE>viour went thither., exo0p·b 
that He might save all whom He found held in them, or' some whom He judged 
worthy of that favour., I still ask: that He was,, however, in hall, and 
that He conferred this benefit on persons subjected to these pains, I d::> 
not doubt ••• • On that very day on which He died, He promd.sed tha~ ti.1e · 
thief should be vdth Him in paradise at the time when He was about to 
descend to loose the pains of hell. Most certainly,, therefore. He was, 
before that time,, both in paradise and the bosom of • ..\.brahrun in Hie 
beatific 'Wisdom,, and in hell in His condemning power; for since the 
Godhead is confined by no limits, where is He not present? At the same 
time, however, so far as regarded the created nature, in assuming whioh 
at a certain point of time,, He, while continuing to be God, became man---
that is to say, so far as regarded His soul, He v.•as in hell: this is 
Plainly declared in these words of' Scripture,, v1hioh were both sent before 
in prophecy and fully expounded by apostolical interpretation: ~Thou 
Wilt not leave my soul in hell.' (Ps .:x:vi.10) eon••y nto,, Epist~°.:!, 
~LXIV, ii, 5; ii, 6., 7. a. Translated by J. Ge Cunningham, rn-
Nioene Fathers., ~· ~ .. , Vol. I ... pp. 516-517. 
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~ody ahd soul are tortured. Hadee is comparable to Paradise, 
being the place of punishment where the damned remain until 
the day of judgment. Neither Paradise nor Hades are themselves 
Heaven or Hell, being places where human souls remain on 
denosit until a future union with bodies at the time' of the 
Resurrection. Augustine believes in a literal hell, physical, 
and eternal; with a material fire in which both the souls and 
bodies of men and devils (if devils have bodies) are burned 
~21 
as a nunishment for sin. 
-----------------------------~------------------------------------------21• "So the;i what God by His phophet has said of the everlasting 
punishment of the daIIll'led shall oome to pass---shall without fail come to 
pass--- 'their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched.' 
In order to impress this upon us most forcibly; the Lord Jesus Hims elf•._ 
did not shrink from using the same words three times over in one passage 
(Mark ix.43-48). Now they who would rofer both the fire and the worm to 
the spirit ••• affirm that the v1ioked ••• shall be burned by the anguish of 
•••spirit: But they who mnke n~ doubt thut in that future punishment both 
bod~ .. and soul shr.tll· surfer, af'f'irin that:.the body shall be burned with fire 
while the soul shall be, as it were, g:1awed by a v~10rm of anguish. Though 
this view is more rer-1sonable,---for it is absurd to suppose that either 
body or soul will escape pain in the future punishment,--- yet,, for my 
O'Wll part, I find it easier to understand both as referring to the body 
than to suppose that neither does; and I think that Scripture is silent 
regarding the spiritual pain of the damned, beoaus e though not expressed, 
it is necessarily understood that in a body thus tormented the soul also 
is tortured with ::A fruitless repentance.... Here arises the question: it 
the fire is not to be immaterial. analogous to the pain of the soul, but 
material, burning by contact, so that bodies may be tormented in it. how 
oan evil spirits be punished in it? For it is undoubtedly the same fire 
which is to serve for the punishment of men and of devils ••• (Matt. xxv.41) 
Unless, perhaps,, ••• the devils have a kind of body made of that dense and 
humid air ii'hich ·we feel strikes us when the wind is blowing •• •• But ii' 
any one maintains thnt the devils have no bodies, this is not a m~tter 
either to be laboriously investigated,, or to be debated with keenness. 
For why may we not assert that even immaterial spirits may, in some extra-
ordinary we.y. yet really be pained by the punishment of material fire,, if 
(oontinued on next page) 
Augustine's ideas of life and death are related in a 
qualitative way to his ideas of heaven and hell. To enter 
into the fullness of life is to narticipate in the kingdom 
of heaven on earth, the church; that is, it is to share in 
the redemption of Christ which the church channels. To be 
apart from the heavenly order is to be dead, cut off from 
cont. 
the spirits of men, 'Vi1hich also are certainly imnaterial, are both now 
contained in material members of the body, and in the world to come shall 
be indissolubly united to their Olin bodies ••• ? I would indeed say that 
these spirits uill burn vdthout ~ny body of their o''IIl as thnt rioh man 
wris burning in hell when he exclained., 'I am tormented in this flame,,--. 
(Luke xvi.24) were I not aware thnt it is aptly said in reply that that 
flame was of the same nature as the eyes he raised and fixed on Lazarus, 
as the tongue on which he entreated th'.'tt a little cooling water might be 
dropped, or as the finger of Lazarus, with which he asked that this might 
be done,---all of which took plaoe where souls exist without bodies. Thus, 
therefore, both tht flame in whioh he burned and that drop he begged were 
immaterial; an<.l res em bled the vis ions of sleepers or persons in an eostasy, 
to whom immaterial objeots appear in a bodily form. For the men himself 
who is in suoh a state, though it be in spirit only, not in body, yet sees 
himself so like to his own body that he cannot discern any difference 
whatever. But that hell, which also is called a lake of fire and brimstone 
(Rev .xx.10) will be material fire, and will torment the bodies of the .. .,,, 
damned, whether men or devils, the solid bodies of the one, aerial bodies 
or the others; or if only men have bodies as well as souls, yet the evil 
spirits, though without bodies, shall be so oonneoted with the bodily fires 
as to reoeive pain vii thout imparting life. One fire o ertainly shall be the 
lot of both, for thus the truth has declared... But eternal punishment 
seans hard and unjust to human perceptions, because in the weakness of our 
lllortnl oondition there is wanting that highest and purest ·wisdom by which 
it oan be perceived how great a ~dokedness was committed in that first 
transgression. The more enjoyment man found in God, the greater was his 
Wickedness in abandoning Him; and when he destroyed in himself a good which 
lllight have been eternal, he became worthy of eternal evil •• ••" De 
.£.!vitate Dai, XXI, 9~ 10, 12, Translation, Ibid., PP• 460-463-;-
- -
-
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that which is of genuine worth and satisfaction. Death is a 
direct product ot sin (rejection of God). Without sin there 
would never have been any death, for man would have continued 
in direct association with the heavenly order. 
Life, in a more technical sense, is more directly related 
to the idea of light. To be alive is to embody spiritual 
qualities to some degree: eome mental activity, some self-
movement, some registration or expression of wisdom. The 
degree of life nossessed by a thing is determined by the 
sort of light in which it ~articipates. Plants share in 
light but not in the same manner or degree as do animals 
and men, the latter two having a more direct and innnediate 
connection with wisdom throu£2;}; the capacities of their souls. 
Life is directly dependent upon the Logos in Creation, for 
Creation occ'TIU'red when Eternai Wisdom came into expressive 
movement. Life was produced first when light was first 
separated from darkness, when the void became illuminated 
by the spiritual quality of deity---the beginning of the 
first day• To be alive is to share in the qualities poss-
essed in narty by human souls; angels, and in their ultimate 
degrees by God• Lire; whenever and wherever it occurs, 
is an expression~ at least to some degree , ot the order 
of the Eternal Logos~ 22 
Death is the opposite of Life. Whereas life is that 
which results from close connection with the Logos: death ia 
that which results from senartion from the Logos. Human 
and animal bodies die when they become separated from the 
souls through wb.:1.ch they subsist i> ·Tne death of human bodies 
is a direct result of the fall of man and the sin of Adam. 
Sin always causes death, and all death is a product of sin. 
Death comes from 11 darkness, 11 and the Devil (fallen sniritual 
22. "But what Thou ·a0;i.dst in the beginning of the creation. 'Let 
there be light1 and there was light~' (Gen. 1.2) I do not unfitly under-
st!l.nd o.f' the spiritual oreature; beoaus e there was even then a kind of life1 
·which Thou mightest illuminate., But as it had not deserved of Thee that 
it should be suoh a life as oould be enlightened, so neither when it aJ.-
reAdy wos, hath it deserved of Thee that it should be enlightened. For 
neither could its formlessness be pleasing unto Thee, unless it beoame 
light,---not by merely existing, but by beholding the illuminating light, 
and oleaving unto it; so also, that it lives,, and lives happily ..... " 
Conf'essionum1 libri tredeoim, XIII, iii, 4. Translation by Pilkington, 
Iii Nicene Fathers, .£.E." oi t .. , Vol. I.1 P• 191. 
" .... They live r'.1ther in Him than under the sun who do not heed• 
lessly hear wha.t the Apostle saith: 'Seek the things that are above,, where 
Christ is sitting t'lt the right hand of God. i.;ind the things that are 
above, not the things that are upon the earth.. For you are dead: and 
Your life is hid with Christ in God' (Col.iii, 1-3). There,,if our life 
is there where Truth is, our life is not under the sun,, rihere is vanity..,.~1 
,!lnarationes in Psalmos, c2~-III, Sermon xiii,, 1. Translation, Ibid. p.205. 
- -
"The life of beasts is exoited with earthly ple"lsure,, seeks 
earthly pleasures alone, and grovels after them with immoderate desire: 
the lif' e of angels is alone heavenly; the life of men is midv.n}y between 
that of angels and of beasts. lf man lives after the flesh,, he is on a 
level with the beats; i.f' he lives after the Spirit, he joins in the 
i'ellov,•ship of angels ..... " In Joanis Evangelium traotatus. XVIII, 7. 
Translation by Jorhn Gibb1 aiid James Innes. in Nicene Fathers,, op. cit •• 
v, - -0 1. VII, P• 120. 
being) is the ultimate source of it, having insnired man 
to rebellion by means of his superior intelligence. One of 
the tragedies of the situation of death lies in the fact 
that the soul desires to be related to a body. Death is th~ 
simnle dissolution of soul from body, not the deterioration 
of' the soui.23 
23. "And neither the first death, which takes plaoe ~hen the soul 
is compelled to leave the body, nor the second death, which takes place 
when the soul is not permitted to leave the suffering body, would have 
been inflicted on man had no one sinned •••• 11 Enchiridion., XCI, 93. 
Translation by J. F. Shaw in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol.III, p. 26fl. 
--
"Although the human soul is truly affirmed to be immortal., yet 
it also has a oert_3in death of its own. For it is therefore called iml(O} 
mortal,. because,, in a sense., it does not cease to live and to feel; while 
the body is cnlled mortal, because ii; can be forsaken of all life, and 
cannot by itself' live at all.. The death, then of the soul takes plaoe 
when God forsakes it, as the deri.th of the body when the soul forsakes it. 
Therefore the death of both .. --that is, of the whole man---occurs when the 
soul, forsaken by God,, forsakes the body. For, in this case., neither is 
God the life of the soul, nor the soul ·i:;he life of the body. And this 
death of the whole man is followed by that which, on the authority of the 
divine oracles, we call the s eoond den th. This the Saviour referred to 
when He said, •Fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in 
hell.' (Matt. x. 28) ouoWherefore we must say that if the first men were 
indeed so created, that if th6Y had not sinned, they would not have 
experienced ftJUkind of death; but that, having become sinnerQ, they were 
so punished .~ith death, that whatsoever sprang from their stock should also 
be punished ini th the same death. For nothing else could be born of them 
than that which they thems elve had been. Their nature was deteriorated in 
Proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of their sin, ~o that what 
existed as punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural oonse-
quenoe in their children.... For neither by sin or its punishment was 
he himself ((Adam)) reduced to that infantile and helpless infirmity of' 
body and mind whioh we see in ohildren• For God ordained that infants 
should begin the \\'Orld as the young of beasts begin 1 t, sinoe their parents 
had fallen to the level of' beasts in the fashion or their life and or their 
death: as it is written, 'If.an when he was in honor understood not; he 
beoame like the beasts that have no understandinc.• (Ps.xlix.12) 
••• :"lhere.:f.'ore, as regards bodily death, that is, the separatiQn of the 
(continued on next page) 
Augustine's philosophy of Salvation is also an outgrowth 
oont. 
soul from the body, it is good unto none while it is being endured by 
those whom we say are in the article of death. For the very violenoe with 
whioh body and soul are wrenched asunder,, v~hioh in the living had been 
conjoined and olosely intertwined, brings ~ith it a harsh expe?'ienoe • 
• • • Death, proceeding by ordinary generation from the first man, is the 
punishment of all who are born of him, yet., if it be endured for ri.ght-
eousness sake,, it becomes the glory of those who are born again ••• ~" De 
Civitate Dei, XIII,, 2, 3,, 6. Translation by Marcus Dods in Nicene Fathers, 
op. cit., Toi. II. PP• 245-247. -
--
u .••• Every man is afraid of the death the flesh; few,, of the 
death of the soul. 'In regard to the death of the flesh, vhich must oertain,. 
ly oome some time, all are on their gu.ard against its approach: this is : 
the souoe of' all their labor. Man, destined to die, labors to avert his 
dying; and yet man, .destined to live for (J!ler, labors not to cease from 
sinning. And when he labors to avoid dying,, he labors to no purpose,, for 
its only result will be to put off death for a while, not to escape it; but. 
if he refrain from sinning, his toil will cease, and he shall live for 
ever •• ••" In Joannis Evangelium traotatus,, XLIX,, xi, 2. Translation by 
Gibb and Innes, in Uicene Fathers,, op. cit.,, Vol. VII., P• 270. 
--
tt· 'Like sheep laid in hell,, death is their shepherd' (Ps. 
xxx1i* 14) ••• Yea, death is either the separation of the soul .from the 
body,, or a separation of the soul from God, and that indeed whioh men fear 
is the separation of the soul from the body: but the real death, whioh 
men do not fear,, is the separation of the soul from God. And oft ~s 
when men rear that which doth separate the soul .from the body, they fall 
into that wherein the soul is separated from God. This then is death. 
But how is 'death their shepherd'? Ii' Christ is life,, the devil is death. 
But we read in many places in Scripture, how that Christ is life. But 
the devil is death, not because he is himself death, but because through 
him is death.... They who belong to him have death to their shepherd: 
but we who think of future im:nortality, and not without reason do wear 
the sign of the Cross of Christ on the forhead, have no shepherd but life. 
or unbelievers death is the shepherd, of believers life is the shepherd. 
Ir then in hell are the sheep, whose shepherd is death, in heaven are the 
sheep, whose shepherd is life. What then? Are we now in Heaven? In 
heaven we are by faith. For if not in heaven, where is the 'Lift up yo6r 
heart'? ••• In body we walk on earth; in heart we dwell in heaven •••• " 
!_nnarationes in Psalmos, XLIX, (Lat. XLVIII) Part III l. Translation 
by Coxe, in Nio ene Path ers, 2.E,• .2!i•• Vol VIII. P• 174. 
of his doctrine of God. God, not man, is the hero in the 
saga of human salvation. Salvation is from God, not from 
man. It is a gift of God, an act of God made possible by an 
event in history. It is a happening, the major part of which 
has already o:ccw:>red and been comnleted in the past. It is 
not a present process or technique. Man does not make or 
produce Salvation; he merely shares in the Salvation that 
God has made man entirely on his own initiative. Man•s only 
activity in S~lvation is that of simple acquiuesence. 
Augustine's general doctrine of Salvation is made 
necessary by his doctrine of the Fall of man. Since man was 
-
created comnletely good and pronounced good in the beginning, 
it is quite obvious that something has haopened to make him 
otherwise since that time. Augustine feels that there is 
little need to argue for the depravity of man, for the fact 
of man's depravity appears to be universally established. It 
is rather the case that he needs to apneal to Revelation in 
order to posit the fact of man's orig~alcomnlete goodness. 
As has already been suggested, Augustine did not believe in a 
literal Adam, but rather took the term to signify the whole 
order of human nature, particularized in the singular for 
purposes of granhic usage. Augustine, furthermore, is not 
specifically concerned about 11\lvhen" man fell, or how long 
it took for him to fall, whether instantaneously or through 
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:a ·lengt.hy -process;; :~:·he•·is·.oonu:!zlb.oed that behind it all 
there is the free choice of man in deliberate rebellion 
against God, in the deliberate and intelligent choice of 
a lower good in th~ place of a higher one. This "Fall.,;" 
whenever it happened, has left its mark on man. Man, a's 
we now find him, is signi.f"icantly "corrupted." In his 
current natural state (but not in his true natural state)• 
he is immoral and guilty in his sins.24 
24. "•••BY them((lidam and Eve)) so great- a sin was oommittedsth';?.·tcy- · 
it the human nature was altered. for thJJ worse,, and was trmsmitted also 
to their postel"ity,, liable to sin and subjoot to death. And the kingdom 
of' doa.th so reigned over men,, that the deserved. penalty of sin would have 
hurled all headlong even into the second death,, or which there is no 
end,, had not the undeserved graoe of God s~ved sc>me there rrom ••• "·£2. 
Civitate Dai,, XIV.I. Translation,, pods, Nicene Fathers, op. oit.Vol. 
II,, P• 2627"° . - -
"But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first 
parents ••• , before th6y sinned, experienoed in their animal body suoh ,. 
enotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin hasb&sn 
purged and finally 2b'olished ••• Their love to God ·was unclouded,. and their 
mutual affeotion was thim; of faithful and sincere marriage: and from this 
love flowed a wonderful delight. beoaus e the.y always enjoyed what was lov'.,_ 
ed. Their avoidance of sin ·was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintain..i 
ed., no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorr~w •••• As happy 
then,, as 1·1ere these our first parents, who 1;1ere agitated by no mental 
perturbations;· and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the 
whole- human re.oe have been, had they not introduced that evil which they 
have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of ·th©.r descendants 
committed iniquity worthy of damnation ••• eur first pa.rents fell into 
open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the 
evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And 
what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For •pride is the beginn• 
ing of' sin'(Ecolus.x. 13) •. And what is pride but the oraving for undue 
exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to 
whom it ought to ol eve as its end,, and become a kind of end to its elf.••" 
~ Civitate E!!.• XIV, 10,13. Translation, ~· P• 273. 
The answer to man's depravity is God's graoe. Specific-
ally 1 the ansvirer lies in the Mediator who bridges the gap 
between man's guilt and God's justice. The Mediator is 
Saviour, Jesus Christ 1 who by incarnation communicates the 
fact of God's love to man. By being a worthy sacrifice, He 
pays man's just and unavoidable penalty for his crimes of 
25 
rebellion. The Incarnation is necessary in order to effect 
25. " ••• The highest Wisdom of God designed to assume this wound, by 
means of a wonderful and ineffable sacrament, when He took upon Hims elf 
man ·without sin, but not VJithout the condition 0£ sin. For He was willing 
to be humanly born, to suffer, and to die. None of these things was 
accomplished by our merit, but by this most excellent goodness,"••• 
.£.!musica, VI,7 (4). Translation by Robert c. Taliaferro, in Vol. II, 
}!.itings of St. Augustine(Fathers of the Church), P• 332. 
_,,.Ano limae that true Med'iator, in so far as, by assuming the form <. 
a. servant, He became the Hediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, 
though in the form of' God He received sacrifice together with the Father, 
with ·whom He is one God, yet in the form of a servant He chose rather to be 
than to reo eive a sacrifice, that not even by this instance aey one might 
have occasion to suppose th:i:rt sacrifice should be rendered to any creature. 
Thus He is both the Priest vJho offers and the Saorifioe offered. 111 De 
Q!vitate Dei, x. 20. Translation, Dods, in Nioene Fathers, op.cit. :-vol. 
II, p. 193':'"9 - -
1tAnd so the human race vias lying under a just condemnation, and 
all men were the children of wrath. Of which wrath it is written: 'All 
our days are passed ai:my in Thy v1rath; •wo spend our years as a tale 
that is told.' (Ps. eo.,9) Of which "Wrath also Job says: •Man that is born 
of a woman is of few days, and full of trouble,• (Job.xiv.l) Of which 
wrath also the Lord Jesus says: •He that believeth on the Son hath ever-
lasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but 
the wrath of God abideth on him. t {John iii. 36---really spoken by John 
the Baptist.) He do es not say it will come, but it 'abid eth on him•' For 
every man is born v:ith it; VJheref'ore the apostle says: •we were by nature 
the children of wrath, even as others.' (Eph.88.3) Now, as men were lying 
U~der this wrath by reason of their original sin, and as this original 
sin was:.:ithe more heavy and deadly in proportion to the number and magnituae 
(oont • on the next page) 
a complete revelation of Holy.illod to unholy man. The sacrifj.ce 
was necessary to allov1 an adequate justification of theatvu!:tied.: 
relation between man and God, that is, to bring man nnd God 
into harmony and direct communion of one accord of will---
At-one-ment :26 Again, it is the case, that this, another 
oont. ' 
of the actual sins which were added to it,, there was need for a );ediator,, 
that is, for a reconciler,, ·who by the offering of one saorifice, of whioh 
all the sacrifices of the law and the prophets were types, should take 
a\'•ay this wrath. 1''herefore the apostle says: 'For if, when we 'were enemies, 
we were reconciled to God by the death of Eis Son,, much more, being recon-
oiled, we shall be saved by His life.' (Rom.v. 10) Now when God is said 
to be angry, we do not attribute to Him such a displeasure against sin 
by the name 'anger,,-·' a v10 rd tra.nsf erred by analogy from human emotions. 
But our being reconciled to God through a Eediator, and receive th·e Holy 
Spirit, so thnt rrn who were enemies are mand sons ••• : This is the g_race of 
God through Jesus Christ our Lord." Enchiridion,, XXX:II,, 33,, Transl~tion 
Shaw, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit. Vol.III,, p.248. ' 
26. "The grace Of GOd could not have been more r;raoiously OOIIllil€Jllded 
to us than thus, that the only Son of God, remaining unchangeable in \Him-
s elf, should asstune humanity, and should give us the hope of His love~ 
by means of the mediation of a human nature,, through which we, from th.e 
condition of men. might oome to Him who wc.s so far off,--.. the irrmortal ', 
from the mortal; the unchangeable from thG ·changeable; the just from the 
unjust; the blessed from the wretohea. ••• m De Civitate Dei, X, 28. Trans-
lation, Ibid,p. 199. -
11 
•• •.If,, as•• .it must needs be that all men, so long as they· are 
mortal,, are also miserable,, we must seek an intermediate who is not only ', 
man,, but also God,, that by the interposition of His blessed mortality,, He· 
p}ey bring men our of their mortal misery to a blessed immortality ••• I do 
not say that Re is Eediator because He is the Word, for as the word He is 
supremely blessed and supranely immortal,, and therefore from miserable 
rnortals; but He is 1.:ediator as He is ma~ for by His humanity He shows us 
that,, in order to obtain that blessed and beatioio good,, we need not seek 
other mediators to lead us through the successive steps of this attainment,, 
but that the blessed and beatific Go\l, having Hims elf become a partaker of 
' (cont. on the next page) 
-168-
phase of Augustine's theology can be resolved finally into 
his idea of the love of God. The very coming of a Mediator 
is but an example of the love of God for man. The fact of 
tbe'.S~crifice,, the Justification,, and the Reconciliation are 
but manifestations of the order of a divine love which passes 
into man's order and redeems man's rebellious will, frames 
new value-objectives, and leads towards Sanctification and 
27 
Everlasting life. The Mediator is the technical means of 
cont. 
our humanity. has afforded us ready access to the participation of His 
divinity •••• Therefore, when He chose to be in the .form of a servant end 
lower than the angels, that He might be our I.1ediator, He remained higher the.: 
the angels, in the form of' God.---Hims-eli' at once the way of life on earth 
and life itself in heaven.tr De C'ivitate Dei, IX, 15. Translation, Ibid •• 
P• 174. - - -
27. This is the universal way of the soul's deliverance, which the 
holy angels and the holy prophets formerly disclosed where they oould 
among the few men who found the grace of God. and especially in the Hebrew 
nation ••• In some explicit statement, and in raany obscure foreshadowings, 
this WlliW was declared; but latterly c::ime the llediator Himself in the flesh. 
and His blessed apostles, revealinG how the grave of the New Testament 
more openly explained what had been obscurely hinted to preceding gen-
eration, in conformity with the relation of the ages of the human faoe ••• 
This way purifies the whole man, and prepares the mortal in all his parts 
for immortality. Fbr, to prevent us from seeking for one purgation for 
the part which Porphyry calla-. intellectual, and another for the part he 
calls spiritual, and another for the body itself, our most mighty and 
truthful Purifier and Saviour assumed the whole human nature. Except by 
the way, which has been present among men both during the period of the 
promises and of the proclamation of their fulfillment, no man has been 
delivered, no man is delivered, no man shall be delivered." De Civitate 
E_e_!, X,32, Translation, Ibid., P• 202. 
"It was therefore truly said that man is ol eans ed only by a 
Principle, although the Platonists erred in speaking in the plural of 
Principles. But Porphyry, being under the dominion of these envious powers, 
. (cont. on the next page) 
man's Salvation. The love of God is its source. 
By placing the main focus of attention upon the work done 
by the Media:t-or in human Salvation, Augustine removes the 
possibility 9f thinking of Salvation as a human accomnlishment. 
cont. 
refused to recognize that Christ is the Principle by '\vhos e incarnation we 
are purified. Indeed he despised Him, because of the flesh itself which He 
assumed, that He offer a sacrifice for our purifioation,---a great nystery, 
unintelligible to Porphyry's pride, which that true and benignant Redeaner 
brought low by His humility, manifesting Himself to mortals by the mortal-
ity which He assumed, •• ,., Thus the good and true Mediator showed that it is 
sin vvhioh is evil, and not the substance or nature of the flesh; for 
this, together with the human soul, could ·nithout sin be both assumed and 
retained, . and laid dovm in death, and changed to something better by 
resurrection. He showed also that death its elf, al though the punishment 
of sin, was submitted to bv Him for our sakes vii thout sin, and must not be 
evaded by sin on our part,~ but rather, ii' opportunity serves be borne for 
righteousness' sake. For he '"Jas '.\ble to expiate sins by dying, beoause He 
both died, and not for sin of Eis own •••• The Principle is neither the 
flesh nor the human soul in Christ, but the Word by which all things were 
made. The flesh, therefore, does not by its own virtue purify, but by 
virtue of the 1'\brd by which it w::i.s assumed, when' the Word became flesh and 
dwelt among us.' (J~hn 1:14) For speaking mystioally of eating His flesh, 
when those who did not understand Him were offended and went away, saying, 
'This is a hard saying,who can hear it'?' He answered to the rest who re-
mained, •rt is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing.• 
(John vi. 6·64) The Principle, therefore, having assumed a human soul and 
flesh, cleanses the soul and flesh of believers. Therefore, when the Jews 
asked Him who He was, He answered that He was the Principle (or 'the be-
ginning' John viii. 25) And this we oarnal and feeble men, liable to sin, 
and involved in the darkness of ignorance, aould not possibly understand, 
unless we were cleansed and healed by Him, both by means of what we were, 
and of what we vJere not. For we v1ere men, but we were not rie;hteous; where-
as in His incarnation there was a human nature~. but it was righteous nnd 
not sinful. This is the mediation whereby a hand is stretched to the lapsed 
and fallen; this is the seed 'ordained by angels,' by whose ministry the 
law also was given enjJining the worship of one God, and promising that 
thia Mediator should come" De. Civitate Dei X, 24. Translation, Ibid., 
p. 194. - -
The work of man in working out his own salvation.is meager in 
comparison with that which has already been done. Futhermore, 
the way is clear and comparatively easy. No formula must be 
deduced and followed from process to process. God has al-
ready done all that needs to be done to make salvation ~osaible, 
Man needs only to narticipate in that which has already been 
provided. Salvation is not to be thought of as man's affair. 
It is entirely God's affair. 
These teachings are consistent with Augustine's doc-
trines of nredeatination and election. God saves whom he 
wills to save, because he has already elected that it will 
be the plight of some to be lost and some to be saved. Yet, 
Augustine attempts to preserve the free choice of all individ-
ual sou]sby insisting that each individual soul does have 
freedom 1n its choice of the nature it is to assume in this 
life, and hence, in the next. Augustine does not negate free 
will by his doctrines of predestination and election. The 
latter are to be understood in the sense that God does allow 
some to be lost and some to be saved, and in his wisdom, knows 
how each individual soul will choose during the time of choice. 
Salvation never occurs in any complete sense during 
earthly existence. It has been made possible in the past,· 
and it begins in the nresent, but it does not come to its 
fullness until its fruition in heaven. There are degrees of 
its realization on earth, however, in the sense that Sanctifir• 
cation is a genuine human possibility. Salvation, 1tse}.f, is 
conceived of as a positive value---the addition of other 
higher values to existence---rather than as a negative one, 
namely, the removal of disagreeable factors from human exist-
ence ••• None of the negative elements of human existenoe are 
removed when Salvation occurs on the human scene. They ·exist 
as potently as ever, if not more so, along with the positive 
values acQured. Salvation on earth can be thought of only 
as a meager sort of Salvation in comparison with Salvation 
in heaven. 
It is inte~esting that Augustine does not think of 
Salvation in heaven simply as 11 going to heaven," but as the 
unlimited and complete beatific vision of God: supreme joy, 
happiness, and satisfaction, both soul and body (a new body) 
recognizing the knowledge and love of God forever. Augustine 
conjectures that something of this sort must have been the 
condition of Adam and Eve before sin and the Fall. 
To summarize the development of Augustine's idea of 
Salvation to this noint, it has been suggested that Augustine 
attributes human salvation solely to the work of the Mediator, 
Jesus Christ, so as to rule out human works or merit as its 
basis. Salvation occurs when the soul becomes aware of the 
love of God in Christ and allows that order of love to effect 
a transformation of human nature, and significantly, or the 
human will. Some men are acted upon directly by the Holy 
Spirit so as to come under the revelation of the nature of 
God in Christ as channelled by the witness of the scriptures 
through the Church. The degree of response to this revelation 
determines the degree of Salvation, and also, the degree of 
Sanctification. Salvation is never adequate or c9mpletely 
certain in earthly life, being decidedly hampered by the 
depraved condition of both body and the soul (the .flesh). 
Passing from a consideration of Augustine's ideas as to 
how Salvation is obtained, we now consider in more detail 
what Augustine means by Salvation. 
It is significant to note that Augustine apnears to 
reduce man to the status of a spectator in his entire religious 
outlook on life. As Augustine sees the situation~ man should 
never not religiously on his own initiative. Religious 
situations are those in which the individual is acted upon 
by some force or personality outside of himself, a force that_ 
is larger and better than he is. Religion is man's meek 
response to God's overpowering majesty and goodness. Qod 
is essentially "aggressive" in his apn:roach to man; taking 
the initiative, he must overpower man with his love before 
man can be saved. Salvation is effected by the adjustment 
of the human will to the will of God. 
The major efforts and energies of the individual are to 
be directed not toward the laying hold of Salvation but 
toward the exnanaion and development of it to its fullest 
degree. "Works" are not for the purpose of atta1n1n.g 
Salvation, but rather for the purpose of enhancing the 
degree of Salvation once it has been attained. The develop-
ment and expansion of Salvation is identical with what 
Augustine means by Sanctification so that the degree or 
28 
Salvation is the same thing as the degree of Sanctification. 
It can be said, then, that the method of Salvation, 
il)llSO'tla.ras the individual can do anything about it, lies 
- 29 
simply in "faith." Christ is ~ way of Salvation, and 
28. Augustine thinks of Sanotifioation in terms of perfection. To 
some extent the stages of his mystioism may be considered as degrees of 
perfeotion and degrees or perf eotion. 
29. "It was by faith in thid mystecy, and godliness of life, that 
purifioation was attainable even by the saints of old, whether before the 
law was given ts the Hebrews ••• or in the periods under the law.•••''~ 
Civita.te Dai,, X1 25, Translation .. Doda, in Nioene Fathers,,_2f.-._ cit., 
V. II1 P• "'m. -
11 
••• Faith1 by whioh men believe in God .. is above all things necessary 
in this mortal life, most full as it is of errors and hardships." De 
.Trinitate, XIII, vii. (10) Translation, Haddan in Nicene Fathers,~· 2.!!• 
Vol. III, P• 171. 
"~t this part or the human raoe to whioh God has promised pardon 
and a share in his eternal kingdom, oan they be restored through the merit 
of their own works? God forbid. For what good work can a lo.st man perform, 
except so far as he has been delivered from perdition? Can they do any•~· 
thing by the free determination or their own will? Again I ~ay .. God forbid. 
For it was by the evil use or his free will that man destroyed both it and 
hirnself .... 1'fhat kihd of liberty, I aslc, can the bond-slave possess., exoept 
when it pleases him to sin. 
man's means of attaining unto Christ is by faith and faith 
alone. Augustine's meaning of Salvation, however, incor-
porates .. more than this. Contrary to many of his contempor~ry 
Christain theologians, Augustine gives a positive meaning 
to Salvation. ~ot only is Salvation saved from a dire con-
sequence in the future life, it is being saved to partication 
in positive joys and satisfaction. Salvation begins in the 
present, at the time of initial faith and realization of 
God's love, continues all through this life, and then 
flourishes into an even greater nositive effect in heaven. 
Salvation is the positive value of the direct narticipation 
in the knowledge anci love of God, the intellectual delight 
of living under a more or less continuous beatific vision of 
God. 
Augustine suggests that there are seven degrees, or 
levels of perfection, unto which the soul may attain •.. The 
first degree renresents no great amount of success or accomn-
lishment for human souls, as it is the bare nrinciple of 
animation or life in bodies, the existing of bodies as a 
unity in the midst of their changing circumstances. It is 
the rudimentary unity of all organisms, common to men, animals, 
and plants~ growth, germination, preservation, adaptation, etc. 
merely for the nurnose of continuing to exist as an organism. 
The second degree of' the soul is that of sensation, 
...:17s-
that degree significantly possessed by animal organisms. 
Augustine writes of this level: 
"..,cNotioe in the higher living organism how great is the 
soul's power in the senses and in looomotio~, which those 
things that are fixed to the earth by roots ca!mot possihly 
share with use. The soul applies its elf to the sense of 
touch; through it feels and distinguisheJ. hot and cold, 
rough and smooth, hard and soft,, light and heavyei "° eto. 30 
.!!2. quanti tate animae,, .X,"'{XI!I,, 71. 
In this level the body itself becomes utilized for some other 
objective. It attains a function beyond the level of its own 
mere existence as an organism. For example, in this level 
there is more than the automatic generation of offspring. Here 
care, protection, and nourishment is provided for the off-
spring. In this level the soul functions by habit or in-
- ( 
stinct, and is directly affected or determined in some measure 
by its enviroment. 
The third level of the soul may be called the "Artistic" 
level. It is the level of memory, measurement and speculation. 
It is the first level that is a distinctively human level, 
for the animal lower than man cannot participate completely 
in this level. Out of this level develops expression, honors, 
the state, peace and war, and social institutions. It is the 
level of reason, poetry, play and music. It is the heritage 
30. Translation by J. J. lfolfa.hon, s. J. in Vol. II of' the Works 
of ~1ugustine in Fathers 2.£. ~Church,, op. oit.,, P• 138. 
shared by all rational souls, both the learned and unlearned~ 
the good and the wicked. Herein the soul onerates not of 
the body' or 'through the body' as in the first two i!'l.stun11e1:1 
but 'about the body.' 
The fourth level of the soul is the level of Virtue. ~his 
plane of develo~ment is the level in which moral goodness 
occurs. Augustine writes of this level: 
11 From this point the soul dares to rank its elf not only 
before its own body, if it is a part of the material world. 
but even before the whole material world itself, and it 
dares to think that the good of the world is not its good 
and to distinguish and despise the countfeits or its ovm. 
power and beauty. Henoe, the more it becomes the cause of 
its ovm. delight, the more it dares to withdraw from baser 
things and wholly to ol eans e its elf' and to make its elf' 
spotless and stainless •••• The soul perceives mare and more .... 
how great is the difference between itself purified and 
itself defiled." 31 
~ quanti tate animae, XXXIII, 73. 
In this level the soul begins to become concerned not about 
its body, as was the case in the previous level, but about 
itself. It is the level in which the soul enters into the 
warfare against evil both against evil on the outside of it 
and the evil inside its own nature. It undergoes a heroic 
struggle to avoid attachment and allegiance to lower values, 
the various 11 alurements 11 of the lower, inferior orders---
the world. In short~ this level is the level of the battle 
31. Translation,-liid •• P• 139. 
• 
for justice. Virtue is an action of the soul in establiehing 
the good instead of the bad. No divine intervention is 
necessarily needed at this level. 
The fifth degro6 of the soul is the level of peace, or 
tranquility. After the soul succeeds in cleansing itself from 
all its stains, it "settles within itself" in joy n.nd pco.ce 
without fear, and is not disturbed at all for any reason of 
its own. This is the level in which the soul attains con-
fidence in itself, that is, its own inherent worth and great-
ness No lonber does it fight to nurity itself but rather fights 
to keep itself pure. In this level the soul grasps the truth 
of its own innate or natural dignity (before the fall) and 
bounds forth in ecgerness, with a yearning desire to know more 
truth •. 
The .aixth degree of the soul is the highest level of 
11 act1vity0 in which the soul may participate. Augustine terms 
it the level of "o.pnroach. 11 He writes concerning it: 
"Now, this «ctivity. the yearning to understand '°;hnt things aro 
true and best, is the soul's highest vision. B~ond this it has 
nothing more perfect, more noble, nnd moro true. This. therefore, 
v.ri.11 be the sixth degree of ootivity. For# it is one thing to have 
tho eye of the soul so clear that it does not look nbout idly or 
incautiously and s eo 't'.rhnt is unseemly, and onothe:r thing to protect 
nnd strengthen tho her:ilth of the eye; and it is another thing,. ngai~ 
to direct a calm nnd stondy gaze upon thnt whioh is to be seen. Those 
who msh to do this before they are cleansed nnd healed are so driven 
back by the lir;ht of truth that they m~ think there is in it not 
only nothing good, but much of evil. They deey it the name of truth 
and by reason 0£ piti~ble yeilding - - - oont~nued --
to onrnal indulgence, the;y draw back into the cavern or their 
own darkness,, enduring it b eoasue th6y are ill and cursing 
the only remedy of their distemper. Whence, divinely inspired, 
the prophet most fittingly prays~ 'Create a clean heart in 
me,, 0 Lord, and renew a right spirit in my breast.' (Ps. 50:12) 
The spirit is right, I believe, if it keeps the soul in its 
quest for truth from losing··the. •m.y and ·going wrong• :Suoh a 
spirit is not re:.1ev1ed in a man unless his heart fires shall 
have been m3do clean, that is, unless he restrain his thoughts 
and dra•N thEm off from all mundane attachment and defilanent." 32 
~ quantitate animae, XXXIII, 75. 
This is the level in which the soul focuses itself awri:.y from 
itself and toward God. It should be noticed that here is a 
difference between soul turning away from sin, evil will, or 
the depravaties of the body into itself and soul turning sway 
from itself. In order to get to God the soul has to get away 
-
not only from the certain evils of the body but from the in-
herent positive value of the soul itself. 
,The seventh and last level of the soul is the level of 
the vision and contemplation of truth which Augustine called 
the level of "Contemplation." Augustine's own words in des-
cription of this level are important: 
" ••• we have oome to the seventh and last step, not really 
a step, but a dwelling pla.oe to which the previous steps have 
brought us. Vlhat shall I say are the delights, what the 
enjoyment, of the supreme and true God; what breath or 
undisturbed peaoe and eternity? These are the wonders that 
great souls have declared, so far as they brought themselves 
to speak of' thes a realities, great souls or incomparable 
greatness, who, we believe, beheld and now behold these things. 
This I now d~re say to you in all simplicity, that, if we 
hold vdth all perseveranoe to the course that God lays dovin 
for us and which we have undertaken to hold, we shall come 
by God's power and wisdom to that highest Cause, or Supreme 
32. Trans!ation, Ibid., P• 139. 
-
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Author, or Supreme Pri11oiple of rdl things, or whatever other 
name you would deem worthy of so great a Reality." 
£!:. quantitate animae, XXXIII, 76. 33 
Augustine's idea of the meaning of Salvation, or union with God, 
is, of course, idonticalwith his doctrine of Contemplation, 
the seventh and highest level of the soul. It is the level 
in v1hich the soul becomes 11 in God 11 to quote Augustine's own 
words a.bout the situation. The soul still ii the soul and 
only the soul. It has not changed its nature from that 
nature with which it was created; it has only nurified that 
nature from its defilement. 
As for the exact meaning, or inner meaning of thee~r1onc()· 
of contemplation itself, Augustine thinks that one word will 
express iG: joy. In the experience of communion, or union with 
deity 1 the soul knows the highest ecstasy possible to man---
It is a complete abandonment of itself, i.e. its self-dir-
ection, within the control of God. Augustine comments on his 
own feelings when in the state of Contemplation, viz.: 
u ••• I marvelled that I .... loved Thee. and had no phantasm 
inst0ad of Thee. And yet I did not merit to enjoy my God 
but vias transported to Thee by Thy beauty, and presently 
torn away from Thee by mine om weight, sinking with e;-i'ief 
into these inferior thine;s •••• Yet was there a romembranoe 
of Thee with me; nor did I any v1 .... y doubt that there was one 
to whom I might cleave,, but that I was not yet one who oould 
oleave unto Thee •••• lmd most oertain I was that Thy 'invisible 
33, Translation. ~., P• 142. 
things from the creation or the ,,,:orld are olearly seen, being under-
stood by the things that are made, even Thy tit.crl:lar ·power and Godhead.' 
(Rom. i.20) Fbr., inquiring nhence it was that I admired the beauty 
of bodies whether clestial or terrestrial, and what supported me in 
judging correctly on things mutable ••• inquiring then, wheno e I so 
judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the unohaneeable and 34 
true aterni ty of' Truth above my changeable mind ..... " 
..C.nnfAssiopum l.ilU:i tredecim. VII,16(23) 
In another passa3e, in which Augustine is recounting a con-
versation he had with his mother shortly before her death, he 
reports an experience that might be considered the experience 
of Contemplation. He writes: 
" ••• we then 'were conversing alone very pleasantly; and, 'forgetting 
those things whioh are before' (Phil.3 :13) we wet-e seeking between 
ours.elves in the presence of the Truth •••• We opened wide the mouth 
of' our heart after those supernal streams of Thy fountain, t the 
fountain of life,' whioh is ' vdth Thoe:' that being sprinkled 
with it no cording to our capacity. we might in some measure weigh 
so high a mystery. And when our oonversation had arrived at that 
point, that the very highest pleasure of' the carnal senses, and 
thnt in the very brightGst material light, s eetned b~r reason of the 
sweetness of the.t life not only not worth of' comparison, but not 
e-·.rnn of mention, we. li:N::inc; ourselves ,·1ith a more ardent affection 
towards 'the '3 elfsame.' did gradually pass through all corporeal 
, thinGs, an<l even the heaven itself. r:hence sun, and zr.oon, and 
stars shine upon the earth; yea, we soared hit;her yet by inward 
musing, and discoursing, and admirine; Thy '\\urks; and we came to our 
oYm minds* and vJent beyond them, that we might advance ns high as 
that region of' unfailing plen.ty. where Thou deed est Israel for ever 
vrl. th the food of truth, nnd made, both whioh have been, and whioh 
are yet to come ••• lmd while we were thus spe~king, and straining 
after here, vve slightly touched her rdth the whole effort of our 
heart; and we sighed, and there left bound •the first-fruits of the 
Spirit;• and returned to the noise of our own mouth, v-1here the 35 
word uttered has both beginning and end • 11 
Conf essiopum libri tredeoim, IX,x, (26) 
34. Transb.tion by Pilkington, in Nio ene Fathers, op. oit., Vol .I 
--P• 111. 
35. Tt-anslation, Ibid., P• 137. 
-
Perhaps still another exami~.3 in which he dedic~tes his feeling 
e.t the time of Contemplation would be instructive. ~vhile writing 
on the subject of God's vlisdom, he exclaims: 
"Y..1hnt is that which shines through me,, and strikes my heart vd. thout 
injury, and I both shudder and burn? I shudder inasmuch as I run 
unlike it; and I burnina.s cuohe.s I run like it. It is 'disdom it• 
self that shines throue;h me,, clearing rey cloudiness •• •" 36 
· Conf'esaionum libri tredooim, XI,, ix (II) 
The primary feeling at the time of the experience is joy •• -
supreme mental elation which is intellectual rather than 
sensuous in character. Connected with this joy is a certain 
feeling of satisfaction, or temporary peace of mind. There 
is also a feeling of incompleteness the inner knowledge that 
the intensity of the joy experienced is not of the final level 
of the full potentialities of the mind to experience joy. 
The evidence seems to be adequate to prove that the ex-
perience itself is solely an intellectual experience. Augustine 
does not attempt to explain union with God except in terms of 
a mental awa:ren.ess of other mental life. In the strictest sense 
it can readily be seen that no actual union between man and 
God can take place if God and man are to be regarded as existing 
in relation to one another but with quite different essences. 
There can be no real merger between the two because there are 
36. Translation. ~.,, P• 166. 
no identical entities. The difference is a difference in 
kind, the difference between that of Creature and Creator~ 
matter and spirit, matter plus form(body and pure form. 
"Union with God" in Augustine's mysticism can only be the 
existence in close relationship of two distinctively different 
substances, one of which exists as pure snirit, the other 
existing as matter somewhat spiritualized so as to be able 
to appreciate and enjoy the order of the spirit. It is as 
if some radium were brought near a piece of copper so as to 
·affect its nature by radiation---the copper still remaining 
only copper and the radium remaining radium. Yet, it will also 
be seen, that there must exist a certain similarity between 
the two different essences in order for there to be any basis 
of unde~standing and appreciation. Man must be enough like 
God intellectually to be able to perceive an intellectual 
being. 
Augustine's own comments in refer0nce to his experience 
of the nature of God are important at this point to illustrate 
his doctrine of the •Otherness' of the nature of God and the 
essentially intellectual character of the experience of union: 
f· •• :x entereid, and with the eye of my so~l (suoh as it was) saw 
above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Unghangeable Light. 
Not this oomrnon light, whioh all flesh may look upon, nor as it were. 
a greater one of the same kind, as though the brightness of this 
~hould be muoh n:ore resplendent, and r:ith its greatness fill up all 
;hings. Not like this was that licht, but different,. yea,. very 
different from all these. Nor was it above my mind as oil is above 
Tiater, not as heaven above earthJ but above ii: we.a; becauso it made 
me,, and I below it, because I was made by it. He who knows the1:.:.~ll 
·'.,and true Love, and loved Eternity& Thou art my God; to Thee c1.r.: 
I sigh both night and day. rrhen I first knew Thee, thou lifted~t 
me up,, that I might see there was that whioh I might see, and tl.et 
yet it was not I that did see. .And Thou didst beat baok the ini'i:t:"111•· 
ity of my sight, pouring forth upon me nost strongly Thy beruns of 
light, and I trembled with love and fear; and I f-pnr; and I found 
myself to be far off from Thee, in the region of dissimularity, as 
if I hear this voice of Thine from on high: '! am the food of 
strong men; grov1, and thou shalt feed upon me; nor shalt thou 
convert me, like the food of thy flesh, into thee, but thou 37 
sho.l t be converted into me.~••• • 11 
Con£essiontun libri. tr~deoim, VII,x., (16) . 
It should be noted that throughout this passage the in-
' it!ative comes from God in the sense that God's light shines 
on man making man different, and not in the sense that man's 
light shines on God illuminating his nature. Thia is the 
doctrine of "Revelationn in its purest form---the simple asser •-
tion th~t God illuniines man by the force of his own. energies, 
not that man illumines himself. Our suggestion is that 
Augustine uses the seven stages to ex~lain what in effect does 
happen when man is saved by the forces of God acting unon him 
from without. All of the seven stages take place in the Sal-
; 
vation or man, even though Salvation is to be thought ot in 
terms of what God has done. Man must cooperate with God in the 
process of working out his own salvation on, the basis of that 
Which has already been done, and the seven processes are the 
- 31. Translation, Ibid., P• l09. 
-
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changes that the soul undergoes in thie process. In a rather 
loose sense, these processes may be termed either Sanctification 
or Salvation,, for the consequent practical meaning of Salvation 
in its latter stages of ~evelopment ,is the same as what is meant 
,,. ... '° 
by Sanctification. He writes: 
"We ~e inquiring of' course, about the power of' the soul, ( r ef'erring 
to the seven stages) and the soul has the power to perform all these 
aots simultaneously, although it may think that it is really doing only 
that aot which implies some effort, or, at least, some fear. For it 
performs chat aot with greater attention than the rest.-·. • • In no aot 
does God abandon the soul either tor punishment or reward, for Re has 
judged it to be the most beautiful, so that it is the eiplemplar .. of' all 
reality. • • • To the soul,indeed, 1s given free ohoioe ••• and the 
gift of free ohoioe is suoh that, making use of it in any way whatever, 
the soul does not disturb any portion of the divine order and law. 
It is conferred by the all vdse and all prevailing Lord of all""oreation. 
But, to see these things as they should be seen is the gift or· a-·· few 
and one becomes fit for the gift only by true religion. For1 true 
religion is that by whioh the soul is united to God so that it binds 
itself again by reconciliation toHilni"ram whom-it had broken off, -as it 
were by sin. Religion, then, in the third aot forms · ~ link with the 
soul and begins to lead it1 in the f'o'llrth, it purifies; in the fifth,. 
reforms; ·in the sixth, it leads into; in the seventh, it feeds. And 
this is done rather quickly, in some oases; in others slowly ---
depending upon the worth or each one 16 lov·e ana merits. • • • 11 38 
E! quantitat~ animas, XXXV- XXXVI, 79-80. 
In this passage Augustine clearly indicates that the seven 
processes are not to be taken in any,scient1f1c sense as a 
formula to follow as a way of salvation, but rather are to be 
seen as the manner in which the soul cooperates with God in 
the nrocess of allowing its salvation to become an actualized 
:a. TransTatTon, MoMahon, in m.oene Fathers. 2.f.• ~·· P• 146-147. 
·' 
or practical reality. It is a situation in which man neither 
saves himself' solely by himself, nor is saved from without 
totally and completely without any cooperation on his part. 
Augustine realizes the need for a harmony between the two ex-
tremes of either God doing everything in salvation or man doing 
everything. In this manner he preserves his basic emnhasis 
that Salvation is to be thought of in terms o.t' Gas's action, 
and yet brings the free will of man into the situation in a 
significant way. He states in the above passa3e that both the 
initiative and providence of God and man's free will apply in 
the situation. 
Two other examnles from his W?'iting illustrate our theory. 
In the Confessions he clearly indicates that the vision occurs 
as the result of an essentially introspective process. Yet, 
he insists that it was not merely an ordinary instance of self-
introspection. He was deliberately lead and directed into the 
process by the initiative of God. He writes: 
"And being thenoe warned to return to myself, I entered into my 
inward self,, Thou leading me on; and I was able to do it,, for 
Thou wert become my helper •••• " Confessionum libri 
tredeo:izn,, VII. x. (16) 39 
In the same book, after describing the hi~ intensity of the 
joy of the contemplative experience he attempts to explain the 
39. Translation, Pilkington,, in Nicene Fathers; op. !.!.!:: 
Vol., l. P• 109. 
psychological routine leading up;to it as followsF 
"• •• thus by degreea, I passed from bodies to th~ soul, which makes 
use of the senses of the body to peroeivei and thence to its inward 
faculty, to the bodily sens es ( which) represe¢ outward things, and 
up to •1hioh reaoh the capabilities of beasts; and thence, again, I 
passed on to the reasoning faculty, unto which whatever is received 
from the senses of the body is referred to be judged, whioh also, 
finding its elf to be variable in me,- raised. its elf up to its'"own · 
intelligenoe1 and from habit drew away my'thoughts, withdrawing itself 
from the oro,·:ds of oontradiotory phantasJnSJ that so it might find out 
that light by which it v1as besprinkled, when without all doubting, it 
cried out , •that the unchangeable was ·to 'De preferred before the 
changeable: t whenoe also it knew that unchangeable , whioh, unless it 
had in some known it could have had no sure ground for preferring it to 
the changeable. And thus, with the flash oi' a trembling glance, it 
arrived at that whioh is. And then I saw Thy invisible understood by 
the things tnat are made (Rom. i. 20). l3ut I was not able to fix my 
gaze thereon; and my infirniity being beaten baok, 1 was thrown again 
on my aooustomed habits. carrying along with me naught but a loving 
memory thereof, and an appetite for what I had. as it were smelt the 
odor of, but was not yet able to es!; • 11 Coni'essionum libri 40 
tredeoim, VII, 16 (23). 
40. Translation, Ibid., p. 111. Augustine also describes this prooess 
in another passage: -
'"V'Tith my external senses, as I could. I viewed the -world, and 
noted that life whioh my body derives from me, and these my senses. Thence 
1 advaned im1ardly into the recesses of my memori;.·--the manifold rooms, 
wondrously full of multi tudionous 't'ieal th; and I considered and was afraid, 
and oould discern none or these things without Thee, and found none oi' then 
to be Thee. Nor was I myself the disoovere~ of these things,•--!, who went 
over them all, and laboured to distinguish and to value everything aooording 
to its dignity, accepting some things upon the report of my senses, and 
questioning about others whioh I felt to be mixed up with myself, distinguish• 
ing and numbering the reporters themselves, and in the vast storehouse or my 
memory investigating some fhings, laying up others, taking out others. 
Neither was I myself when I did this (that is, that ability or mine whereby 
J: did it), nor was it Thou, for Thou art that never-failing light whioh I 
took counsel of as to them all. whether they were what they were, and what 
was their worth.... Nor in all these whioh I review v~hen consul ting Thee,. 
find I a secure plaoe for my soul, save in Thee, into whom my scattered 
members may be gathered together, a:1d nothing of ine depart from Thee. And 
sometimes Thou doest introduce me to a most rare affection, inwardly, to an 
inexplicable sweatilesa, whioh, ii' it should be perfected in me, I know not to 
what point that life might not arrive •••• '' Confessionum libri tredeoim, X 
xl, (65) Translation, Ibid., P• 161. 
- . 
Continuing in the same vein of argument, he reaches a near 
poetic level of language in indicating that the same experience 
is possible to everyone: 
" ••• Ir to any man the tumult of the flesh were silenoed,---silenoed 
the phantasies of earth, waters, and air,•--silenoed, too the poles; 
yea, the very soul to be silenced to herself, and go beyond herself 
by not thinking of herself--·silenoed fancies and imaginary revelation~ 
every tongue, and every sign, and wh'.'.'tso ever exists by passing away •• • 
having only quickened our ears to Him who created them, and He alone 
speaks not by them, but by Himself, that Yle may hear His word, not 
by fleshly tongue, nor angelic voice, nor sound of thunder, nor the 
obscurity of a similtude,, but that vre might hear Him-·-Him whom in 
these we love---without these, like as we two now strained ourselves., 
and with rapid thought touched on the Eternal Y:iisdom which remained 
over all. If this could be sustained, and other visions of a far 
different kind be withdrawn, and this one ravish and absorb, and 
envelope its beholder amid these inward joys so that his life might 
be eternally like that one moment of knov;ledge which we now "'i.~heil 
after, were not this 'Enter thou into the joy of Thy Lord?' 41 . (Matt. xxv. 21) 11 Confessionum libri tredeoim, IX,, x. {26) 
Man must do something in order to hear the voice of God, in 
order to allow the light of revelation to shine unon him. A 
41,. Translation, Ibid., 137. Augustine comments in no re detail oonoern-
ing the nature of the mjstio insight: 
". 0 Al though we see some things with the body, others w.i th the 
mind., the distinction between these t~~ sorts of sight is seen by the mind, 
not the body. The objects which are beheld by the mind have need of no senses 
of the body to let us know thElt they are true, but those perceived through 
the body cannot be included in our knowledge if there is no mind to which 
these incoming messages can be referred. 21.nd it is a fact that those incoming 
messages, which it is said, in some wise, to receive, are left outside, but 
it fonns imagGs of them, th1t is, incorporeal likenesses of physical things, 
whioh it com.~its incorporeally to the memory, so that from there, when it 
has the will or power, it may give judgment on them, after bringing them out 
of oustody and displaying them in the sight of its thought.. And men it 
has its full powers, it also makes a distinotion between these two: what it 
left outside in its corporeal aspect, what it beholds within as a likeness., 
and it discerns that the fonner is not there,, but the latter is. In the same 
· (continued on next page) 
Certain purification and discipline is demanded but such is not 
the sole determining factor in the situation. The greater de-
termination lies outside of what man can do. 
It is the distinctive mystical doctrine of Augustine that 
man is not made moral by his own actions in themselves alone 
but by the permeation of his natural and now depraved order by 
something superior in value and essense to that which he knows, 
and ever may know as his own nature. The love of God in pro-
viding redemption through the Mediator is t:t e ultimate source 
of the mystical experience. By this love the individual is con-
verted from a depraved evil self willed and self-seeking individ-
ual into a person who wills and acts according to the will and 
love of God. 
The conclusion would appear~ peverthelesa, to follow that 
~ 
the soul does work to some extent in order to receive the full 
ble~sing of Salvation. The degree of benefit attained from 
cont. 
v~ay you think of my corporeal faoa •. while I am absent; the imago is. present to 
you,. but the faco whosG image it is absent; the one is body, the other the 
inoorporial likeness of bodyu .. Not all the .Apostles saw Christ. Therefore 
He says: 'So long a time have I been with you, and you have not known me?' 
But he who knew 'what is the breadth and length mid height and depth, and 
the ohority of Christ which surpasseth all kmwledge,' saw both Christ and 
the Father. For ,,-,,e do not now know Christ aooording to the flesh, but 
aooording to the spirit. Fbr •our breath, Christ the Lord_, is taken before 
our .face • and may He in His mercy deign to fill us unto ru.1 the fullness 
, " of God that we may be able to See Him.• Epistolae CXLVII. 31, 38, 52. 
Translation by Sister Wilfred Parsons, in The Work;; of Augustine_, The Letters, 
Vol. III, ~Fathers of~ Church, ~· oit., pP;-~~,206,221. -
Se.lvnli10n appears to vary in ~ccorda.nce with the sort of ·love 
and devotion given to God. In this manner human free will is pre-
served in his own choice of Salvation, the final judgment being 
based upon the individual's resnonse to value, knowledge and love. 
Human works in Salvation become the works of religion rather than 
the works of Salvation or the works of morality. Faith is of 
continual importance in Salvation for it is by the initial re-
sponse of Faith that the soul allows itself to be laid hold of 
in Salvation and it is by the continued response of faith that 
Salvation is allowed to be made continually effective. Faith 
accounts for the growth of the soul through its various nossible 
degrees of development along the way of Sanctification and hence 
leads directly to the occence of the .. ,\;j-.£:.:t,!~ vision.42 
42. "I think you now agree, after considering all these arguments, 
that it is correct to say that •God is not seen in any locality, but in the 
olean heart; He is not sought by bodily eyes, nor limited by our sight, nor 
held by touch, nor heard by his utterance, nor peroeived in His approach.' 
If there is anything of this whioh we do not understand, or about which we 
are •otherwise minded, this also God will reveal to us if, whereunto we are 
OOI!le, we continue in the same. 1 (Phil. 3:15-16) •For we have oome to believe 
that God is not body, but spirit.• (John 4:24); and that 'God is light and in 
him there is no darkness' (I. John 1:5) and 'with him there is no change nor 
shadow of alteniation' (James 1:17); and that ' He inhabiteth light inaooes• 
sible, whom no man hath seen nor can see' (I. Tim. 6:16); and that the Father 
and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, (I. John 5:7,8) without any di• 
varsity or separateness of nature, and the olean of heart will see Him 
(Matt. 5:8); and that 'we shall by like to him, beoaus ewe shall see him as 
he is' (I. John 3:2); and that 'God is charity and he that abideth in charity, 
abideth in God and God in him' (I. John 4:16); and that we ought to 'follow 
Peaoe and holiness, without whioh no man shall see God' (Heb. 12:14); and that 
this corruptible and mortal body of ours--shall be ohanged at the resurrection, 
and shall put on inoorruption and immortality (I. Cor. 15:53), and that 'it is 
· ·' ··.· (Con:t;. ·on next page) 
: ... 
It must also be pointed out that the various .levels of the 
soul do not constitute an exact parallel to a way or ascent in 
the way or Salvation. As has already been mentioned a number 
of times, according to Augustine there is only one Way of Sal-
vation, Christ the Mediator. Life on earth is not to be inter-
preted as a journey on the road to Salvation, for the journey 
of human life on earth is not the same as the entrance into the 
Cont. 
eown a natural body. it shall rise a spiritual body.' (I. Cor. 15:44). when 
the Lord will •reform the body of our lo-vvness' and make it 'Like to the body 
or his glory' (Phil. 3 :21); and that God •made man to his image and likeness .. 
(Gen. 1:26-27); and that we are renewed in the spirit of our mind unto the 
b:lowledgeof God 'according to the image of him that created us.' (Col.3:10) 
Those who walk by, faith (II. Cor. 5:7) according to these and other similar 
authoritative pronouncements of the holy Scriptures who have made spiritual 
progress by an understanding divinely given or strengthened, and who have been 
able to assess the value of' spiritual things, have seen that the' mental sight 
is superior to the bodily e!ght ... and that the objeots of this mental vision 
are not limited by space; they are not separated from each other by intervenli. 
1ng spaoes and their parts are not less than the whole •••• But. in order to 
attain that vision by which we see God as He is,, He has warned us that our 
hearts must be cleansed. As then objects are oalled visible in oUl" fashion 
ot speaking. so God is called invisible (I. Col 1:15; Tim. 1:17) lest He be 
thought to be a material body, yet He will not deprive pure hearts of the 
contanplation of Hes substance,, sinoe this great and sublime reward is promis-
ed on the Lord's own word, to those who worship and love God. At the time 
when He appeared visibly to bodily eyes, He promised that His invisible being 
also would be seen by the clean of heart: 'lie that loveth me shall be loved 
ot my Father. and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him' (John 
14:21) It is oertain that this nature of His. whioh He shares with the Father 
is equally invisible as it is equally incorruptible, (I. Tim. 1:17) whioh, 
as was said above, the Apostle at once set forth as the divine substance, 
oommending it to men vdth what words he could. But, i:f' bodily eyes behold it~ 
in virtue of the changed nature of bodies at the resurrection, let those who 
can assert this look to it: for M'/ part, I am more impressed by the statement 
ot him who attributes this to clean hearts, not to bodily eyes, even at the 
resurreotion. " Epistolao CXLVII, 46, 48. Translation, Ibid. PP• 214-216. 
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4; 
various level of the soul. As Augustine has already stated in 
the previous quotation, all of the various seven stages may occu~ 
within a very short time, almost at the same instance, and do 
Oo¢Ur. before there is any knowledge of Salvation at all. Signif-
icantly, in Augustine they occur when the soul first really ''find.a''~' 
God, in the initial dramatic encounter with the Mediator--- when 
the individual bas his first genuinely 11relig1ous 11 experience. 
43. 11 As to these three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, 
and the composite, although, so lon& as a man's faith is preserved, he may 
choose any of than without detriment to his eternal interest, yet he must 
never overlook the claims of truth e,nd duty. No man has a right to lead suoh 
a life of contemplation as to forget in his own ease the service due to his 
neighbor; nor has any man a right to be so immersed in active life as to nog-
l.:eat .. · the contemplation of God. The charm of leisure must not be indole:r. .. 
vacancy of mind, but the investigation or discovery or truth, that thus e~~ry 
man may make solid attainments without grudging that others do the smne. And, 
in aoti~e life, it is not the honors or power of this life we should covet. 
since all things under the sun are vanity, but we should aim at using our 
position and in:f'luence, if these have been honorably attained, tor the wel-
fare of those who are under us •••• 'Accordingly no one is prohibited t.rom the 
8earoh af'ter truth, for in this leisure may most laudably be spent; but it is 
unseemly to covet the high position requisite for governing the people. even 
though that position be held and that government be administered in a seemly 
manner. Lnd therefore holy leisure is longed for by the love or truth; but it 
is the neoessity or love to undertake requisit-o business. If no one imposes 
this burden upon us, we are free to sift and contemplate truth; but if it be 
laid upon us, we are necessitated for love's sake to undertake it. And yet: 
not even in this case are we obliged wholly to relinquish the sweets of con-
templation; for were these to be withdrawn, the burden might prove more than 
we could bear.... But the aotual possession of the happiness of this life, 
iwithout the b:>pe of what is beyond, is but a false happiness and profound 
misery. For the true blessings of the soul are not now enjoyed; :f'or that is 
no true wisdon which does not direct all its prudent observations, manly 
actions. virtuous self-restraint. and just arrangements. to that end in which 
God shall be all and all in a secure eternity and perfect peace. De Civitat·e 
XIX, 19-20. Translation by Dods. in Nicene Fathers, 2l'_• ~., Vol7""II, p.413. 
As such, Augustine interprets Salvation as something that may and 
should occur in the beginning of human life on earth, something 
designed to serve as an aid in the journey of 11fe---not a.a a re-
ward for the successful completion of the journey. Religion, as 
he understands it , is but a series of beatific visions. It is 
not a search to f:i.i..1d Gcd---to discover what and how he is 1 but 
a relation of more or less continual communion with God---quite 
incompletely so on earth under the limitations of the flesh, but 
44 
completely so in heaven. 
In sunnnary, we have seen that the religious approach of 
Augustine is one of humility and wonder in his apnroach to the 
idea of God, to the existence of things of value in the universe, 
and to the phenomena of life and being in general• Beyond the 
world as we know it he sees God and the phenomena of God is more 
44.· "But the peaoe whioh is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with 
God by faith, and shall hereafter enjoy eternally viith Him by sight. But the 
pea.oe "·1hioh \-~e enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to our ... 
selves, is :bather the solaoe of our misery than the positive enjoyment of 
felioity. Our very righteousness, too, though true in so fnr as it has respeot 
to the true good, is yet in this lii'e of suoh a kind the.t it consists rather 
in the ranission of sins than in the perfeoting of virtues.... In this, then, 
consists the righteousness of a man, that he submit himself to God, his body 
to his soul; and his vioes, even when they rebel, to his reason, vhioh either 
defeats .or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God graoe to do 
his duty, and the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all 
the blessings he receives. But, in th~t final peaoe to whioh all our righteous• 
ness has ref'erenoe, •• it will not be neoesaary that reason should rule vioes 
~hioh no longer exist, but God shall rule the man, and the soul shall rule the 
body, with a sweetness and !'aoility suitable to the f'elioity of a life whioh 
is done with bondage •••• ; and thus the peaoe of this blessedness and the 
blessedness of this peaoe shtXll be the supreme good."~ Civitate Dei, XIX, 27. 
?ranslation by Marcus Dods, Vol. II ot Nunber Four of Hafner Series, p.341. 
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profound to him that the phenomena of the natural world. More 
than he is interested in system, he is interested in the hiJ.n:.an 
heart. When thinking about ultimate values, he tends toward ~~o 
practical, functional, immediate, common-sense meaning ratheI' 
than towards speculation as the theoretical unity of things in 
relation. His as au.ranee comes from the heart rather than from 
the head. 
As such, Augustine has every right to be called a mystic. 
Instead of placing the numinous in the technique or phenomena 
of mystical experience, he places it one step removed in the 
nature and being of the God behind the experience• Once the 
mysterious is incorporated within the nature of God, the tech-
niques and process of mystism become less profound than they 
would otherwise appear. 
What is Augustine suggesting as to the meanine; of mysticism? 
He is suggesting that the main concern in religious life should 
be that of a humble response to the evident goodness of God as 
it now appears naturally and normally to every man, and in a 
special way to certain men. He is suggesting that the fact of 
Salvation should be separated from the joy or degree of Sal-
vation---that the joy of Salvation should be the object of human 
discipline rather than the fact of Salvation. Starting from 
his serious view of the necessary nature of ultimates, he con-
cludes that man is quite incapable of causing his own salvation, 
.. 1~ .. 
that such never could be the case for salvation is a issue muc~ 
broader that the capabilities of man. As such, then, man Jl'.l.era~i.7 
cooperates with God in the Salvation that God has provided·~ ... ,., 
through the gracious action of the Mediator. Salvation belr..g 
essentially that which God has done for man, no tremendous ef·:'ort 
is required to attain it---merely the acceptance of that which 
has been provided---an act of will· Salvation has already occurred 
in the past. It is a thing done, an act accomplished. By his 
act oi will man makes a loving response to the impact of the love 
of God in Christ---action quite capable to every man regardless 
of the depths-of his depravity. 
The joy of Salvation comes, at least, at first---in the 
initial divine encounter-~-in the realization that a way has 
already been provided, that the labor for salvation has already 
been undergone by Christ in the Sacrifice. It continues as the 
same order of love is expanded by the training of the will into 
a greater degree of harmony with the will of God---hence further 
purification and moralization. 
The high peak of joyous union of God is entirely God con-
trolled unmerited by man---entirely a gift of God. It is not a 
payment but a reward, and not so much a reward for righteousness 
as it is a response for love• This high peak is the comm.union 
of man's highest nature, which is still quite meager compared to 
God, with God's nature. It is a communion possible only to men 
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and angels as only angels and human souls are in the image of 
God. 
In the final analysis, the mysticism of Augustine appear~ 
to be entirely a product of revelation. It is something that 
comes to man, not because of what he does or what he deserves~ 
but because God desires to reveal his .Q!a! nature. Nothing of 
the dignity of man is violated by the outreaching and willf'ul 
action of God. To the contrary, that which is highest in man 
recaptures something of the order of the angels, some of the 
elevated order of life on which the soul must have existed be-
fore it entered into its current evil state. As the light of 
God shines on man, man is once again illuminated, so that his 
value becomes more apparent just as man is: not God, but a 
creature of the dust formed so as to incorporate within his 
being values and meanings that image that which is Ultimate 
Value. 
Chapter VI 
Comparisons and Conclusions 
I. Metaphysics 
Although there are no exact parallels between the items of 
' 
the systems of the two men, there does appear to be an undertone 
of the teachings of Plotinus throughout the writings of Augustine. 
As has been indicated their world views differ considerably both 
in the nature of the items within the system and in the way of 
their relation to one another. They do not have the same ideas 
of the nature of God, or of ultimate reality, or of the world, 
or of the origin or life, man, and being. Yet, there is some 
similarity in the,ir doctrines of' being, their meanings of value, 
and their descriptions of the practical life of man on the earth. 
Perhaps the major points of difference in the metanhysics 
of Plotinus and Augustine rest in their difference of opinions 
concerning the nature of ultimate reality and in the difference 
between emanationism and creationism. Augustine's idea of God 
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appears to the writer to be a merger or the Creator-Yahweh of 
the Old Testament with the One of Plotinus. There is a vague 
simularity in his insisto.ice that God is really the meaning anu 
force behind the meaning of reality1 with the Plotinian doctrine 
of the resolution of all being into the One.2 Yet, Augustine 
must make one dramatic difference: God is not just the world and 
the world is not of the same nature aa is God.3 God is assen-
tially different from the nature of the world in his own fun-
damental order of being.4 He is self-existent apart from the 
same order of our physical universe, which is by definition in a 
state of change, deterioration, and general denravity.5 Whereas 
Plotinus defines ultimate value within our own known scheme of 
things and insists that we may see it if we but clear our vision~ 
Augustine insists that it.is located outside of anything that 
may be termed human or ~hysical or matter.7 Plotinus makes God 
and reality one and the same thing. Augustine thinks of reality 
in terms of God but does not see all reality to be of the same 
kind. 
1. See P• 98, 101. 
2. PP• 18-19. ~· PD• 106-108. 
4• P• 107• 5• PP• 97, 151-161. 
b • p'O • 18 I 94 • 7• PP• 107-108. 
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In many respects Augustine's idea of God seems to inoorpo·· 
rate certain ideas and meanings involved in the One,, the Dlvi:".10· .. 
Mind and the World-Soul, yet,, his trinity is not at all ps.re.110:.. 
to the trinity of ·Plotinus.-·-The.tSOn1~incorporates. many:·_mtJm.d:ng:-; 
: . ·.· . 
and conce'Pts found in Pl.otinus' ideo. of the Divine-Mind,, namely,, 
Light, Life, Truth, and in some sense, Being. The Divine-Mind 
is almost identical with the concept of the Logos. , One major 
difference is love. Plotinus never speaks;of the Divine-Mind as 
benevolent or conpassionate. Augustine's doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit's dwelling in the heart of the believers is reminiscent 
of Plotinus' doctrine of the indwelling of the World-Soul within 
the life of the world. Augustine's idea of the Father incorpo-
rates ideas found in all three items of Plotinus' trinity. 
Augustine's God apnears to be more directly involved in and 
concerned with the personal affairs of men. VJbereas the One of 
Plotinus is beyond knowledge, beyond truth, and beyond human 
8 feeling, the God of Augustine is capable;of being felt and 
known in the heart and mind of man.9 Augustine considers God 
to be a mind,lO and there 1a little or no evidence to show that 
he ever thought of him as existing_ as anything beyond the level 
or mind. Augustine also thinks of God as spirit, an idea in-
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corporated within Plotinus 1 idea of the Divine-Mind. Augustine 
seems to enlarge the idea to include something of Plotinus 1 idea 
of pure unity. Augustine teaches that only God (entire trinity) 
is purely spiritual---the only pure spirit.11 This would make 
God as a mind superior to Plotinus' idea of mind. Apparently 
Augustine broadens the concent of God as a mind by developing 
the concept "spirit" into proportion similar to Plotinus' One 
rather than restricting himself to Plotinus 1 idea of mind. 
Plotinus' God is identical with the total reality of the 
natural order,12 Reality exists only as a superficial division 
of the being of God; Everything that is real is God and God is 
everything that is real~ There is a vague mention of this latter 
doctrine in Augustine's insistence that the reality of the world 
is to be associated with God, and in some vague sense considered 
as God,13 but he also asserts a fundamental difference between 
the nature of the world and the nature of God.14 Instead of one 
essence in the universe, there are two basic essences, according 
to Augustine, spirit and matter. God is spirit, and God alone 
is spirit. All else that is, is matter.15 Betweon matter and 
spirit there is an everlasting difference and never are the two 
- 11. P• 124• 
12. P• le footnote 2. l;. P• 96 1 footnote l; P• 98, footnote 3• 14. PP• 100, 117 1 118, footnote 20. 
15• PP• 116-117. 
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the same. Spirit cannot be ex~lained in terms of our material 
or natural order. Plotinus, on the ;other hand, considers our 
natural order to be in actuality of the order of spirit and at• 
tempts to explain the natural order in terms of the spiritual. 
Plotinus makes the natural and the spiritual one and the same 
order. 16 
The differences in the idea of God and ultimate reality 
makes other differences in the metaphysical order. It the world 
is identical with God, and hence eternal, as Plotinus teaches,17 
its beginning does not need to be explained, because of course, 
it would have no beginning. Only the basis for its maintenance, 
or continued existence, would need to be expiained; and this 
18 Plotinus does by his theory of emanations. On the other hand, 
if the essence of the world is fundamentally different from the 
essence of God, the beginning of the second essence must be ac-
counted for. This Augustine does in his theory of creation.19 
There is a certain sense in which both are somewhat similar 
in their doctrines of the maintenance of the world---both teach 
that it is sustained by God, or the ultimate reality in the uni-
verse. Plotinus teaches that the One is the power behind the 
16. PP• lB, 57• 
17• PP• 19• 
18. P• 17. 
19. P• 101 ff. 
being of the lower orders, mind, soul, and matteri20 and 
Augustine suggests that if God were to withdraw his support of 
the world it would collapse into nothingness. 21 Augustine seems 
to see God as continually sustaining the being of the world as a 
world. But the routines _of emanation are quite different from 
the routines of creation. Neither emanation nor creation is 
particularly connected with the question of time. Time makes 
no difference in reference to emanation one way .or the other, 
since the universe is eternal. It does make a difference, in 
the case of the historicity of the world, according to Augustine, 
for time came into being at the time of the coming;into being of 
the world. However, even the creation did not involve time as 
22 1toce1:11n'•~ before time came into being. 
Emanation is primarily a process, an eternal nrocess in-
volving the relation of eternally fixed orders of being.23 
Creation occurrod all at one tim~ 1 ·at one instant.24 Creation is 
more to be cone ei ved of as an event that!. as a process 1 al though 
it is an event that incorporated a process---a process that began 
and ended in the same one day, or seven days, of creation.25 
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If things were created all at one time, no process other than 
creation is needed to explain their realations. Things are as 
they are simply because they were created in their now fundamen-
tally fixed relationso The practical result of emanation and 
creation in .this res~ect :;ap:t:Jears to be nearly the same, the 
issues of the eternality of the universe and the precise nature 
of God's role in accounting for the worldo He is the cause of 
the world in both instances. 
Emanationism and creationism make a difference in the con-
sequent order of the items within the world. According to 
Plotinus, the whole world is ensouled and possessed with a mind, 
and is the One in all its reality. Technically, according to 
Plotinus., the world is a soul, is a mind, and is God.26 He 
suggests that _the world in which we live and move and have our 
being is really a spiritual world, in actuality beautiful, noble, 
and good. He further suggests that we may be able to see the 
true inner value of the world if we but scrape;off its ugly 
crusts in order to be able to see its true value at its center. 
Augustine, on the other hand,,doaa not;b~lieve that the world is 
ensouled except in the loose sense in which God might be con-
sidared aa the soul or directing power of the world. Then, it 
is not the case _of the v.o rld it self being a soul, as is the case 
- 26. P• 43; PP• 18, 22, 32. • 
in Plotinus. Matter and soul nature are never considered iden-
tical in Augustine. Rather, it is the case that souls have their 
own unique form and matter apart from the form and matter of 
bodies.27 Since God made both matter and form both are good, 
according to Augustine not just form only, as in the case ;ot 
Plotinus. Contrary to the thought of Plotinus, bodies are also 
good. All created things have bodies, including angels. Grant-
ing the separation of matter from spirit Augustine still con-
siders matter and bodies to be items of value, but secondary to 
the value of spiritual things. It is not necessary that all 
bodies be souls or have souls associated with them. Further-
more, in the thought of Augustine. all souls are not;of the same 
kind, human souls being different in kind from animal souls, and 
angel souls being different in kind from human souls.28 Life is 
a property of souls, in Plotinus, 29 but it is a quality of deity, 
in Augustine,30 being directly connected with the meaning of 
light. 
Although Plotinus and Augustine aooear;to be rather similar 
in their common sense opionions about the life of man, they vary 
somewhat in their interpretation of human life. Essentially, 
Plotinus makes man a part;of God, a participant in that which 
27. P• 111-112. 
28. p. 112.---
29. P• 37• 
30• PP• 109, 110 1 121~ 160. 
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constitutes the ultimate value of the universe. Augustine finds 
this idea repulsive, but yet admits that man mirrors or images 
the nature of ultimate value and reality, specifically in his 
soul, even in some minor sense in his body, as we11.31 Augustine 
does not consider ma n as distinctively a soul, as does Plotinus, 
but rather considers him a combination of soul and body. Both 
admit that ma n is prominent in his position within the universe, 
poised essentially midway between its extremes of value and dis-
value. Both agree that the soul of man (or man as a soul) is 
immortal, but Augustine also thinks that body is in some sense 
32 immortal. Augustine thinks of death as the separation of the 
soul from the body~3 whereas Plotinus thinks of it as but the 
generation of another individual body. Contrary to the teaching 
ot Plotinus, Augustine teaches that souls desire normally and 
legitimately to be united with bodies.34 
There is some similarity in their teachings concerning 
angels and demons, both granting them as spiritual beings, more 
spiritual than man. Plotinus considers them purely intellectual 
beings, or nossibly minds only, since they are not souls,;5 
whereas Augustine oonsideres them spiritual in the sense of 
31. 
32. 3,. 
34. 
35. 
P• 122. 
P• 127: 
P• 159, 
p i27. 
P• 46. 
P• 158, footnote 21. 
168. 
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hav~ng purer wills and holier actions than men, and regard angels 
as having souls and bod1es36 of their own kind. 
Metaphysically, Plotinus appears to be most concerned about 
ontology and cosmology, whereas Augustine is concerned about 
psychology and theology. Plotinus attempts to give a strictly 
systematic total world view that will account for all our experi-
ence in a strictly rational way. Augustine, on the other hand, 
does not seem to be quite so technically concerned, preferring 
rather to apneal to the nature of psychial life and revelation 
for the grounds;of the formation of his world view. Perhaps, 
Augustine was not;so much rebelling against the metaphysics of 
Plotinus as he was enlarging unon it. We conjecture that he 
would think that Plotinus' system was not adequate in the sense 
that it was designed to sat1gfy the head instead of the heart. 
Starting from the inner life;of man, Augustine would attempt to 
construct a system based unon the greatest and richest meaning 
man can affirm, namely, '!God11 From a God-centered core he would 
reconstruct all other meanings and s~ make all other ideas and 
values relative to the meaning of God. Whereas Plotinus would 
make psychology subordinate to a particularly suggested rational 
ontology and cosmology, Augustine would be willing to forego a 
rational ontology, and cosmology in favor of psychial reality. 
36. PP• 111 ff. ---. 
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It is conceivable that the world view of Plotinus could be 
placed within the world view of Augustine, without a great deal 
of clash being involved, if its center as an end-in-itself is 
transDorted outside of the center core ,of the world to the God 
beyond the created univorse and Creationism is substituted for 
Emanationism. This would amount to the adaptation of the views 
of Plotinus to the world view or Augustine, which could occur 
much more easily than could the contrary. See chart .Q!! ~ nage. 
II. Religion 
It has been noted that Plotinus tends to merge his religion 
with his philosophy in all but the last stages of religion. 
Augustine, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between 
religion and nhilosonhy. The religion of Augustine does not it-
self constitute a system of philosonhy or deal with its own 
first principles. 
-We have also noted that Augustine in his religion emphasizes 
the meaning of God as an oxnerience more than he emphasizes the 
intellectual or rational meanings of God~7 In the case of 
Plotinus, it is difficult to determine what he would consider 
"the God,of experience" to be. Man experiences all three of his 
deities, the World-Soul, the Divine-Mind, and the One, which he 
tells us are really one thing---on& ultimate substance or 
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essence. It is conceivable that Augustine might have taken his 
argument for the one exsence end throe persons ;of God38 from 
Plotipus' idea of the one essence of divine reality. As has been 
indicated, however, no exact parallel may be between the items 
of their two trinities. 
One notable religious difference is the role of God in the 
salvation of the individual. In Augustine, salvation is by 
action of God and in Plotinus it is by action of man, each indi-
vidual man. Plotinus' God is removed from the work of Salvation, 
whereas Augustine's God performs the major ;work of Salvation. 
In Plotinus we find nothing of the "warmth", intimacy and 
benevonence of God eo highly emphasized by Augustine. Typical 
of Plotinus' religious attitude toward deity is his satirical 
remark 11the gods must come to me. not I to them," by which he 
really means to imply that gods do not come to men. However, 
in another sense he is teaching that men do go to God---not to 
the gods, but to the One---by themselves. His way of salvation 
is a teaching concerning the way men may go to the One. In an-
other sense, he would say that God is with us always by the fact 
of the constant immanence of the orders of his trinity in every 
man. Knowledge of the experience of God·--something of what 
Augustine means by the experience of the Holy Snirit--however, 
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is reserved only for the high peak of the final stages of the 
mystic way. For Plotinus it comes only at the time of union with 
the Divine-Mind and union with the One('l39 
The role of free will in religion is essentially the same 
for both Plotinus and Augustine. Both deny indeterminism and 
think of determinism in the sense of self-determinism. However, 
there is one difference in their views. In the case of Augustine 
~he ideal is that the self should be directed from without, by 
the will of God, even though it does have its own power of 
choice. Man's determination then is determined by God's·free 
choice. In the case of Plotinus no choice whatsoever is involv-
ed. Man's plight is rigidly determined by the general nature of 
the universe, by the unvarying princinle of things in their fixed 
orders. Nevertheless, both views are essentially optimistic. 
Plotinus says that man possesses the inherent ability to work for 
his own salvation. Augustine says that man has the power of 
choice to allow God to convert him. 
Sin, according to Plotinus, is the choice of a lower good, 
attachment to body instead of attachment to mind and unity.4° 
Sin, according to Augustine, is also the choice of a lower good 
but it consists in the choice of a great number of lower goods 
instead of a possible higher good. Loosely speaking, it is 
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attachment to the things of the 11flesh11 instead of to bodily 
things that Augustine objects to.41 Here we may see a certain 
intimation of Plotinus' doctirne of the primacy of spiritual 
things as value objects. In Augustine, sin is the choice of the 
less spiritual type of good. Augustine, however, has more to say 
about the nature of sin. He identifies it with the will of man 
more than he identifies it with bodily things. Sin is always an 
abt ot will. Man possesses a depraved or corrupted will that 
must be dealt with before his salvation can become effective. 
The same doctrine is imnlicit in Plotinus in the fact of.his 
emphasis unon man's ordinary attachment for bodily things, but it 
1s not nearly so technical and well developed as it is in the 
thought of Augustine. 
Both Plotinus and Augustine had keen sense of justice and 
believed that there will be adequate reward and punishment. for 
human behavior. Both taught that life as we know it does not 
provide ad~,1uate rewards and punishments for human behavior. 
Both teach a future life ,of the soul in which justice will be 
'i 
mbre completely effected. For Plotinus this is reincarnation, 
dr the determined generation of a new body from the soul---a 
body determined in type and value according to the merits stored 
up in the previous existence.42 For Augustine, this would be a 
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future existence of the soul and body of man in either heaven 
or hell, if in heaven with a new or purified body not subject to 
the depravity of earthly bodies and with a sanctified soul also 
not subject to wrong choices; if in hell, with the same type; 
body and soul even more corrupted and under more ~ositive pains 
than those felt in earthly lifa.43 As has already been indicated, 
Plotinus' idea of life is that it is a quality of souls and 
Augustine's idea is that it is a quality of deity. Augustine 
feels that life varies qualitatively according to the proportion 
to the individual narticipation in the things of the spir1t---
according to his faith and religious behaviour.44 Again, this 
idea is implicit in Plotinus in the very fact that he suggests 
that human life can be imnroved. Plotinus, also, suggests that 
human life grows better as it becomes more like the order of the 
One but he does not see the possibl11ty for as great a change in 
the order of human life on earth as Augustine a~nears to see. 
Both Plotinus and Augustine have doctrines of Salvation. 
Plotinus essentially merges his idea of salvation with hie mean-
ing of mysticism and his meaning of religion. All three are 
separate and distinct in Augustine, yet related. 
Plotinus conceives of salvation as a work of man,45 
. -
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Augustine sees it as significantly the work of GodQ46 Both 
Plotinus and Augustine agree that salvation demands certain worke 
on the part .of man to be made completely effective in his lif9o 
In a sense, this is wha·~ they both mean by rel1B1on: that which 
man can do in effecting his own salvation. Augustine is careful 
to give the credlt for salvation to God; Plotinus gives the 
credit to man. Their difference in opinion as to how the majo~ 
work of salvation is accom~lished is a fundamental difference in 
the religious thou.slit of Plotinus and Augustine. The hero;of 
salvation according to Augustine, is the Mediator.47 Plotinus' 
hero, however, is man, himself--man is his own mediator. The 
answer to man's problem, according to Augustine, is God's grace: 
redeeming and regenerating love made effective to man through the 
life and work of Christ and communicated now in immediate ex-
perience through the power of the Holy Spirit. The answer to 
man's problem, according to Plotinus, is education, or possibly 
philosophy~--ded1oation and self-discipline to a new idea and 
way of life, a way which inoornorates optimistic assertions 
about the meanings and possibilities of human life and puts 
supreme emphasis unon the value of intellectual life and a spe-
cialized religious experienoe.48 Plotinus and Augustine have 
quite similar meanings of the inner nature or salvation, although. 
there is a technical difference in the meanings of their finel 
stages of union. However, there is a fundamental difference in 
their doctrines· of the means of salvation. 
!II. Mysticism 
We have considered the mysticisms of Plotinus and Augustine 
under the headings of their religion but it is well to point ~ut 
that metanhysioal meanings as well are involved in their mean-
ings. Whether or not the religi'on is built upon the metaphysics 
or the metaphysics is built unon the religion varies according 
to the views of the particular philosopher. We suggest that the 
former is t1ue in the case of Plotinus, and the latter, in the 
case of Augustine. 
We have also distinguished between the method of mysticism 
and the meaning ot mysticism. We have indicated that in certain 
instances mysticism has been 1dent1f1ad with the meaning of 
salvation, and in others there have been more technical distinc•. 
tions :made between the two. 
We suggest that the mysticism of Augustine was only in-
directly influenced by the mysticism of Plotinus, being more 
thnn 
significantly determined by his own religious doctr1nes/oy the 
direct influence of the mysticism of Plot1nus. Many of the 
methods of mysticism taught by Plot1nus appear within A~gustine's 
doctrine of Sanctif1cation~9but the meanings of their mysticism 
vary cons1derably.50 We shall now compare the meanings of thiir 
mysticism. 
In the first place, the two theories of mysticism are 
similar in that they regard mystical union as a worthy end in 
1tself .5l The psychological meaning of salvation ia apparently 
the same for both Plotinus and Augustine, namely, a beatific 
vision wherein there is a believed to be direct knowledge of God. 
Augustine sees the beatific vision as the finest experience that 
can hapnen to man on earth, but even so, regards it as only a 
foretelling of the greater degree of joy and satisfaction that is 
to result from the same sort of union in heaven. Plotinua re-
• 
gards the beatific vision as the final and most important ex-
perience possible in the life of man and is more cautious in 
assertions about its possibility in future life. Both regarded 
the experience as a "sniritual" experienoe---52 an experience 
contrary to the ordinary involvement in material affairs. In 
the case of Plotinus, it is a situation of pure spirit becoming 
identical with pure sp1r1t.53 In Augustine's case it is that of 
being acted upon by pure apirit.54 Both describe the experience 
49. PP• aaj i74. 
50. PP• 90, 18la 
51• PP• 86, 178. 
52• PP• 71, 176. 
5;? • P• 90• 
54• DP• 181•182. 
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as a time of joy, rest, a nd peace.55 Both suggest that there is 
pain at the time of the waning of the high peak of intensity of 
the experience.56 It is a time when the soul feels at one with 
God, the world., and all men« Both regard the experience as a 
time when that which was possessed previously, but lost, is re-
gained. In the case of Plotinus, the individual soul itself re-
gains its knowledge of its nrevious state of communion with God 
before it fell into body.57 In the case of Augustine, man has a 
sort .of intuitive awareness or recognition of the blessed state 
of communion with God enjoyed by the first pair in the Garden 
of Eden.58 
Both Augustine and Plotinus argue rationally about their 
mystical theories. The theories themselves are essentially 
rational in the sense that they are consistent within themselves-
--true to their own first principles. The way of ascent in the 
doctrine of Plotinus is rational in every phase but the last, 
when it must be admitted that irrationality occurs. It would be 
difficult to call any nart of Augustine's mysticism 11 irrationaU' 
Both Augustine and Plotinua have developed their mystical theo .. 
ries into nhilosophies of mysticism. They have well related 
their mystical doctrines to their metaphysical and religious 
55. 
56. 
57. 58. 
np • rrc;-179" 
PP• 86, 18b. 
PP• 82-83. 
n• 180• 
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systems---a situation that is rare, indeed, both in the history 
of mysticism and in the history of philoaonhy. Both Augustine 
and Plotinus deal directly with most of the major problems of 
philosophy in reference to their mysticism, and their theories 
are philosophical in the sense that they have not avoided giving 
some answer to normal philosonhical queries. Both Plotinus and 
Augustine were schooled in the meaning of abstract concepts and 
in the terminology of philosophy. Both theories are carefully 
worked out theories, given cautiously, with the intention of 
being taken seriously at face value. 
The difference in the mysticisms of Augustine and Plotinua 
should be quite apparent. In the first place, their mysticisms 
start from different sources. In Plotinus, it starts in the will 
of man, as man decides to try to save himself by entering into 
the process of the way of salvation.59 In Augustine, it starts 
in the will of God, actually in the love of God, when God, real. 
izing that man is a sinner, decides to save him, elects the par-
ticular man to be saved, and suddenly comes to him with the re-
velation of his nature as love.6o 
In the second place, the time of the occurence of the be-
atific vision is different. In Plotinus, it occurs at the end of 
a long and rigorous process involving hours, days, and years, 
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61 ~ossibly as a reward for the effort rendered. Xn Augustine, 
it occurs at the beginning of religion as a gift, anparently 
designed as an e.id in the livlng of life on earth.62 In 'Plotinus 
it is an end-in-itself as it occurs in human life.63 In 
Augustine, it can be an end-in-itself only in heaven.64 In 
Plotinus, it occures rarely. In Augustine, it occurs quite 
frequently, almost constantly among the piouse65 
In the third nlace, the type ;,of the union is not the same. 
In Plotinus, there is the merger of two identical substances.66 
In Augustine no virtual union occurs or can occur due to the 
difference of the nature of the two essences.67 Augustine's 
union appears to be roughly similar to the type ·of union Plotinus 
means in the union of the soul with the Divine-Mind. Yet, even 
this similarity is not strictly accurate, for in the case of the 
union of the soul and the Divine-Mind, in Plotinus 1 the union 
takes nlace, even then by virtue of the soul literally becomming 
mind so as to allow a mind to Mind relationshin. Augustine 
teaches that man is a mind and that God is a mind but the two are 
not the same sort of minds. God as a mind is so sunerior to man 
as a mind that the mental communication between them can occur 
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only meagerly. This 1s one reason for the need for the Incarna" 
tion. It might be conjectured that God differs from man even in 
the esse~ce of his mind if His general essence is to be oonsider-
ed different from man's essence. The tyoe of union cannot be the 
same, for there is not the same type of God with whom the union 
occurs. Augustine's 11 union 11 is minds in one accord~ 68 Plotinus' 
"union" is a merger, a union beyond intellection.69 
In the fourth nlacej there is a difference in the manner 
and meaning of purificaion, Essentiallyj purification in 
Plotinus means 11 flight.u70 In Augustine, it means the negation 
of the lower values. According to Plotinus, the soul is itself 
superior to the nnture of the world about it, superior to all 
bodies and sense life, so that its object in nurification con-
sists of its being connected with and concerned about only itsel~ 
Plotinus writes: 
"Tho purific'1tion of tho Soul is simply to r-.11017 it to be 11lone; it 
is pure r~hcn it keeps no comp'1ny; uhcn it looks to nothing Pithout 
itself; ,·1hon it cntc;rt..,ins no -:lien thou:hts--·bo tho mode or origin 
of such notions or offcctions -.-1h'1t they rnny, ••·-·-,:hon it no longor 
secs in the 1·10rld of im~gc, rnuoh less ol".bor".tcs ime:ges into voritnble 
nffcctions. Is it not r'\ tr~c purii'icii.tion to turn cxmy tot·:::lrds the 
oxr.ot oontr".ry of 0~rthly things?" III. 6. 5. 
In Plotinus, purifica.ti~n is by means of isolation. Granting 
the evilness of matter and the limitation of body, puriflc.ation 
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amounts to a higher degree of instrosnection in which matters cf 
sense are forgotten. Aufa\stine, on the other hand, not being 
convinced that matter as such is evil or that bodies .or sense 
life are evils as such, interprets purification in a positive 
way--•in the rigid use of the body and the senses for the nurpose 
here nad now for which God intended them.71 Conceiving of de-
filement as the prostitution of a value rather than as its 
limitation by the presence of foreign elements, purification 
consists simply in the return to the usage for which a thing 
was intended. 
Related to this difference in the idea of purification is 
another difference: difference in ascetic ideal. From the noint 
of view of Plotinus the employment of the civic virtues was for 
the purpose of the imnrovement of the self---civic virtues were 
but a means of self-purification.72 Civic duty in the mysticism 
of Augustine, on the other hand, results from a love for one's 
fellowmen, not as a means to salvation but as a nroduct of it.7~ 
Plotinus's reason for suggesting a lack of close association with 
other men is due to the bad influence they are likely to exert 
in distracting a person from the process of salvation, iri par-
ticular, away from the next higher phases of introspection. 
Purity in heart for Plotinus means the nurity of the heart---
..,220 ... 
complete singlemindedness of intention.7~ Purity in heart for 
Augustine means goodness in the heart---a holy intention or 
prooer attitudeo75 The struggle for purity results from the 
'76 
effort to recall the true nature of the soul, in Plot1nuso 1 In 
Augustine, it comes as a result of the battle against Satan, 
against the dep:raTJity of the will of man, the alurements of thE=l 
flesh, etc. 77 
A sixth difference in their mysticism is a difference in 
their opinion as to the power by which the soul is able to come 
into union with the divine and sustain itself in union. In 
Plotinus, the soul moves under its own oower. It is its own 
guide and source of energy and inspiration.78 In Augustine,· 
the soul moves along the way of ascent led on by a powe~ not its 
own.79 Salvation comes from without, even within the mystic 
process. Augustine insists that the imnrovement of the soul 
within its various levels is possible only by the extra power of 
80 
religion. In Plotinus, this power is the ~ower of introanec-
tion---the releasing of the remarkable powers latent within the 
mind.81 In Augustine, this power is grace---the grace of God, 
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which takes over in the midst of man's realization of his own 
weakness, and which comes more or less ae a reward for his 
82 humility. Little instrosoection in involved in the mysticism 
of Augustine. 
The seventh, and last difference that should be noted is 
their difference in opinion as to the nature of the self at the 
time of union. Plotinus sees individuation as a vice and sug-
gests that in the final stage the soul loses consciousness of it-
self as an individual existing item.a; There is no suggestion 
at all that this happens in the view of Augustine. As has al• 
reacY been shown, in Augustine's case the soul cannot lose its 
identity by becoming God in all its being, because, of course, 
the soul never really changes in its fundamental order at all: 
1t never becomes ar.i~hing that it was not or ceases being what 1t 
already was. In the case of Augustine we might almost argue 
that the condition of the soul in the union is contrary to that 
which Plotinus suggests, that is, that the soul is made more 
acutely aware of its own individuation. In the beatific vision 
the soul sees itself in its true perspect1ve---1t sees itself a$ 
it really is in relation to God, the world, and other souls. 
Time and time again Augustine asserts that there is a fundamental 
difference between God, man, and the world in essential natures 
82. P• 166. 
8~. P• 871 footnote, middle. 
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and essence, It would appear that this would be one pf the 
facts of insight that the soul would be aware of in its time of 
illumination. The conclusion is at least implicit that the 
exnerienoe of union tends to make the soul not only increasingly 
aware of its own nart:i.cular nature, a nature which oan be aooent-
ed once it is understood, but also increasingly aware of the 
true nature of other individual things---even as individuala,84 
The mysticism of Augustine---indeed, even his mystical 
theory of being--·is closely :related to his concept of 11 11ght11 • 
His high peak of religious ecstasy ia itself a revelation, the 
coming of light into the world and creation itself is by virtue 
of the shining of "the Unchanging Light," to use Augustine's 
own term.85 To sneak of God as light, as ~ugustine does, and to 
think of the origin of the world, truth, wisdon, and goodness, 
in terms of the radiation of a light, as Augustine also does, is 
to identify mysticism and revelation in abstract terms, and in a 
manner strongly reminiscient of the metaphysics (but not the 
mysticism) of Plotinus. It is the concern of Augustine's 
mysticism that God does reveal himself to man, though the coming 
of light in the form of Christ, the Mediator, in whom the light 
of God remained steady. The goal of life is the finding of the 
truth: that which is itself of sunreme value because it is steady 
and redeeming. God as the unchanging source of revelation, as 
the epitome of light itself is the major item of concern in the 
mysticism of Augustine. Ue may assume that Augustine was strong-_ 
ly influenced in his formulation of these abstract notions by 
Plotinus' concent of the unchanging One, the absolute of being, 
value, and meaningL 
The mysticism of Plotinus is the mysticism of naturalism 
and humanism. By its anpeal to values beyond the ordinary and 
material, it seeks to encourage man with the assuracne that the 
world is better off than it apnears to be, that that which 
appears to be meager and lowly is really noble, after all. This 
mysticism teaches the dignity of the· natural .order and locates 
evil not in the nature of the order itself but in man's false 
oninion of it. Salvation, hence, lies in a process of re-
education: purification, self-discipline, and i~trospection un-
til the new oninion is reached in the merger of self-
consciousness with the All. 
The mysticism of Augustine is the mysticism of hun:ility and 
otherworldliness. Granting that the present world ,order is bad, 
it adds that it should not be so, because it was not created badJ 
and suggests the possibility of its redemption. The values to 
which it appeals are not within the world order itself but over 
and beyond it in a realm that does not exist in such a state 0£ 
depravity. Man is really a rather helpless creature, he cannot 
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save himself. If he und hie world order are to be suvej somo-
thing from this other .order must come into his own and arrange 
for its transformation into tho order that it should bo---the 
order that it once was. Even so, man's final salvation is not 
in reference to this natural order but in his existence in an 
order a~nrt from this one---in the journey of his soul to heaven, 
to live everluatingl¥ with God. in direct knowledge and communion 
with his essence, a~art from the limitations of earth. 
---000---
A.pnondices 
I. 
Tho Works of Plotinus 
The works of Plotinus consist of six series each of which contain 
nine essays, hence the name 11 Ennec.d3H (enneud is the Greek word 
for nine). Those es8ayo h~ve been furthar numbered according to 
paragraph. The fifty four essays are titled ns follows: 
I. The Ethical Trcntises 
l. The Animc.te end the i'v1an 
2. On Virtue 
3. Dialectic (or the Unward Way} 4. On Hcppiness (or the Authentic Good of Li£e) 
5. On Hapniness and Extension of Time 
be On Beauty 
7, On the Primal Good ~nd its Secondary Forms 
8. On Evil, its Nature and Source 
9• On "The Reasoned Dism1ssal11 • 
II. Psychic ~nd Physical Treatises, Part One. 
l. On the Kosmos or on tho hcav0nly System 
2. Tho Heavenly Circuit 
,. Are the Stars causes? 
4. Matter 'in its Two Kinds 
5. On Potentiality and Actuality 
6. Quality and Form-Idea 
7. On Comnlete Transfusion 
8. Why Distant Objects anuear Small 
9. Against those that affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and 
the Kosmos itself to be Evil (Against the Gnostics.) 
III. Psychic and Physical Treatises, Part II 
1. Fate 
2. Providence: First ·rreatise 
; • Providence: Sec. ond Treatise 
4. Our Tutelary Snirit 
5. On Love 
6. The Impassivity of the Unembodied 
7. Time and Eternity 
8. Nature Comtemnlation and the One 
9. Detached Considerations 
continued--
IV. Concerning the Nature of the Soul 
l. On the Essence of the Soul (I) 
2. On the Essence of the Sou1 (II) 
,. Problems of the Soul (I} 
4. Problems of the Soul (II} 
5• ,Problems of the Soul (III) 
6. Perception and Memory 
7 • The Immortality of the Soul 
8. The Soul ~·s Descent into Body 
9. Are all Si.,uls one? 
v. The Divine Mind, Being 
1. The Three Initial Hypostases 
2. The Origin and Order of the Beings following on the amt 
;. The Knowing Hy-postases and the Transcendent • 
4. How the Secondaries Rise from The First: and on The Che 
5. That the Intellectual Beings are not Outside the 
Intellectual Principle: And on the Nature of the Good 
6. That the Principle Transcending Being has no Intellect~ 
ual Act. What Being has Intellection primarily and 
what Being has it secondarily 
1.. Is there an Ideal Archetype of ?articular Beings? 
8 On the Intellectual Beauty 
9• The Intellectual-Principle, The Ideas and the Authentic 
Existence 
VI. On ~he One and Good 
l. On the Kinds of Being (I) 
2. On the Kinds of Being (II} 
;. On the Kinds of Being (III) 
4• On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic 
Existent (IJ 5. On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic 
Existent (II) 
6. On Numbers 7. On the Origin of Multiplicity in the Ideal Realm and 
on the Good 
8. On Free-Will and the Will of the One 
9. On the Goo~, or The One 
II 
English Translations of the Works ot Plotinuaf 
MacKenna., Stephen, The Work~ 91. Plotinus. Six voiumes in Two. 
Senerate paginazation. Charles T. Branford Company, 
Bpeton. Translated about 1916 Uses som~ expressions 
archaic to Americans. Type is excellent~ Expression 
is difficult. 
Guthrie~ Kenneth Sylvan, ~lotinus Complete Works~ -Translation 
completed about 1916. Small tYPe• Good exnression. 
Comparative Literature Press$ Grantwood, N. J. 
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III 
The VJorks of Augustine 
There are no complete works of Augustine available in English. 
The most comnrehensive edition now available is the eight volumem 
of his works in the Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, Phillip 
Schaff, edi ti or, o~ ~he fr}._1~ .. I\fi™ ,ithe Nicene ~ 2 ~­
Nicene father~ ~er.·:t.es. s. P. c. K. 1889. 
A new English translation is now in preparation under Roman 
Catholic auspicee~ The series is entitled Fathers of the 
Church and is by Cima Publishing House. A.bout four-VoIU'ilies on 
Augustine have now been released. 
The three major la.tin ed1C:1ons of the VJorks of Augustine a.re: 
Sancti Aureli!.~@lstini, Oper~ Edited by the Benedictines 
of St. Maur. ll vols. Paris, 1679-1700. 
Patrologia Latina, J. P. Migne. Opera ~ia Sanoti Aurel11 
Augustin!, vol. XXXII•XLVII, Paris, 1877. 
Cornus scrintormn ecclesiastioorum latinorum. Vienna-Leipzig 
F. Tempiky & G. Freytag. 1887. 
IV 
Major Writings of Augustine 
De Civitate Del - The City of God 
De Trinitate--: Concerning the Trinity 
COnfessionum libri tredecim - The Confessions 
Enchridion ·--fii"0'Handbo~ 
Enistulae - The Letters 
Sermones - Sermons 
Rectractationum libri duo Retractiones 
Ennarationes in PsalmoS--- Exposition of Psalms . 
Contra ~caCiemICos-Y-fbri ~ - Against the Academecians 
De Doctrina Ch:'istiana, iv 11br1 - Christian Doctrine De Genesi ad·litterarillibri duodeoim - Genesis word for word De Genesi ad litteram, liber imnerfeotus - 11 Imnerfect 
C'Ontnit:PeiagI'um - The Anti-Pelagian Writings 
De Musica " Concerning Music 
SQ'if1QgU1'orum , libri 11 - The Soliloquies 
In Joannis Evangelium tractatus " The Gospel of John 
De Quantrt'ate Animae ·-·The Magnitude of the Soul 
De immortalitate animae • Concerning the immortality of Soul 
-
eto. 
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